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ABSTRACT
Four Empirical Essays in Development Economics
by
KAHSAY Haftom Bayray
Doctor of Philosophy

This dissertation contains four empirical studies on related topics in
development economics. The four studies are all randomized field experiments and
all of them use original data obtained from rural households in Northern Ethiopia for
empirical analysis. The first study examines the medium term effects of commercial
weather index insurance. I examine a randomized controlled trial in which
commercial weather index insurance was offered to rural households who are highly
vulnerable to drought. The results show that weather index insurance can
significantly improve agricultural investments, agricultural yield and also household
finance.
The second study evaluates the effects of weather index insurance on rural
households' spending on children's education. I examine whether insured households
can better pay for their children's education expenses due to better risk management.
I also examine whether insured households can maintain their children's education
expenses when they experienced rainfall shocks. The results of these two questions
are both positive.
The third study examines the level of risk aversion of individuals and of
groups. Specifically, I examine whether risk preference among poor people with low
level of education can be framed by interactions among peers. The results of a
randomized field experiment show that groups not only are more risk averse than
individuals but also that the risk preference of individuals can be largely affected by
prior interactions in groups.
The final study examines how individuals provide responses to survey
questions of sensitive nature. I conducted a randomized field experiment to examine
whether survey design methods and survey incentives affect how individuals provide
responses to sensitive questions. The results show that individuals who receive high
survey incentives will more likely provide positive responses to questions that are
moderately sensitive in nature (but not highly sensitive). I find no evidence that the
way survey questions are being asked affects the way individuals respond to sensitive
questions
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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction

This dissertation contains four empirical studies on related topics in
development economics. The four studies are all randomized field experiments and
all of them use original data obtained from rural households in Northern Ethiopia for
empirical analysis.
In the first study The Medium Term Impacts of Commercial Weather Index
Insurance: Evidence from Rural Households in Northern Ethiopia, we analyze an
impact evaluation of a weather index insurance program that is offered commercially
among rural households in northern Ethiopia. There are four main reasons why it is
important to conduct an impact evaluation study of a commercially offered weather
index insurance program.
The first reason is that, there is a growing literature on empirically evaluating
the impact of weather index insurance participation among rural households in
low-income countries (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and Viceisza, 2010; Dercon and
Christaensen, 2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014).
However, there are still two important sets of knowledge gaps about the impact. First,
not much is actually known about the impact of weather index insurance when the
insurance is commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. This
is because most of the existing studies evaluate the impact of weather index
insurance programs that are heavily subsidized (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and
Angelino, 2010; Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014). Although large subsidies on
insurance premium can often encourage a high rate of insurance participation in
conducting impact evaluation, subsidized insurance programs are generally not
1

financially sustainable and may not give us reliable estimates on the impact of the
insurance when the insurance is instead offered commercially. Specifically, when
rural households have to decide whether to obtain the insurance by their own means,
the insurance participation rate may be lower and the average impact of weather
index insurance programs may be different.
Second, not much is known about the medium-term cumulative impact of
weather index insurance when the insurance is offered commercially to rural
households for a number of consecutive years. There are two specific reasons for
why the evaluation of the medium-term impact of weather index insurance is
important. The first reason is that in many regions, large rainfall shocks that can
substantially affect agricultural production do not take place every year (or even
every two years). Therefore, it is not possible to assess the full and the cumulative
impact of the weather index insurance (i.e., impacts across good and bad agricultural
seasons in multiple years) if the impact evaluation is conducted only over a relatively
short period of time. However, except for a few ones (e.g., Karlan et al., 2014), most
of the existing studies only evaluate the impact of weather index insurance over one
or two years (Gine and Yang, 2009; Hill and Angelino, 2010; Madajewicz et al.,
2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Cai et al., 2014).
The second reason for why the evaluation of the medium-term cumulative
impact is important is that rural households may need a while before they can fully
understand the design and features of weather index insurance and to complete all of
the desired changes in their agricultural production. Rural households in many
low-income countries typically have a low level of financial literacy (Gaurav et al.,
2011; Cole et al., 2012) and may find it not easy to easily understand the design and
features of weather index insurance products (Cole et al., 2012; Gine et al., 2013).
2

Although interactive exercises and experimental games are sometimes used to
educate rural households (Norton et al., 2014), rural households can possibly learn
the most about weather index insurance products through their own experiences of
having the insurance products for a longer period of time. Therefore, empirical
studies that last for only one or two years may not capture all of the behavioral
changes of insured households and also the full impact of the insurance.
This study makes two main contributions to the existing empirical research
on the impacts of weather index insurance. The first contribution of this study is to
investigate the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. Second, our
study provides empirical evidence on the impact of weather index insurance when
the insurance is offered commercially to rural households for a number of
consecutive years (relatively longer period). To examine the medium-term impact of
weather index insurance, we conduct a randomized controlled trial that has been
conducted as a part of the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA)
project in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia since 2010.
The second study Rainfall Shocks and the Effects of Weather Index Insurance
on Household Education Expenses: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia evaluates the
effects of weather index insurance on rural households' spending on children's
education. Specifically, this essay examines whether insured households can better
pay for their children's education expenses due to better risk management. It also
reports whether insured households can maintain their children's education expenses
when they experienced rainfall shocks.
In developing countries, children of farming households that practice
smallholder rain-fed agriculture are vulnerable to rainfall shocks (Jacoby & Skoufias,
3

1997; Jensen, 2000; Janzen and Carter, 2013). Households practicing smallholder
rain-fed agriculture are usually poor and have few means to mitigate adverse impacts
of rainfall shocks (Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Dercon et al., 2005).When there are
large rainfall shocks, many of these households faces a significant drop in
agricultural income and are mostly forced to reduce investments on children’s
education (Jensen, 2000; Ferreira and Schady, 2008; Dung, 2013). Some households
may even pull their children from school and send their children to work for
additional income (Jensen, 2000; Dung, 2013). Furthermore, as formal credit and
insurance are usually not available in rural areas, rural households that face large
rainfall shocks typically fail to take loans to maintain their children’s education
(Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Jensen, 2000; Giesbert and Schindler, 2012; Dung,
2013).
In principle, it is possible that weather index insurance participation helps
rural households invest in their children’s education. Specifically, if weather index
insurance can help rural households better manage rainfall risks a priori and can help
rural households increase the level of agricultural investment and hence also their
agricultural yield and income (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill & Angelino, 2010; Cole et
al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), rural households may have more financial resources to
meet with the investment needs of their children’s education. Furthermore, when
facing large rainfall shocks, insured households may also receive monetary
compensation from the insurance policy and this compensation may help them
overcome cash constraints that usually take place after rainfall shocks. Rural
households with such compensation are therefore less likely to cut investment in
their children’s education after rainfall shocks.

4

Given that weather index insurance participation may have the potential to
promote children’s education investments among rural households, it is surprising
that to our knowledge, there is little research evaluating the effects of weather index
insurance on the education expenses of rural households (Chen & Jin, 2012; Janzen
& Carter, 2013; Landmann & Frolich, 2013). While there are a few empirical studies
evaluating the linkage between insurance participation and various educational
outcomes, these studies often focused on school dropouts (Shah & Steinberg, 2015),
school enrollment and school attendance (Janzen & Carter, 2013), school enrollment
(Chen & Jin, 2012), and school attendance (Landmann & Frolich; 2013).
This study, therefore, examines the effects of weather index insurance on the
education expenditure of rural household. Specifically, our study evaluates whether
households that purchased weather index insurance policies spend more on the
education expenses of their children. We also examine whether the effects of the
insurance on household education expenses are large enough to cover the adverse
effects of rainfall shocks on household education expenses.
The third essay Aggregating and Disaggregating Risk Preference: Evidence
from a Framing Experiment among Ethiopian Farmers presents the results of a
randomized field experiment conducted with a large number of rural farmers
randomly selected from Northern Ethiopia. The essay examines whether risk
preference among poor people with low level of education can be framed by
interactions among peers.
Economists have long been investigating the risk preference of individuals
and also the aggregation of risk preference of individuals in small groups. The
literature generally finds that groups are more averse to risks and uncertainties than
individuals. In some of the literature, groups are also shown to be more risk averse
5

than individuals are in more risky situations and are less risk averse than individuals
in less risky situations (Shupp & Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al.,
2009; Sutter et al., 2012).
Despite the large body of theoretical and empirical literature, the existing
literature on the aggregation of individual risk preference, however, contains a few
gaps. First, the literature fails to distinguish and compare two different types of
research designs that examine the aggregation of individual risk preference. Mainly,
in the literature there are two-arm one-stage research studies that compare the risk
preference of a sample of individuals side-by-side with the aggregate risk preference
of groups that are formed by a different sample of individuals (Kocher & Sutter,
2005; Masclet et al., 2009); there also are one-arm two-stage research studies that
compare the risk preference of individuals with the aggregate risk preference of
groups that are sequentially formed by the same sample of individuals (Bateman &
Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2012; Amnrus et al.,
2015).1 While both types of research design show that small groups are more risk
averse than individuals, to our knowledge, no literature has examined whether or not
the results obtained from these two sets of research designs are qualitatively the same.
In particular, except for a few ones (e.g., Shupp & Williams 2008) most of the
literature has not pointed out, whether prior structural manifestation of individual
risk preference has any effects on the aggregation of individual risk preferences in
small groups.
Second, the existing literature almost totally neglects the disaggregation of
group risk preference back to individual risk preference (Baker et al., 2008). The

1

Baker et al., 2008 exceptionally examine a one-arm three-stage research
(individual-group-individual) and further investigate how participations in a group discussion (second
stage) affect individual risk preference in the third stage (phase).

6

disaggregation of group risk preference has also important economic implications,
however. Many decisions made collectively by small groups under risks and
uncertainties have to be further managed by or executed by only individuals of the
groups. As the literature has shown that individuals are typically less risk averse than
groups, it is important to study whether individuals who participated in group
decisions on risk and uncertainty tend to be more risk averse as compared to those
who do not. In particular, whether individuals who experienced risk preference
decisions in small groups will bring forward the aggregate risk preference of the
group or will actually revert back to their individual level of risk preference. The
literature, however, is basically silent on this aspect.
Third, most empirical research on the aggregation of individual risk
preference are conducted in experimental settings and computer labs using only
convenience samples of university students (Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Shupp &
Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; He et al., 2011) or self-selected groups of
individuals such as married couples (Bateman & Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009;
Sutter et al., 2012). In the first case, however, there raises questions about whether
the findings obtained from university students can offer practical values for real
world situations and decisions faced by individuals and groups of different
background (Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton, 2015). In the second case, there
also are concerns about how decisions made by such endogenously formed groups
can be generalized.
Fourth, because of research budgetary limitations the experimental scale in
the existing studies is mostly either small scale as in the case of (Bateman & Munro
2005; Shupp & Williams 2008; Parkinson & Baddeley, 2011) or moderate scale
(Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton,
7

2015). By contrast, this research is conducted in Ethiopia with poor rural farmers and
the lower per capita income in Ethiopia allow us to conduct a large scale field
experiment by providing small cash amount ($3 per participant) as an incentive for
participation in the experiment.
This research is designed to address these several limitations of the existing
literature and has three main goals. First, we aim to compare the two different
aggregation methods of individual risk preference in small groups and evaluate
whether the mechanisms on individual risk preference aggregation can have
differential effects on the elicited group risk preference. Second, we want to
investigate whether the experience of risk preference in small groups and knowledge
of risk preference exercise in a small group have any effects on individual risk
preference. Third, we want to conduct a risk preference study using a more
methodological sampling procedure to obtain a study sample that has both a higher
degree of external validity and also a better representation of real communities that
regularly faces risks and uncertainties.
In the final essay Eliciting Responses to Sensitive Questions in the Field: A
Randomized Experiment, we present the results of a randomized field experiment
conducted with a large number of rural households randomly selected from Northern
Ethiopia. The essay analyzes the effects of financial incentive, and the framing of
survey questions on the responses to survey questions of sensitive nature.
Researchers in the social sciences often conduct research with survey data on
topics that are considerably sensitive in nature. A large body of empirical work has
been done on topics related to abortion (Schuman et al., 1981; Peytchev, et al., 2010),
drugs (Timothy et al., 1989; Aquilino & Sciuto, 1990; Turner, et al., 1998), sexual
behaviors (Turner, et al., 1998), child labors (Dumas, 2007), and domestic violence
8

(Koenig, et al., 2006; Rabel et al., 2014). One major difficulty that researchers face
in examining the empirical patterns of these sensitive topics is about the availability
and the reliability of data. In order to conduct an empirical study of these topics, data
need to be collected from the field. However, as already shown in the existing
literature, many people are not willing to take part in field surveys and to response to
such questions. And even if people agree to participate in field survey, they may not
necessarily tell the truth. First, some survey questions may be intrusive, socially
undesirable or sometimes respondent perceives some level of threat of disclosure
(Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). Second, respondents may not critically read the
questions and rush their answer due to lack of motivation, cooperation or sense of
obligation (Jobber & Saundrens, 1988).
The existing literature on sensitive questions has largely been focusing on
examining ways to reduce survey nonresponse per se. A large body of literature has
shown that both monetary and non-monetary incentives can increase survey response
rates. 2 Yet, despite the growing literature on the use of incentives to improve
response rates and response quality in broad ranges of survey modes, there are still
some fundamental unanswered questions.
Although field surveys are one of the major methods of how researchers
collect data from the field, only a few empirical studies have been designed to
examine whether and how researchers can better obtain information about sensitive
questions from respondents (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith,
1996; Jobe et al., 1996). While there are some empirical studies on mechanisms that

2

Among the other literature, including (Goetz et al., 1984; Joseph & Peter, 1986; Jobber & Saunders,
1988; Singer et al, 1999; Leung et al., 2004; Ryu et al., 2005; Baron et al., 2008; Wetzels et al., 2008;
Petrolia & Bhattacharjee, 2009) examined effects of monetary incentives. (Willimack et al, 1995;
Kalantar & Talley, 1999; Singer et al, 1999; Leung et al., 2002; Ryu et al., 2005; Haris et al., 2008)
analyzed the effect of non-monetary incentives.
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improve responses to sensitive questions, these studies mainly compare the
disclosure level of sensitive questions (response to sensitive questions) among survey
modes (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Jobe et al.,
1996; Brakel et al., 2008), and only a few studies evaluate the impact of promised
incentive on responses to sensitive questions (Brakel et al., 2008). This essay,
therefore, contributes to the growing literature by examining the effects of financial
incentive, and the framing of survey questions on the responses to survey questions
of sensitive nature.

10
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CHAPTER 2
The Medium Term Impacts of Commercial Weather Index Insurance: Evidence
from Rural Households in Northern Ethiopia

2.1 Introduction
Rain-fed agriculture plays a central role in the economy of many low-income
countries where a large majority of the population lives in the rural area and most of
the rural population conduct their farming activities with no or limited access to
irrigation water (World Bank, 2010). In Ethiopia, for example, over 80 percent of the
population earns their living in the agricultural sector and almost all of the rural
population depends primarily on rain-fed agriculture (World Bank, 2012).
While large variations in rainfall patterns are often reported to substantially
affect agricultural production in many low-income countries, rural households in
these countries typically have few means to adequately manage rainfall risks or to
effectively mitigate adverse impacts that are caused by large rainfall shocks (Udry,
1994; Dercon et al., 2005). First, rural households in low-income countries are
generally poor and many of them have a low level of income and savings for
consumption smoothing over agricultural seasons (Janzen and Carter, 2013). Second,
formal credit and insurance products typically are not available in the rural area and
it can be both physically and financially costly for rural households to obtain them in
nearby cities or major towns (Morduch, 1995; Udry, 1994; Giesbert and Schindler,
2012).3 Third, even though rural households may sometimes help each other through
informal risk-sharing network at the community level, these risk-sharing
arrangements typically fail to offer rural household protection from rainfall shocks
3

In Ethiopia, for example, less than one percent of the rural households have agricultural insurance
coverage (World Bank, 2010).
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because rainfall shocks are, in most of the times, systematic at the community level
(Dercon & Kirchberger, 2008; Cole et al., 2012).
In the past few years, insurance companies are making innovations in the
design of agricultural insurance in order to overcome major technical, economic, and
behavioral barriers and to make agricultural insurance products, both less costly and
also more suitable for large-scale commercialization (IFAD and WFP, 2010; Zant,
2008; Dercon et al., 2014). Specifically, insurance companies are making use of
reliable weather information (those that are available from official weather stations
and/or those that are available from weather satellites) to develop a new type of
agricultural insurance products for rural households called weather index agricultural
insurance (henceforth, weather index insurance). Unlike traditional agricultural
insurance, which provides protection directly on crop yield and/or crop revenue,
weather index insurance is designed in a way that links the level of premium, the
liability of the policy, the conditions for payouts, and the amount of compensations
to an objective and well-designed weather index.
With these innovations in the product design, weather index insurance may
have improved features and cost advantages over traditional agricultural insurance
and may encourage a higher rate of participation in agricultural insurance among
rural households in low-income countries (Yoong et al., 2013). First, the marginal
cost of offering weather index insurance can be substantially reduced. Specifically,
weather index insurance does not require monitoring of the agricultural inputs ex
ante or assessment of agricultural damages ex post at the household level or the farm
level. Second, the design of weather index insurance would not induce moral hazard
behaviors among insured households. Specifically, the conditions for and the amount
of payout compensations depends only on an objective weather index and insured
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households cannot strategically manipulate their crop protection efforts in order to
increase the likelihood or the amount of payout compensations. Third, with possibly
a lower level of insurance premium (in part due to the two reasons discussed right
above), weather index insurance may be able to encourage a higher level of
participation among rural households (including those who are relatively less
risk-averse and those who have a smaller scale of agricultural production) and may
be able to lessen the problem of adverse selection that typically exists in any
insurance market.
While there is a growing literature on empirically evaluating the impact of
weather index insurance participation among rural households in low-income
countries (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and Viceisza, 2010; Dercon and Christaensen,
2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), there are still
two important sets of knowledge gaps about its impacts.4 First, not much is actually
known about the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. This is because
most of the existing studies evaluate the impact of weather index insurance programs
that are heavily subsidized (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill and Angelino, 2010; Karlan et
al., 2014; Cole et al., 2013). Although large subsidies on insurance premium can
often encourage a high rate of insurance participation in conducting impact
evaluation, subsidized insurance programs are generally not financially sustainable
and may not give us reliable estimates on the impact of the insurance when the
4

It has been reported that the provision of weather index insurance, for example, can increase
risk-taking in the form of the adoption of modern inputs (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014).
Agricultural insurance helps farmers to redirect their farming activities towards relatively risky but
high return activities. In addition, the provision of agricultural insurance has also been shown to
improve specialization. Insured households switch from diversified cropping patterns towards
specialization in few but profitable farming activities (Gine et al., 2005). Furthermore, there are
evidences that agricultural insurance may increase risk copping ability. Since part of the weather
shocks are shielded by the insurance company, insured households will be able to smooth their
consumption in the incidents of drought (Gine et al., 2005; Dercon and Kirchberger, 2008).
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insurance is instead offered commercially. Specifically, when rural households have
to decide whether to obtain the insurance by their own means, the insurance
participation rate may be lower and the average impact of weather index insurance
programs (both among all households being offered the insurance and among only
households being insured) may be different.
Second, not much is known about the medium-term cumulative impact of
weather index insurance when the insurance is offered commercially to rural
households for a number of consecutive years. There are two specific reasons for
why the evaluation of the medium-term impact of weather index insurance is
important. The first reason is that in many regions, large rainfall shocks that can
substantially affect agricultural production do not take place every year (or even
every two years). Therefore, it is not possible to assess the full and the cumulative
impact of the weather index insurance (i.e., impacts across good and bad agricultural
seasons in multiple years) if the impact evaluation is conducted only over a relatively
short period of time. However, except for a few ones (e.g., Karlan et al., 2014), most
of the existing studies only evaluate the impact of weather index insurance over one
or two years (Gine and Yang, 2009; Hill and Angelino, 2010; Madajewicz et al.,
2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Cai et al., 2014).
The second reason for why the evaluation of the medium-term cumulative
impact is important is that rural households may need a while before they can fully
understand the design and features of weather index insurance and to complete all of
the desired changes in their agricultural production. Rural households in many
low-income countries typically have a low level of financial literacy (Gaurav et al.,
2011; Cole et al., 2012) and may find it not easy to understand the design and
features of weather index insurance products (Cole et al., 2012; Gine et al., 2013).
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Although interactive exercises and experimental games are sometimes used to
educate rural households (Norton et al., 2014), rural households can possibly learn
the most about weather index insurance products through their own experiences of
having the insurance products for a longer period of time. Therefore, empirical
studies that last for only one or two years may not capture all of the behavioral
changes of insured households and also the full impact of the insurance.
In this study, we have two overall goals. The first goal is to conduct an
impact evaluation of a weather index insurance program that is offered commercially
among rural households in Ethiopia who rely primarily on rain-fed agriculture. The
second goal builds on the first one. The second goal is to evaluate the medium-term
cumulative impact of the weather index insurance program.
In order to achieve these two goals, we examine a randomized controlled trial
that has been conducted as a part of the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation
(HARITA) project in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia since 2010. Specifically,
we evaluate the impact of commercial weather index insurance offered at the village
level. In the RCT, five rural villages were randomly selected from three
representative drought-prone districts in Tigray for receiving the weather index
insurance program for four consecutive years (from 2010 to 2013). Three other
villages, one from each of the three districts, were also randomly selected as
untreated, control villages for comparison. We have detailed survey data of about
400 rural households in the eight sample villages (baseline data collected by
HARITA researchers in 2010 and endline data collected by us in 2014). The data
obtained from the two waves of the survey allow us to construct a panel dataset for
the evaluation of the medium-term cumulative impact of commercial weather index
insurance over a period of three years.
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Our study has a few limitations, however. First, the scale of the RCT in the
HARITA project for conducting impact evaluation is only moderate. Although the
HARITA project was later expanded to offer commercial weather index insurance to
over 80 rural villages in the Tigray region, due to initial budget and resource
constraints, baseline data at the household level was only available for 400
households that are located in eight rural villages. With a moderate scale of the RCT,
our treatment and control sample are not perfectly balanced. As such, in our
estimations, we control for a number of household and village characteristics in order
to obtain reliable causal impact estimates of weather index insurance.
Second, since no subsidy was provided to rural households for insurance
participation, insurance participation among rural households who are offered the
commercial weather index insurance program is fully voluntary. As such, the
insurance participation rates in the five insurance offering villages are only moderate
(averaged at 21.5 percent among the five villages).5 There are two steps that are
attempted to obtain reliable causal impact estimates of weather index insurance. First,
in order to obtain sufficient data of households who purchased weather index
insurance, in the five offering villages, the HARITA project oversampled rural
households who choose to participate in weather index insurance. Second, apart from
obtaining an intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the average impact of the weather
index insurance program in the insurance offering villages (as versus the control
villages), we also make use of the experimental design of our study to conduct a set

5

Commercial sales in the five villages in 2010 were 1,306 (Norton et al., 2014). Population in the
five villages was 36,301 (DRMFSS, 2007). Besides, the five villages on average have a household
size about 6 to a household (DRMFSS, 2007). Then, we compute the average weather index insurance
participation rate by dividing the commercial sales in the five villages by the average number of
households in the five villages.
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of instrumental variable estimations and obtain treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)
estimate of program impact.
Third, our study focuses on the impact of commercial weather index
insurance on selected outcomes that are most likely to be immediately affected.
Specifically, we will only evaluate the impact of commercial weather index
insurance on agricultural expenditure, agricultural yields, and also household finance
only. We do not evaluate other potential welfare impact of the weather index
insurance program (such as consumption, health, and education). Demand and
take-up for weather index insurance are not also the main focuses of this study.6 We
leave these sets of analysis to other future studies.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our research venue
and our research methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the
medium-term impacts of commercial weather index insurance. Section 4 discusses
the results and concludes.

6

However, the determinants of weather index insurance participation have been considered for the
purpose of instrumental variable (IV) estimations.
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2.2 Research Venue and Methodology

2.2.1 Research venue
The HARITA project is conducted in the Tigray region in the Northern part
of Ethiopia. The Tigray region is predominately rural and about 80 percent of its 4.3
million population lives in the rural area (CSA, 2007). The region is in severe
poverty and the per capita income is reported to be only 232 USD (Bureau of Plan
and Finance, 2010). Cultivable land is scarce in the region as the region is
predominated by the complex terrains, degraded and arid lands (Ersado et al., 2004;
Headey et al., 2014). In the rural part of Tigray, the average size of household is 4.6
(CSA, 2007) and the average land holding of household is only about one hectare
(Headey et al., 2014). Most of the rural households practice small-scale rain-fed
agriculture with a limited amount of technology inputs (Ersado et al., 2004). The
region usually rains in the period from June to September and is dry in most of the
other months (Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector, 2007). The
region has a lower level of annual rainfall (typically at between 400 and 800
millimeters per year) and there were several droughts that substantially affected
agricultural production in the region in the past few decades (Kumasi and
Asenso-Okyere, 2011).
The HARITA project is a large-scale development program that is conducted
in collaboration between private and public organizations both within and outside of
Ethiopia (including Oxfam America, the International Research Institute for Climate
and Society of Columbia University, Mekelle University, Nyala Insurance Share
Company in Ethiopia and the Relief Society of Tigray). The project aims to
strengthen the livelihood of rural households in the drought-prone area in the Tigray
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region through promoting better risk management among rural households and
weather index insurance is the key component of the project (Oxfam America, 2010).
After some initial pilots, in 2010 the project offered commercial weather index
insurance to all rural households in five rural villages in the region. In these five
villages, a total of 1,306 rural households voluntarily purchased weather index
insurance.7

2.2.2 Sampling Methods
The sampling of the HARITA project is composed of three major steps. In
the first step, based on the availability of weather stations, the historical patterns of
drought occurrences, and also the vulnerability of agriculture production on droughts,
three districts (or Weredas) from different parts of the Tigray region were selected to
be the sample districts of the HARITA project. Specifically, Kolla Temben in the
Central Tigray, Raya Azebo in the Southern Tigray and Saesie Tsaedaemba in the
Eastern Tigray were selected to be the three study districts.8
The second stage of the sampling involves selecting a number of different
village communities (or Tabyas) from the three study districts. Due to budgetary
constraint in the early stage, the HARITA project could only conduct a baseline
study with a total of eight different village communities in 2010. Specifically, the
7

The HARITA project has later been expanded to offer weather index insurance in more rural
villages in the Tigray region. Specifically, in 2014, weather index insurance was offered in 81 rural
villages in the region and a total of 23,000 rural households have purchased weather index insurance
(Oxfam America & WFP, 2014). The total sum insured amount has increased to nearly 2.5 million in
2014. In the last five years, insurance companies collected on average a premium rate of 21.3 percent
of the total insured amount.
8
The three districts locate in three different agro-climatic zones of the region and can broadly
represent the selected region. Kolla Temben has a mono-modal rainfall pattern. It has a dry low land
agro-ecology with rugged and high mountains that dominate the topography. It also has average
latitude of 1,691 meters and has a mean slope of 7.6 percent. Raya Azebo has a bi-modal rainfall
pattern. It has a lowland agro-ecology, a plain topography, an average altitude of 1683 meters, and a
mean slope of 5.04 percent. Saesi Tsaedaemab has a mono-modal rainfall pattern. It is in a
mountainous zone (with low, middle and high lands) and has an average altitude of 2,433 meters and a
mean slope of 8.6 percent.
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researchers of the HARITA project randomly chose one village community in each
of the three districts as control villages that are not offered any intervention on
weather index insurance. The research team also randomly selected a total of five
village communities from the three study districts for receiving the weather index
insurance intervention. In doing this step, there were three sample villages selected
each in the district of Kolla Temben and the district of Raya Azebo. There were two
sample villages selected in the district of Saesie Tsaedaemba.
The last stage of the sampling was to select sample rural households from
each of the eight sample villages. In the three control villages, the evaluation team
proportionally and randomly selected 2.9 percent of all households in the three
villages. Accordingly, the evaluation team respectively randomly selected 48, 26 and
24 households for control purpose from the village of Agazi, Menj and Werebaye
(Madajewicz et al,. 2011). That is, a total of 98 rural households were randomly
selected from the three control villages. In the five offering villages, however, the
selection of rural households involves further details. Since the HARITA project
provided no subsidy to rural households for the participation of the weather index
insurance, in the offering villages there were rural households who purchased
weather index insurance and also households who chose not to purchase weather
index insurance. In order to obtain a good representation of these two types of rural
households in our study sample, the HARITA researchers conducted a stratified
sampling method in selecting rural households from the five offering villages. First,
from the list of households who purchased weather index insurance, the researchers
randomly selected 15 percent of households who purchased insurance from each
insurance villages and a total of 165 households from the five offering villages were
proportionally selected). Second, from the list of households who chose not to
24

purchase weather index insurance, 3.5 percent of the households who decided not to
buy insurance were proportionally selected from the five insurance treatment villages.
Accordingly, the researchers randomly selected a total of 132 households
proportionally from the 5 villages. Therefore, in the baseline survey in 2010, there
were 395 households in the sample.
Due to attrition, however, we could only follow up with 373 of the 395 rural
households in the sample in the endline survey that is conducted by us in 2014. The
rate of attrition was small and was at only about 5 percent over a period of four years.
We compared the baseline characteristics of the households who dropped out in our
endline survey with those who stayed in the endline survey and found no systematic
patterns.9 Therefore, we believe that the low rate of attrition is not likely to affect
our results.

2.2.3 Weather Index Insurance Intervention
The intervention of this RCT study was the offering of commercial weather
index insurance to all of the rural households in the five offering villages. In each of
the five villages, a village-specific weather index was first developed for the design
of the weather index insurance policies. Specifically, the International Research
Institute for Climate and Society at Columbia University used both data of past
rainfall experiences collected from rural households through a series of interactive
exercises and also historical rainfall estimates obtained from the African Rainfall
Climatology (ARC) satellite to construct an objective, village-specific weather index.
Ground-level rainfall information (whenever available) was also used to supplement
the estimates obtained from the weather satellite.
9

For the sake of brevity, results from the attrition analysis are not shown but are available upon
request
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Once the weather indexes for all the five villages were developed,
village-specific weather index insurance policy was designed and then offered to the
rural households. During the four years of the study period, two insurance companies
(Nyala Insurance Share Company and Africa Insurance Company) offered the
product through local microfinance institutions (MFIs).10
Commercial weather index insurance was offered in the five offering village.
Specifically, in each of the offering villages, households were offered weather index
insurance for each of the agricultural seasons during the study period that pays a
maximum liability up to 3,000 Ethiopian Birr (about 150 US dollars) with a
minimum threshold of 800 Birr.11 One of the challenges for weather index insurance
marketing is many farmers in developing countries prefer to buy a policy for smaller
premium (Gine et al., 2010). Farmers in the HARITA project have also shown a
similar behavior, many farmers chosen the minimum threshold to lower the premium
cost (especially those who buy insurance on cash base). On average farmers pay a
premium about 20 percent of the sum insured, which actually depends on the
contract phase. The lowest premium paid by farmers is about ETB 160. Even though
the level of liability selected by many of the farmers is small, it has significant
economic meaning for rain-fed dependent smallholder farmers. For example, the
lowest liability policy (ETB 800) is nearly equivalent to the mean cash loans
received the year before the baseline survey. It can also cover mean cost of inputs,
including cost of chemical fertilizer, cost of hybrid seeds and land preparation cost.

10

The two insurance companies further obtained reinsurance services from the Swiss-Re Group.
Insurance policies were designed for Wheat and Teff (Mostly cultivated endemic crop). Farmers
can buy insurance for any or both of the crops.
11
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2.2.4 Data Collection
As already mentioned above, this study makes use of two waves of household
survey data to construct a panel dataset for the evaluation of the medium term
impacts of commercial weather index insurance. Specifically, in July 2010,
researchers in the HARITA project conducted the first household survey and
collected baseline data about the rural household. Then, in February 2014, we
conducted a follow-up survey with the same set of rural households and collected
endline household data. In each of the two waves of the household survey, the rural
households provided a wide range of information including basic characteristics of
household members, health and education of household members, agricultural
activities, household assets, and also agricultural risks and coping mechanisms.

2.2.4.1 Dependent variables
In the two waves of surveys, we obtained household level data for five
different major expenditures on agricultural activities. Specifically, we have data on
the expenditure on land preparation (which includes oxen rent, equipment rent and
labor cost for land preparation), expenditure on hybrid seeds, expenditure on
chemical fertilizers used, and expenditure on farming labor (both family labor and
hired labor).12 Using these information, we also obtain an estimate of the total
expenditure on farming at the household level (i.e., the sum of all the inputs
mentioned above).13
The behavioral change to adopt better farm technologies discussed in the
previous paragraph is expected to improve crop yields. The hypothesis is that buyers
12

The investment on these inputs and their return depend on the realization of good amount of
rainfall and they are considered as risky investment activities in our study area.
13
We impute the cost of family labour using the average level of wages that are paid to hired
labourers. The 2013 endline values are adjusted for inflation.
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of WII index insurance improve their yield because of their engagement in prudent
risk taking activities in the form of new technologies as mentioned in the previous
paragraph. As long as insured farmers are willing to engage in prudent risk taking
activities in the form of adoption of new technologies because of insurance
participation, the second causal channel to understand the impact of WII is through
its effect on household level economic outcome as measured by harvest value. We
obtain imputed data on two measures of agricultural outcomes. First, we impute the
total value of agricultural output. In the surveys, rural households reported the type
and the amount of agricultural outputs they obtained from their harvest. Then, we
imputed the value of gross output using the price report for the nearest district based
on the Ethiopian monthly market watch produced by the WFP. The total value of
agricultural output is then calculated as the value of gross output from various crops
cultivated and the values are calculated based on post-harvest prices. Second, we
calculated the amount of agricultural income net of agricultural costs (henceforth, net
agricultural income). Specifically, we obtain a net agricultural income of the rural
household by deducting the costs of all of the agricultural inputs (i.e., those that are
discussed in the paragraph above) from the total imputed value of agricultural output
as defined in this paragraph before.
Since we are also interested in estimating whether the commercial weather
index insurance has any impact on the finance of the rural households, we further
make use of the data collected in the survey to construct a few variables that can
represent some aspects of the financial situation of the rural households. Specifically,
in the household survey, we obtain the total amount of savings (in cash) of the
households and also the total amount of cash loans received by the households in the
year before the baseline and endline surveys. Our intervention is expected to
28

positively affect loans. In our study areas, farmers mainly buy fertilizer and seeds in
terms of loans and at the time of drought, many farmers are unable to pay their loans.
As such, insured farmers are expected to pay back their loans and consequently get
more loans for agricultural investments such as fertilizer and seeds in the planting
season.14
In addition, we evaluate the change of the household assets using the total
value of livestock (including cattle, horses, sheep, goats, poultry, and other animals)
that the households have in the baseline and endline periods. Livestock is the major
asset for farmers in rural Ethiopia and it is also used as ex post shock coping
mechanism. The income and risk management effects of weather index insurance
may be translated to positively affect livestock holdings. Improvements in income
which is a potential effect of weather index insurance should, therefore, positive
impact on livestock asset. Weather index insurance also assists to smooth
consumption at the time of the shocks, insured households do not need to engage in
coping strategies, including sale of livestock in order to smooth consumption (risk
management effect of WII).
2.2.4.2 Treatment variables
The RCT design of our study allows us to define two related treatment
dummy variables to capture the weather index insurance intervention. Since the
weather index insurance intervention was offered at the village level, we first define
the dummy variable, Household in Insurance Offering Village to represent whether
14

Our expectation on the effects of the intervention on savings is mixed. In one hand, weather index
insurance possibly increases farm income in good years. So, this income effect may increase both
consumption and savings. On the other hand, capital is scarce for farmers in our study areas; therefore,
farmers may prefer to invest more in agricultural production than keeping their money in safe assets
such as savings. Moreover, since insured farmers are partly protected from higher income volatility
due to weather shocks, insured households perhaps save less and invest more in productive but riskier
farming activities.
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the rural households live in one of the five insurance offering villages or not.
Specifically, the variable equals one (1) if the rural households lived in the insurance
offering villages and equals zero (0) if it was otherwise.
Since the HARITA project provides no subsidy to encourage insurance
participation, insurance participation was purely voluntary and not every of the rural
households living in the insurance offering villages purchased the insurance.
Therefore, we created another dummy variable, Households Participated in
Insurance, to represent whether the rural households participated in the weather
index insurance. Specifically, this variable equals one (1) if the rural households
lived in one of the five insurance offering villages chose to participate in the weather
index insurance and equals zero (0) if it was otherwise. Since weather index
insurance was not available in the three control villages, the variable is set to zero (0)
for all of the sample rural households in these villages.
2.2.4.3 Control variables: Household characteristics
Due to the moderate scale of the RCT study, the characteristics of the sample
rural households may not be perfectly balanced between the five insurance offering
villages and the three untreated control villages. Therefore, in our regression analysis,
we also make use of various household information that are available in the baseline
survey to construct a number of household characteristics as control variables.
Specifically, we construct a dummy variable on whether the head of the household is
a female (1=yes; 0=no), a variable on the age of household head (and also a variable
of the square of the age of the household head), a variable on the number of years of
education of household head received, a variable on the size of household, and also a
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variable on the size of farmland owned by the household.15 We call this set of
household variables as the baseline household characteristics.
2.2.4.4 Control variables: Severe crop failure due to droughts
In our endline survey, we also collected information about households’
rainfall experience in the four year study period (2010 to 2013). Specifically, we
asked our study households to report their drought experience and its severity level.
Based on the households’ report, we created a dummy variable, severity of crop
failure, to indicate the occurrence of rainfall shock in the four year study period.
Severity of crop failure equals one (1) if the household reported severe crop failure
due to drought and equal to zero (0) if the household reported either no crop failure
due to drought or only moderate crop failure due to drought.

2.2.5 Statistical Approach
We use both descriptive statistics and regression analyses to estimate the
impact of the weather index insurance intervention on agricultural expenditure,
agricultural yield, and also household finance. In our regression analysis, we obtain
robust estimates of the standard errors with the use of clusters of observations at
village level.
The basic model of our regression analysis is village fixed effects (FE) model
in a value added

Yijendline = a0 + a1*Village Insurance Offeringj + a2*Yijbaseline +a3*Crop_failureij
+μj + eij.

(1)

15

In Tigray-Ethiopia, major land redistribution was last implemented in 1992. Therefore, the size of
farmland does not change much in our study period.
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Yijbaseline and Yijendline are the baseline and the endline outcome variables of
interest (agricultural expenditure, agricultural yield and household finance) for
household i in village j. Our independent variable is the dummy variable Village
Insurance Offeringj. Crop_failureij is a dummy variable used to describe the
occurrence of rainfall shock. A set of village dummies, μj, are included in the model
to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities at the village level. We hope
that the estimate for the parameter a1 can give us an Intention-To-Treat (ITT)
estimate of the average impact of the weather index insurance intervention in the
medium term.
In order to control for potential differences in the baseline characteristics of
the sample households between the five insurance offering villages and the three
untreated control villages, we further include in the model a set of baseline
household characteristics (as defined in the above section). The model which
controls for various baseline household characteristics is as follows:

Yijendline = a0 + a1*Village Insurance Offeringj + a2*Yijbaseline + a3*Household
Characteristicsij + a4*Crop_failureij + μj + eij.

(2)

In the two regression models above, we target to obtain reliable estimates of
the intention-to-treat effect of the weather index insurance intervention. However, as
the HARITA project did not provide rural households with any subsidy for the
weather index insurance, not all rural households that were offered the opportunities
to purchase weather index insurance eventually chose to participate in the insurance
(by making payment themselves). As such, the actual impact of taking-up the
weather index insurance (not just being offered the insurance) is not estimated in the
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above model. At the same time, the participation of weather index insurance in our
offering villages is clearly selective (and endogenous) due to voluntary participation.
For this reason, we conduct a set of instrumental variable (IV) estimation to obtain
reliable Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) estimate of the impact of taking-up weather
index insurance. Specifically, we make use of the random assignment of the weather
index insurance program across the eight sample villages, as represented by the
variable Village Insurance Offering, to instrument for the actual participation status
of rural households, as represented by the variable, Household Purchased Insurance.
The first stage of the IV model is as follows:

Household Purchased Insuranceij = b0+ b1*Village Insurance Offeringj +
b2*Household Characteristicsij + b3*Crop_failureij + μj + υij.

(3)

Household Purchased Insuranceij is a dummy variable that equals one (1) if
the rural household chose to participate in weather index insurance and equals zero
(0) if otherwise. 16 Household Characteristicsi is the same set of household
characteristics at the baseline as already defined above. Crop_failureij is a dummy
variable used to describe the occurrence of rainfall shock. A set of village dummies,
μj, are also included in the model to control for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneities at the village level.
After estimating the first stage of the IV model, we obtain predicted values of

16

The dependent variable in our first stage IV is binary, in the first stage IV a nonlinear regression
model such as probit model may seem appropriate. However, according to Angrist (1999) the second
stage estimate, in the case of nonlinear first stage, may be inconsistent unless the model for the first
stage conditional expectation function (CEF) is correct. On the contrary, the second stage estimates, in
the case of first stage linear probability model, is consistent whether or not the first stage conditional
expectation function (CEF) is linear. Angrist (1999), therefore, suggests the safest option is to use a
linear probability model in the first stage.
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the Household Purchased Insurance variable, Predicted Household Purchased
Insurance, and use these predictions to run the second stage of the IV regression:

Yijendline = c0 + c1* Predicted Household Purchased Insuranceij + c2*Yijbaseline +
c3*Household Characteristicsij + c4*Crop_failureij + μj + eij.

(4)

We hope that the estimate for the parameter c1 in the IV model above can
give us a reliable estimate for the Treatment-on-the-treated impact of the take-up of
the weather index insurance intervention.

2.3. Average Impacts of Weather Index Interventions

2.3.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics on key variables used in our analysis.
Panel A presents the basic demographic characteristics. Most of the household heads
are illiterate (on average household heads attend 1.5 years of education). The average
size of household is 5.3 persons to a household with nearly 44 year old household
head. Female household heads are by far less than the male household heads. On
average, 36 percent of our sample has female household heads. In panel B we also
present summary statistics of several agricultural assets. The households in our
sample study area are small farm holders with little amount of savings. On average, a
household owns about 3.5 tsimad (nearly one hectare) of land with Birr 218.4 cash
savings. Panel C reports household expenditure on various agricultural inputs,
including land preparations, chemical fertilizer, hybrid seeds and farming labor.
Panel D reports value of agricultural produce and agricultural income.
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Table 2 provides a summary of the baseline mean comparison of sample rural
household in our treatment and control villages. The key outcome variables
(agricultural expenditure, agricultural yield and finance—panel B to D) are not
balanced in some of the cases across treatment and control villages. Hence, the fixed
effect and instrumental variable statistical estimations in a value added are made to
account for the baseline differences.
In Appendix Table 2, we report the mean comparison of sample rural
households in treatment and control villages at the endline in 2013. It indicates that
weather index insurance intervention improves value of livestock, expenditure on
land preparation, expenditure on farming labor and total expenditure on farming
(Column 3, and row 7, 9, 12 & 13). On the other hand, the descriptive statistics show
no statistical evidence that weather index insurance intervention improves
expenditure on chemical fertilizer, yield and cash savings. While weather index
insurance increases cash savings, expenditure on chemical fertilizer and yield
(Column 3, and row 6, 10, 14 & 15), the estimates are not statistically significant.
Surprisingly, the estimate for the expenditure on hybrid seeds is negative and
significant at the 10% level (Appendix table 2, column 3, and row 11). It seems that,
by the descriptive statistics, weather index insurance has positive effects on some of
our outcome variables. However, the findings from descriptive statistics may be
biased because of different confounding factors.
Moreover, in order to be sure that our multivariate result is not confounded
by compliance problem, we compared the participation status at the baseline and
endline. Appendix table 4 documents partly the compliance of the different
households in the offering village. As it can be seen from the table there is a
difference in the number of compilers and non-compliers at baseline and endline
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(Appendix table 4- Row five and six). To ensure if compliance is a problem or not
we compared the average outcome using treatment status at baseline versus the
average outcome using treatment status at endline.17 Then, our objective is to see if
there is a significant difference between the two results. We found no significant
difference between the two regression results.

2.3.2 Multivariate Result
Our multivariate results provide a slightly different story from the descriptive
results described above. Specifically, when we estimate the basic model (equation 1)
as discussed above, we find that weather index agricultural insurance (WII)
intervention improves agricultural investment. Weather index insurance intervention
raises total expenditure on farming by Birr 171.49 (Table 4-Column 5, row 1) and is
significant at the 1 percent level. We also try to decompose farm investment in-to
land preparation, chemical fertilizer, hybrid seeds and farming labor and see the
impact. We find WII intervention has also positive and significant impact on the
decomposed components of farm investment. Particularly, WII intervention increases
expenditure on land preparation, expenditure on chemical fertilizer and expenditure
on hybrid seeds, respectively by Birr 53.97 (se=22.39), Birr 67.89 (se=6.64) and Birr
13.27 (se=1.33), and the estimated values are significant at the one percent level
(Columns 1-3, row 1). Table 4 also shows that past rainfall shock experience
adversely affects agricultural investment. Particularly, the occurrence of severe crop
failure due to drought in past years significantly reduces expenditure on land
preparation (Column 1, row 2).

17

Results for the second sets of regression are not show but are available from the author upon
request
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In order to capture the observed baseline differences between treatment and
control villages, in Table 5 we report estimates of the impact of WII intervention
controlling for differences in baseline household characteristics (we estimate model
(2) above). The impact on both the aggregate and disaggregate farm investment is
large, positive and significant. Specifically, the total expenditure on farming is Birr
482.70 (se=54.99) higher for rural households in the offering village than the farmers
in the control villages and is significant at the one percent level (Column 5, row 1).
Moreover, we also find that WII intervention improves the disaggregated
components of farm investment. The expenditure on land preparation, expenditure on
chemical fertilizer and expenditure on hybrid seeds are higher for rural households
who are in the offering villages (Column 1-3, row 1). Overall, a comparison of Table
4 (basic model) and Table 5 (adjusted model) shows that, after controlling for
baseline differences in household characteristics the impact of WII became larger
and values are significant at the one percent level.

2.3.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
The application of instrumental variable (IV) estimation depends on finding
valid instrumental variables(s). We use the random assignment of the weather index
insurance program at the village level as an instrument for household weather index
insurance participation in estimating the model (3) above. Annex table 3 reports the
first stage IV result that regresses household insurance participation on village
treatment status controlling for investment outcome variables at baseline, household
baseline characteristics and village dummies. Overall, we find a strong and
significant effect of village treatment status on household insurance treatment
(Annex table 3, column 1-5, and row 1). Moreover, the requirement for a valid IV is
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also satisfied. The first stage regression statistics (F-statistics) is large enough to
reject the null hypothesis of weak IV (Annex table 3, columns 1-5, row 12).
Table 6 reports the results from estimating the second stage IV regression (or
it estimates model (4) above). The IV estimates tell us a story which is very similar
to those discussed before. For example, total expenditure on farming (aggregate
value) is Birr 562.74(se=139.74) higher for rural households with insurance than
without insurance (Column 5, row 1). The value is large, positive and statistically
significant at the one percent level. Further, to see the impact on specific agricultural
input decisions; we also disaggregate the farm investment. It shows that WII
intervention increases expenditure on land preparation, expenditure on chemical
fertilizer and expenditure on farming labor. Particularly, the expenditure on land
preparation, expenditure on chemical fertilizer and expenditure on farming labor are
respectively Birr 117.27 (se=31.56), Birr 82.28 (se=29.07) and 358.04 (112.69)
higher for policy holder rural households than rural households who do not buy
insurance (Column1, column 2 & column 3, row 1) and the values are significant at
the one percent level. The effect on expenditure on hybrid seeds is positive, but not
statistically significant (Column 3, row 1). In fact, when we compare the results of
the average treatment effect on the treated households with those of village level
effects, the effects on the treated households is higher than the village level effects.
Appendix table 1 presents IV estimates that tell us an important story on
rainfall shocks, weather index insurance and insurance compensation. Experience of
rainfall shock in the preceding years reduces expenditure on agricultural investment
(Column 1-5, row 3) but the coefficients are not statistically significant except for
expenditure on chemical fertilizer. Insurance (along with ex-ante behavioral change
to adopt risky technologies) increases expenditure on land preparation, expenditure
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on chemical fertilizer, expenditure on farming labor and total expenditure on farming
respectively and the values are statistically significant (Column 1, column 2, column
4 & column 5, row 1). Insurance compensation (ex-post shock) also help to maintain
expenditure on chemical fertilizer and expenditure on hybrid seeds (Column 2 &
column 3, row 2), and, the coefficients are statistically significant at the 10 percent
level.

2.3.4 Estimation on Agricultural Yield and Household Finance
In Table 7 we present estimates from second stage IV regression results to see
if the effects of WII intervention can go beyond agricultural investment. It shows that
the effects are not limited to farm investment. Rural households who bought WII
have improved the total value of agricultural output. The total value of agricultural
output (total revenue) is Birr 748.05 (se=400.39- column 1, row 1) higher for
households with weather index insurance than without insurance. However, the
increase in the value of agricultural output seems not sufficiently large to generate a
significant change in agricultural income. As it can be seen from the table the impact
of WII intervention on agricultural income is positive, but not statistically significant
(Column 2, row 1).
In addition to yield and agricultural income, we also investigate the impact of
WII on cash savings and cash loans. Here, the effect is again positive and significant.
Cash savings and cash loans received are Birr 128.01 (se=67.27) and Birr 235.64
(se=46.45) higher for buyers compare to rural households without WII (Columns 3&
5, row1). Moreover, table 7 suggests that low levels of rain in the preceding years
reduce agricultural output and farm income (Column 1 & column 2, row 2) but the
coefficients are not statistically significant.
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2.4. Discussion and Conclusion
This study makes two main contributions to the existing empirical research
on the impacts of weather index insurance. The first contribution of this study is to
investigate the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. Second, our
study provides empirical evidence on the impact of weather index insurance when
the insurance is offered commercially to rural households for a number of
consecutive years (relatively long period). To examine the medium-term impact of
weather index insurance, we conduct a randomized controlled trial that has been
conducted as a part of the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA)
project in the Tigray region of Northern Ethiopia since 2010.
Overall, our results are not too different from the RCT studies carried out by
Karlan et al. (2014) in Ghana and Cole et al. (2013) in India. The main differences lie
in the decomposed investment impact. In our case the decomposed impact is large,
positive and significant, whereas in Cole et al. (2013) the decomposed part brought
no impact except investment on pesticide. This should not be surprising, however.
Our study is based on a large scale commercial sale of insurance where rural
households will not have any motive to hide their true behavior; in their intervention
they provided large subsidies. Our study also covers a four year period, which gives
enough factors of production adjustment time.
It is important to note that our results reported in the above paragraphs are not
caused by substitution effects among the selected inputs for our impact study. We
offer two possible justifications. First, the labor cost for both treatment and control
households has been increased. Had there been a substitution of other inputs for labor,
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labor cost could have declined for both or either of the cohorts. Second, studies show
that there is an excess labor surplus in rural Ethiopia. There is no incentive for rural
households to substitute other inputs for labor. Thus, the driving factor is the change
in behavior that induces insured rural households to be engaged in higher risk and
higher return production activities.
Our results are also consistent with the story that rainfall shock experience
reduces agricultural investment (past rainfall shock experience deteriorates savings
and also it is a barrier to the adoption of agricultural technologies like chemical
fertilizer), weather index insurance (along with ex-ante technology adoption
behavioral change) helps better management of agricultural investment and insurance
compensation (ex-post) also help to maintain farmers’ investment on risky
agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizer.
In general, our results provide the following three sets of conclusions. The
first one is that carefully designed and implemented weather index insurance can
indeed improve agricultural investment, yield and finance. Second, weather index
insurance should be promoted given its strong potential effect, lower cost, lower
moral hazard and simple to implement. Third, from a development points of view our
result suggests that variability of weather coupled with incomplete insurance markets
may hinder agricultural development in developing countries. As such, an
introduction of innovative weather index insurance in developing countries may play
a significant role in boosting investments, savings and economic growth.
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Tables and Figures

Table 1
Summary statistics of sample rural households in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia in 2010 (N=395)
Mean
S.D.
Min
A. Demographic characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
Age of household head (in years)
Years of education of household head
Size of household
B. Household finance

Max

0.36
43.89
1.52
5.34

0.48
13.94
2.57
2.24

0.00
18.00
0.00
1.00

1.00
80.00
10.00
12.00

Size of farmland (in tsimad)
Cash savings (in Birr)
Value of livestock (in Birr)
Total Cash loans received the year before (in
Birr)
C. Agricultural costs

3.53
218.39
6,163.94
1100.92

2.96
1,228.00
9,057.74
2526.76

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

23.00
15,000.00
67,545.00
31957.00

Expenditure on land preparation (in Birr)
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer (in Birr)
Expenditure on hybrid seeds (in Birr)
Expenditure on farming labor (in Birr)
Total Expenditure on farming (in Birr)
D. Agricultural yield

484.92
194.38
44.53
1,625.98
2,349.81

813.41
322.87
96.14
2,163.03
2,918.72

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

9,200.00
2,677.00
654.00
16,100
22,009

Total value of agricultural produce (in Birr)

5,827.05

29,487.48

0.00

441,020.00
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Imputed agricultural income (in Birr)

3,473.53

29,649.22

-20,938.40

Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program.
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare.
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439,559.00

Table 2
Mean comparison of sample rural households in offering and control villages in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia in 2010
Offering
Control
Difference
village
village
(1) – (2)
(N=297)
(N=98)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Demographic characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.383
0.275
0.108* (0.054)
Age of household head (in years)
42.76
47.29
-4.53*** (1.71)
Years of education of household head
1.60
1.25
0.35 (0.273)
Size of household
5.27
5.51
-0.23 (0.289)
Household finance
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
3.389
2.42
1.47*** (0.250)
Cash savings (in Birr)
224.29
200.50
23.78 (167.59)
Value of livestock (in Birr)
6,421.78
5,382.51
1,039.27 (874.5)
Cash loans received the year before (in Birr)
1,176.95
870.48
306.46 (250.3)
Agricultural costs
Expenditure on land preparation (in Birr)
524.27
365.65
158.62* (69.09)
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer (in Birr)
213.19
137.34
75.84** (36.19)
Expenditure on hybrid seeds (in Birr)
39.74
59.02
-19.27* (11.42)
Expenditure on farming labor (in Birr)
1,790.00
1,129
661*** (193.58)
Total Expenditure on farming (in Birr)
2,567.30
1,690.80
876.5*** (265.02)
Agricultural yield
Total value of agricultural produce (in Birr)
6,542.52
3,666.01
2,876.50 (2269.6)
Imputed value of agricultural income (in Birr)
3,969.60
1,975.20
1,994.40 (2286.2)
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program.
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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Table 3
The participation of weather index insurance among rural households in 2010
Dependent variable: Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Household in insurance offering village (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.556**
0.530**
0.573***
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.09)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.132
0.0686
(0.10)
(0.10)
Age of household head (in years)
-0.012
-0.006
(0.01)
(0.01)
Years of education of household head
0.028*
0.033*
(0.01)
(0.01)
Size of household
0.016*
0.028**
(0.01)
(0.01)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-0.015
(0.01)
Total cash savings (in Birr)
-0.000
(0.00)
Total value of livestock (in Birr)
-0.000*
(0.00)
Total cash loans received last year (in Birr)
-0.000
(0.00)
Observation (N)
395
395
395
Adjusted R-Square
0.235
0.265
0.309
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program.
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Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are
reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.

49

Table 4
Intended-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a period of four years (in Birr)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(1)
Expenditure on Expenditure on Expenditure on
Total
Expenditure on land
chemical
hybrid
farming
Expenditure on
preparation
fertilizer
seeds
labor
farming
Household in insurance offering village 53.97***(22.39)
67.89***(6.64) 13.27***(1.33)
41.32(81.05) 171.49***(18.14)
(1=Yes; 0=No)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks -67.84** (27.24)
-16.06(16.40)
9.62 (7.03)
-77.68 (133.55)
-133.06)
household faced in the last four years
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010
0.07*** (0.010)
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010
0.11***(0.030)
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010
0.08*(0.040)
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010
0.12***(0.020)
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010
0.13***(0.020)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
373
372
372
373
371
Adjusted R-square
0.17
0.30
0.14
0.18
0.21
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013
survey is collected by the author.
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are
reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 5
Adjusted intended-to-treat (ITT) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a period of four years (in
Birr)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(1)
Expenditure on Expenditure on Expenditure on Total Expenditure
Expenditure on land
chemical
hybrid
farming
on
preparation
fertilizer
seeds
labor
farming
Household in insurance offering village (1=Yes;
72.58**(21.89)
94.84***(14.33) 16.86***(1.53) 181.31*(96.89) 482.70***(54.99)
0=No)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks
-53.65*(28.09)
-7.61(21.40)
11.03(6.70)
-21.53(137.03)
-58.59(193.03)
household faced in the last four years
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010
0.04***(0.01)
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010
0.07*(0.03)
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010
0.05(0.04)
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010
0.06***(0.01)
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010
0.06***(0.01)
-74.02**(23.62)
-42.39***(11.50)
-7.11(4.98)
-222.45*(116.29)
-327.42**(136.04)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
9.19(6.27)
0.35(4.06)
0.84(1.61)
38.19(22.44)
48.58(32.91)
Age of household head (in years)
8.07(5.67)
10.36**(3.62)
1.87*(0.87)
48.35**(15.54) 68.84**(23.18)
Years of education of household head
13.71**(5.07)
10.72**(3.11)
1.54(1.25) 112.97***(13.29) 136.11***(15.29)
Size of household
3.80(4.46)
5.77*(2.60)
0.26(0.68)
12.50(17.40)
21.37(23.55)
Size of farmland
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
373
372
372
373
371
Observations (N)
0.30
0.43
0.18
0.36
0.39
Adjusted R-square
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013
survey is collected by the author.
51

Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are
reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 6
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a
period of four year (in Birr)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Expenditure on
Expenditure on Expenditure on Expenditure on Total Expenditure
land
chemical
hybrid
farming
on
preparation
fertilizer
seeds
labor
farming
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 117.27***(31.56) 82.28***(29.07)
2.40(17.03) 358.04***(112.69) 562.74***(139.74)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks -52.14**(22.55)
-34.49(22.92)
3.86(7.97)
-30.43(101.42)
-103.42(147.66)
household faced in the last four years
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010
0.04***(0.01)
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010
0.09***(0.03)
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010
0.07*(0.04)
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010
0.06***(0.01)
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010
0.07***(0.01)
Household characteristics
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
373
372
372
373
371
Observations (N)
0.23
0.38
0.11
0.29
0.31
Adjusted R-square
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013
survey is collected by the author.
Note: The dummy variable “Household purchased insurance” is instrumented by a village insurance treatment dummy variable. Household
characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head, size of household
and size of farmland. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 7
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural outcome and
household finance over a period of four year (in Birr)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Total value of
Imputed farm
Total cash
Total value of
Total cash
agricultural
income
savings
livestock
loans received
produce
the year before
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 748.05*(400.39)
102.54(365.79)
128.01*(67.27) 108.77*(58.69) 235.64***(46.45)
0=No)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks -382.49(266.21)
-236.12(302.09) -183.38(130.34) 81.68(186.39)
5.57(92.47)
household faced in the last four years
Total value of agricultural produce in 2010
0.0003(0.001)
Imputed agricultural income in 2010
-0.001(0.001)
Total cash savings in 2010
0.09(0.07)
Total value of livestock in 2010
0.02***(0.01)
Total cash loans received in 2010
0.02(0.01)
Household characteristics
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
367
365
373
373
373
Observation (N)
0.14
0.10
0.05
0.10
0.10
Adjusted R-square
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013
survey is collected by the author.
Note: The dummy variable “Household purchased insurance” is instrumented by a village insurance treatment dummy variable. Household
characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head, size of household
and size of farmland. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1
Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on agricultural expenditure over a
period of four year (in Birr)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Expenditure on
Expenditure on Expenditure on Expenditure on Total Expenditure
land
chemical
hybrid
farming
on
preparation
fertilizer
seeds
labor
farming
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No) 127.01***(34.79)

68.12**(27.01)

-6.31(19.10)

354.74***(137.47 543.88***(166.11
)
)
29.60(483.29)
165.66(636.37)

Household purchased insurance * Rainfall
-83.05(97.15)
133.13*(77.41)
75.22*(40.63)
shock
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks
-23.73(28.10)
-80.43**(31.55) -21.73(15.20)
-40.62(183.24)
-160.76(240.54)
household faced in the last four years
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010
0.04***(0.01)
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010
0.08***(0.03)
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010
0.07**(0.03)
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010
0.06***(0.01)
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010
0.07***(0.01)
Household characteristics
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
373
372
372
373
371
Observations (N)
0.23
0.35
.
0.29
0.31
Adjusted R-square
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013
survey is collected by the author.
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Note: The dummy variable “Household purchased insurance” is instrumented by a village insurance treatment dummy variable. Household
characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, age of household head square, years of education of
household head, size of household and size of farmland. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in
parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Appendix Table 2
Mean comparison of sample rural households in offering and control villages in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia in 2013
Offering
Control
Difference
village
village
(1) – (2)
(N=297)
N=(98)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Demographic characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.325
0.387
-0.062 (0.024)
Age of household head (in years)
46.40
50.50
-4.10** (1.67)
Years of education of household head
1.47
1.07
0.39 (0.305)
Size of household
5.38
5.13
0.245 (0.238)
Household finance
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
3.37
2.47
0.91** (0.359)
Cash savings (in Birr)
146.6
68.50
78.10 (81.69)
Value of livestock (in Birr)
379.30
170.20
209.10** (95.5)
Cash loans received the year before (in Birr)
293.30
220.00
73.00 (48.05)
Agricultural costs
Expenditure on land preparation (in Birr)
177.50
112.70
64.80*** (22.4)
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer (in Birr)
174.20
156.60
17.60 (17.76)
Expenditure on hybrid seeds (in Birr)
17.54
26.40
-8.86* (5.02)
Expenditure on farming labor (in Birr)
985.48
793.23
192.24* (102.84)
Total Expenditure on farming (in Birr)
1,359.00
1,098.00
260.00*(129.7)
Agricultural yield
Total value of agricultural produce (in Birr)
1,155.00
948.00
207.00 (210)
Imputed value of agricultural income (in Birr)
(197.00)
(148.00)
(49.00) (201)
Observations (N)
280
93
187
Data source: Data for the 2013 survey is collected by the author.
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
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significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Appendix Table 3
First-stage estimation of the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT)/Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the impact of weather index insurance on
agricultural expenditure over a period of four year (in Birr)
Household purchased insurance (1=Yes; 0=No)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Household in insurance offering village
0.743***
0.774***
0.743***
0.749***
0.750***
(1=Yes; 0=No)
(0.064)
(0.067)
(0.064)
(0.065)
(0.066)
Expenditure on land preparation in 2010
Yes
Expenditure on chemical fertilizer in 2010
Yes
Expenditure on hybrid seeds in 2010
Yes
Expenditure on farming labor in 2010
Yes
Total Expenditure on farming in 2010
Yes
Household characteristics
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
373
372
372
373
371
Adjusted R-square
0.441
0.44
0.441
0.441
0.439
First stage regression statistics:
F-statistics
161.9 (p=0.000) 130.76 (p=0.000) 161.3 (p=0.000) 165.8 (p=0.000) 166.2 (p=0.000)
Durbin-WU-Hausman test of endogenity
11.54 (p=0.0007) 6.16 (p=0.013)
0.014 (p=0.90) 11.87 (p=0.001) 14.34 (p=0.0002)
Chi-square
Ho: Variable exogenous
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013
survey is collected by the author.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, age of household head square, years of
education of household head, size of household and size of farmland. Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust
standard errors adjusted are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Appendix Table 4
Sample frame summaries and observational counts
Count at 2010
Count at 2013 Difference
(1)
(2)
(2) – (1)
All sample households
395
373
22
A. Households in offering villages
297
280
17
- Insured households
165
188
23
- Uninsured households
132
92
40
B. Households in control villages
98
93
5
Difference between treatment and
199
187
12
control villages (A-B)
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the 2013
survey is collected by the author.
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CHAPTER 3
Rainfall Shocks and the Effects of Weather Index Insurance on Household
Education Expenses: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia

3.1 Introduction

Economic and rainfall shocks have huge negative impacts to the
accumulation of human capital among children in developing countries (Jensen, 2000;
Escobal, 2005; Edmonds, 2006; Janvry et al., 2006; Duryea et al., 2007; Guarcello et
al., 2007; Ferreira and Schady, 2008; Ferreira and Schady, 2009; Dung, 2013). For
example, in Brazil, labor market shocks that trigger loss of the father’s income have
caused school dropouts (Duryea, 1998; Neri et al., 2000; Skoufias & Parker, 2002;
Duryea et al., 2007). In Mexico recession has also caused drops in school attendance
(Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Binder, 1999) while rainfall shocks adversely affected
farm income and increased school dropouts and drops in school enrollment in India
and Ivory Coast (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000). Similarly, adverse
agricultural conditions have been shown to have caused reductions in education
expenses and investments (Jensen, 2000). In the long run, rainfall shocks have also
been shown to significantly affect human capital formation (Alderman et al., 2004).
While adverse rainfall, in general, pushes down the average child wage rate
that reduces the opportunity cost of schooling leading to improve child schooling
(Jensen, 2000); households, on the other hand, desperately look to any kind of means
which likely to cause high marginal utility of child income leading to negative child
schooling (Ferreira and Schady, 2008). Therefore, the extent in which shocks affect
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child education depends on the strength of the two effects operating in the opposite
direction (Ferreira and Schady, 2008).
In developing countries, children of farming households that practice
smallholder rain-fed agriculture are particularly vulnerable to rainfall shocks (Jacoby
& Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000; Janzen and Carter, 2013). Households practicing
smallholder rain-fed agriculture are usually poor and have few means to mitigate
adverse impacts of rainfall shocks (Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Dercon et al., 2005).
There are several studies that attempt to test the hypothesis of perfect consumption
smoothing in developing countries (Deaton, 1992; Townsend, 1994; Grimard, 1997;
Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Fafchamps et al., 1998; Kazianga and Udry, 2006;
Dercon, 2007; Janzen and Carter, 2013). Most of the studies find minute evidence of
consumption smoothing and reject the hypothesis of perfect consumption smoothing.
When there are large rainfall shocks, many of these households faces a
significant drop in agricultural income and are mostly forced to reduce investments
on children’s education (Jensen, 2000; Ferreira and Schady, 2008; Dung, 2013).
Some households may even pull their children from school and send their children to
work for additional income (Jensen, 2000; Dung, 2013). Furthermore, as formal
credit and insurance are usually not available in rural areas, rural households that
face large rainfall shocks typically fail to take loans to maintain their children’s
education (Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Jensen, 2000; Giesbert and Schindler, 2012;
Dung, 2013).
Over the last decade, researchers, multilateral institutions and insurance
companies have worked on innovations in index insurance as a means to facilitate
resilience against weather shocks in lower income countries (Chantarat et al., 2007;
Zant, 2008; Collier et al., 2009; Miranda & Farrin, 2012; Dercon et al., 2014).
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Specifically, researchers, multilateral institutions and insurance companies have
made considerable efforts to develop a new type of agricultural insurance known as
weather index insurance for households in low income countries (Zant, 2008; Collier
et al., 2009; Dercon et al., 2014). Unlike traditional agricultural insurance, which
guaranties policyholders for verifiable production loses arising from weather shocks,
weather index insurance indemnifies insured household based on the realization of a
weather index such as rainfall deficit measured over a specified period of time in a
particular area (Chantarat et al., 2007; Collier et al., 2009; Miranda & Farrin, 2012;
Karlan et al., 2014; Karlan et al., 2014).18
Weather index insurance pilots have shown that WII has a potential to
provide several welfare enhancing benefits in lower income countries (Collier et al.,
2009; Karlan et al., 2014). For example, it has been shown that weather index
insurance participation help rural households invest more in their farm and help
households obtain a higher agricultural yield (Giné and Yang, 2009; Dercon and
Christaensen, 2011; Cole et al., 2013; Janzen and Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014).
It has been also shown that compensations from insurance companies during adverse
weather shocks may help insured households smoothing their streams of payments
specially the payment for the capital investment required for their agricultural
production (Collier et al., 2009; Janzen & Carter, 2013; Karlan et al., 2014).
In principle, it is possible that weather index insurance participation also
helps rural households invest in their children’s education. Specifically, if weather
index insurance can help rural households better manage rainfall risks a priori and
18

Weather index insurance (WII) has several advantages over the traditional crop insurance. First,
weather index insurance does not require farm level input and output inspections which substantially
reduce overhead costs. Second, because WII is based on the realization of observed rainfall that
cannot be influenced by the policyholder or the insurer, it eliminates the moral hazard and adverse
selection problems (Chantarat et al., 2007; Miranda & Farrin, 2012; Karlan et al., 2014). With these
costs and designing advantages WII has been gaining popularity in many lower income countries
(Chantarat et al., 2007; Yoong et al., 2013).
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can help rural households increase the level of agricultural investment and hence also
their agricultural yield and income (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill & Angelino, 2010;
Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), rural households may have more financial
resources to meet with the investment needs of their children’s education.
Furthermore, when facing large rainfall shocks, insured households may also receive
monetary compensation from the insurance policy and this compensation may help
them overcome cash constraints that usually take place after rainfall shocks. Rural
households with such compensation are therefore less likely to reduce investment in
their children’s education after rainfall shocks.
Given that weather index insurance participation may have the potential to
promote children’s education investments among rural households, it is surprising
that to our knowledge, there is little research evaluating the effects of weather index
insurance on the education expenses of rural households (Chen & Jin, 2012; Janzen
& Carter, 2013; Landmann & Frolich; 2013). While there are a few empirical studies
evaluating the linkage between insurance participation and various educational
outcomes, these studies often focused on school dropouts (Shah & Steinberg, 2015),
school enrollment and school attendance (Janzen & Carter, 2013), school enrollment
(Chen & Jin, 2012), and school attendance (Landmann & Frolich; 2013).
In this paper, our main goal is to examine the effects of weather index
insurance on the education expenses of rural household. Specifically, our study
evaluates whether households that purchased weather index insurance policies spend
more on the education expenses of their children. We also examine whether the
effects of the insurance on household education expenses are large enough to cover
the adverse effects of rainfall shocks on household education expenses.
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In order to achieve the goals, this study evaluates a randomized control trial
(RCT) that has been conducted by HARITA research group on a sample of 8 villages
and 400 households in Northern Ethiopia in 2010.19 In the RCT, eight villages were
selected from three drought prone districts. Five of the eight villages were randomly
assigned for weather index insurance intervention and households in these villages
were offered weather index insurance. To obtain district representative control
villages, one village was randomly selected from each of the three districts for
control purpose. Households in the three villages were not offered weather index
insurance. We obtained detailed baseline survey data of about 400 rural households
in 2010 and conducted a follow-up survey with the households again in 2014. We
mainly use the endline data to examine the effects of commercial weather index
insurance on education expenses (more details in part 2-sampling method).
Our study has, however, a few limitations. First, due to the limitation of our
survey dataset, we can only conduct a study of the effects of weather index insurance
on household education expenses. We do not have detailed records of the education
of each of the children of our sample households, and therefore, we cannot evaluate
the effects of the insurance on school enrollment, school attendance, or other aspects
of educational performance. We also only have one wave of survey data on
household education expenses and hence we cannot employ panel data estimation
techniques in our regression analysis.
Second, while there was randomized allocations of weather index insurance
at the village level (i.e., some villages randomized to receive the insurance
19

The HARITA project was funded by Oxfam America and was implemented by a collaboration of
private and public organizations both located in Ethiopia and also from outside the country, including
the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) of Columbia University, Mekelle
University, the Nyala Insurance Share Company, the Africa Insurance Company and also the Relief
Society of Tigray. More information about the HARITA project can be found in (Chen et al., 2010;
Norton et al., 2014).
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intervention and some villages randomized not to receive the insurance intervention),
households in our treatment villages obtain no financial subsidy for their
participation in weather index insurance initiatives and hence buying insurance is
voluntary in nature. Given this background, households in treatment villages decided
by themselves whether to purchase insurance with their own resources or not and
there is likely self-selection among sample households into the insurance program. In
order to deal with the selection issue and to obtain more reliable estimates of the
effects of weather index insurance on household education expenses, we conduct our
empirical analysis using the instrumental variable estimation technique (more details
in part 2-statistical approach).
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes our research venue
and the research methodology, which include the sampling method, weather index
insurance intervention, data collection, and the statistical approach. Section 3
presents the results of the effects of weather index insurance on household education
expenses. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.

3.2 Research Methodology

3.2.1 Research Venue
The region of Tigray is located in the northern Ethiopia and is about the same
size as Denmark. Similar to other parts of Ethiopia, the region is predominately rural
and nearly 80 percent of its 4.3 million population live in the rural area (World Bank,
2012). Most of the region’s population is severely poor and the per capita income of
the region is only 230 US dollars (Bureau of Plan and Finance, 2010). Cultivatable
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land is scarce as the region has mostly complex terrains, arid and degraded lands
(Ersado et al., 2004; Headey et al., 2014).
In the rural part of Tigray, the average size of a household is about five and
the average size of landholding per household is only about one hectare (CSA, 2007;
Headey et al., 2014). Most of the rural households in the region practice low-yield
smallholder rain-fed agriculture with limited technology inputs and virtually no
irrigation water (Ersado et al., 2004). The rain season in the region is a mere
four-month period from June to September, and is mostly dry in other months. The
level of annual rainfall is low, typically amounting to between 400 and 800
millimeters of rain in a year. Accordingly, negative rainfall shocks are a major threat
to agriculture in the region and severe droughts had occurred multiple times in the
past decades (Kumasi and Asenso-Okyere, 2011). Specifically, droughts have
happened during our study period. In the 2011/2012 agricultural season large part of
Tigray experienced a drought, which left 0.4 million people in need for urgent
humanitarian assistance (Sandison, 2012). Despite regular droughts having
substantially affected the agricultural production and livelihood of the people in the
region until the introduction of the HARITA project few rural households in the
region had any kind of agricultural insurance.
The HARITA project is a large-scale development project that has been
conducted in the rural part of Tigray since 2010. 20 The project is aimed at
strengthening the livelihood of the rural population and to promote better

20

The HARITA project was funded by Oxfam America and was implemented by a collaboration of
private and public organizations both located in Ethiopia and also from outside the country, including
the International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) of Columbia University, Mekelle
University, the Nyala Insurance Share Company, the Africa Insurance Company and also the Relief
Society of Tigray. More information about the HARITA project can be found in (Chen et al., 2010;
Norton et al., 2014).
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management of agricultural risk among households that depend on rain-fed
agriculture.21 Weather index insurance is a key component of the HARITA project.
Over the four-year period of this study the HARITA project has gradually
expanded to providing commercial weather index insurance to more rural households
in different villages of the region. Specifically, in 2014 weather index insurance was
offered in 81 rural villages and a total of 23,000 rural households purchased weather
index insurance through the HARITA project (Oxfam America & WFP, 2014).
However, despite the large-scale insurance participation in the region, baseline
household data was only collected from 400 rural households in the eight villages.
Therefore, in this study the evaluation of the commercial weather index insurance
program can only be conducted with a moderate size of sample.

3.2.2 Sampling Method
The sampling of the randomized control trial (RCT) part of the HARITA
project is composed of three main steps. In the first step, the research group in the
HARITA project selected three drought-prone districts (or Weredas) from the Tigray
region to be the study districts. In order to assess the drought vulnerability risk of the
districts, district-level information such as the availability of weather stations, the
historical patterns of drought occurrences and also the drought vulnerability of
agricultural production were considered. A list of drought-prone districts was then
compiled and the project selected from the list one district from three different
agro-climatic zones of the region. Specifically, the project selected the district of

21

The HARITA combines risk reduction (improved resource management), risk transfer(weather
index insurance) and credit facilities (prudent risk taking) to strengthen the livelihood of poor farmers
(Oxfam America, 2010)
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Kolla Temben in the Central Tigray, the district of Raya Azebo in the Southern
Tigray and the district of Saesie Tsaedaemba in the Eastern Tigray.22
The second randomization step was to select treatment and control villages
(or Tabyas) from the three sample districts. A total of eight drought-prone villages
from the three sample districts were randomly selected using procedures similar to
those in the selection of drought-prone districts (as mentioned above). In this step,
three drought-prone villages were selected from the district of Kolla Temben, three
villages were selected from the district of Raya Azebo, and two villages were
selected from the district of Saesie Tsaedaemba. Furthermore, one village in each of
the three districts (three villages in total) was randomly assigned to be the control
villages. The other five villages were assigned to receive the weather index insurance
program and are the treatment villages of the study.
The third step was the selection of sample households from the eight villages
for the study. Although weather index insurance was offered to all rural households
in the five treatment villages, due to resource considerations, in 2010 the HARITA
project did not collect baseline survey data with all households in these villages.
Instead, the HARITA project only conducted surveys with about 400 households
randomly selected from the villages.
In the eight sample villages there were three different types of rural
households: (1) households in the three control villages that were not offered weather
index insurance; (2) households in the five treatment villages that were offered
weather index insurance and chose to purchase the insurance; and (3) households in
22

Kolla Temben has a mono-modal rainfall pattern. It has a dry lowland agro-ecology with mainly
rugged and high mountains. The district has an average latitude of about 1,700 meters and a mean
slope of about 7.5 percent. Raya Azebo has a bi-modal rainfall pattern. It has a lowland agro-ecology
and a relatively plain topography. The district has an average latitude of about 1,700 meters and a
mean slope of about 5 percent. Saesi Tsaedaemab has a mono-modal rainfall pattern and is in a
mountainous zone (with low, middle and high lands). It has an average altitude of about 2,400 meters
and a mean slope of about 8.5 percent
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treatment villages that were also offered weather index insurance but chose not to
purchase the insurance. In order to conduct the program evaluation in a cost-effective
way, the project used a stratified sampling method in selecting rural households
(Madajewicz et al., 2011). First, in the three control villages, the project randomly
chose about three percent of the households to be part of the household sample
(henceforth, control households). In this first step, the project randomly selected a
total of 98 rural households from the three control villages. Then, from the lists of
households that purchased weather index insurance in the five treatment villages, the
project randomly selected about 15 percent of households. In this second step, a total
of 165 households were selected (henceforth, insured households). Third, from the
lists of households that chose not to purchase weather index insurance in the five
treatment villages, the project randomly selected about four percent of the
households. In this third step, a total of 132 households that did not purchase
insurance were selected (henceforth, declined households). Following these three
steps, the sample included a total of 395 households (98 + 165 + 132) at the baseline.
There was, however, an attrition in the sample. In our endline survey
conducted in 2014, we could only follow up on 373 of the 395 sample households.
However, considering that the endline survey was conducted almost four years after
the baseline survey, the rate of attrition (at only about five percent) is low. We also
compare the baseline characteristics of the households of whom we could reach at
the endline with those of whom we could not reach. We find no systematic patterns
in their baseline household characteristics and, therefore, believe that attrition would
not affect the results of this study (results of the attrition analysis not reported for the
sake of brevity).
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3.2.3 Weather Index Insurance Intervention
The intervention of this study was the offering of commercial weather index
insurance to rural households in the five treatment villages. The first step of the
intervention was to develop an objective weather index for each of the treatment
villages. In this step, the International Research Institute for Climate and Society at
Columbia University (IRI) first collected historical rainfall estimates from the
African Rainfall Climatology (ARC) satellite and, whenever available, also
ground-level rainfall information. Using these two sets of rainfall information, the
IRI then developed a village-specific weather index for each of the five treatment
villages.23 In order to ensure that the weather indexes were well calibrated, in each
of the five villages several rural households (usually the more senior and more
educated members of the communities) were invited to an interactive index
validation exercise during which they compared their past rainfall experience against
the indexes.
After the weather indexes were validated, village-specific weather index
insurance policies were developed and priced by local insurance companies.24 Since
the insurance was offered on a commercial basis, the insurance companies expected
to be able to cover their operational costs and to make a reasonable profit on average
(i.e., over the years of different rainfall levels). Insurance was offered to the rural
households in the five treatment villages through a local microfinance institution, the

23

More specifically, for each village community index insurance was designed for two major types of
staple crops (wheat and teff) and rural households could buy insurance for only one or both of the
crops. The index insurance is (Trigger and exit). A trigger is a minimum rainfall required for an
insured crop for a given phase. No payout occurs for rainfall amount above the trigger level. Payout
starts for each deficit rainfall below trigger up to the exit point. The maximum payout will be paid if
the rainfall total is below the exit level in a given phase (Norton et al., 2014)
24
Two local insurance companies (Nyala Insurance Share Company and Africa Insurance Company)
were responsible for the pricing of the insurance at different stage of the project. The two insurance
companies both further obtained reinsurance services from the SwissRe Group to reduce their level of
risk exposure.
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Dedebit Credit and Saving Institute (DeCSI), which operates in most of the rural
parts of the Tigray region. DeCSI was responsible for completing the contractual
agreement with rural households on behalf of the insurance companies. It was also
responsible for collecting insurance premiums and, if there were large rainfall shocks,
settling payout claims.
The HARITA project offered weather index insurance on a commercial basis
to all rural households in five treatment villages of the sample for four consecutive
years from 2010 to 2013. Rural households could purchase different amounts of
insurance and the most that one household could purchase had a maximum liability
(i.e., the amount of the full payout during severe droughts) of 3,000 Ethiopian Birr
per year (or at about 150 US dollars). However, as common in other insurance
programs (Gine et al., 2010), most of the rural households in our study chose to
purchase a basic amount of insurance, which had a maximum liability of 800 Birr per
year (about 40 US dollars).25 On average insurance premium was around 20 percent
of the amount of the maximum liability and most insured households contributed
around 160 Birr a year.26

3.2.4 Data Collection
This study makes use of two waves of household survey data for the
evaluation of medium-term effects of the commercial weather index insurance
program. Specifically, in July 2010 the HARITA project conducted a field survey
25

The full liability of the basic policy (at 800 Birr) was already about the average amount of total
cash loans households typically get in a year. The amount was also more than enough to cover the
average cost of several major agricultural investments including, the cost of land preparation, the cost
of hybrid seeds and the cost of chemical fertilizers.
26
In the HARITA project, there are two ways households could pay for the insurance premium. First,
households could purchase the insurance in cash. Second, if households were poor and if they were
part of the social safety net program (Productive Safety Net Program, or PSNP); households could
contribute to insurance premium by making cash-equivalent labor contributions to local public
projects.
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and collected baseline data from 400 rural households in the eight sample villages. In
February 2014 we (i.e., the author of this study) conducted a follow-up survey with
the rural households and collected endline survey data. In these two waves of surveys,
we obtained a wide range of information about the rural households. The information
included basic household characteristics, agricultural investments and production
outcomes of the households, incomes and assets of the households, and also the labor
supply of household members.
We only have data on household education expenses in the second wave and
no other child level education data such as school enrollment, school attendance,
school dropouts and other aspects of educational performance. Therefore, we cannot
examine the effect of weather index insurance on school enrollment, school
attendance and school dropouts.
We are able to study the effects of weather index insurance on school
expenses by merging the baseline and endline data. Moreover, in the endline survey
we collected education expenses data, including payments for stationery, payment
for books and uniforms, tuition fees (mainly school registration fees). Unfortunately,
data for the educational outcome variables was not included in the first wave of
household survey (baseline survey), thus, we are not able to construct a panel dataset
for the evaluation of the impacts. As a result, this study mainly makes use of data
from the endline survey. We also use the baseline data in dealing with the effects of
baseline differences.

3.2.4.1 Dependent variables: Household education expenses
In our survey, we obtained three household-level measures of household
education expenses. The first education expenses variable is general education
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expenses which include the expenses on uniform, books, and other educational
supplies. The second education expenses variable is the total amount of tuition fees
that households paid. The third education expenses variable is total education
expenses which is the sum of the other two variables above.

3.2.4.2 Treatment variables: Household insurance status
The design of our research study allows us to define two sets of treatment
dummy variables to represent the status of households in the weather index insurance
program. Since the insurance program was offered at the village level, we first
defined a dummy variable, Household in treatment village to represent whether the
households live in a treatment village and whether they were offered the weather
index insurance program. Specifically, the variable equals one (1) if rural households
lived in one of the five treatment villages and equals zero (0) if otherwise (i.e.,
households living in one of the three control villages).
Since the HARITA project provided no subsidy for insurance participation,
not every household in the five treatment villages purchased the insurance. Therefore,
we create another treatment dummy variable, Household purchased insurance, to
represent whether the rural households participated in the insurance project.
Specifically, this variable equals one (1) if rural households in the five treatment
villages purchased weather index insurance and equals zero (0) if households in the
treatment villages did not purchase the insurance. The variable is also set to zero (0)
for all sample households in the control villages.
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3.2.4.3 Control variables: Severe crop failure due to drought
We asked the sample households to report their rainfall experience in the
four-year study period (2010 to 2013) in our endline survey. Specifically, in our
endline survey, we asked households, whether they had experienced crop failure due
to drought and the severity level of crop failure. Using this information, we construct
a binary variable to measure the extent of crop failure household experienced due to
drought. Specifically, we construct the variable severe crop failure due to drought,
which the crop failure dummy takes equals one (1) if the household experienced
severe crop failure due to drought and equals zero (0) if the household did not
experience severe crop failure due to drought (either experienced no crop failure due
to drought or experienced only moderate crop failure due to drought).

3.2.4.4 Control variables: Household and child characteristics
We make use of baseline household information in the survey to construct a
number of household characteristics to be used as control variables in our estimations.
Specifically, the list of household variables includes the gender of the household
head (1=female; 0=male), the age of the household head, the number of years of
education of the household head received, the size of household, the size of farmland
the household owned, total value of agricultural production and also imputed
agricultural income. We call this set of household variables baseline household
characteristics.
In our endline survey, we also collected information about the number of
children in a household, their different age groups, including the number of children
in the household attending middle school and the number of children in the
household attending high school. The numbers of children in a household in different
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age groups are introduced to account the effect of intra-household resource allocation
on child education expenses.

3.2.5 Statistical Approach
We use different regression analysis techniques to obtain reliable estimates of
the effects of weather index insurance on household education expenses and tuition.
In our regression analysis, we use robust estimates of the standard errors with the use
of clusters of observations at village level.

3.2.5.1 Estimating intended-to-treat (ITT) effects of the weather index insurance
program
We estimate an ordinary least square (OLS) model to estimate the effects of weather
index insurance participation on household education expenses. Our OLS model is as
below:

Householdeducationexpensesijendline = a0 + a1*household_in_insurance_villageij
+ a2*Household characteristicsij + a3*Children_characteristicsij + a4*Crop failureij
+ Villagej + eij.

(1)

In other words, the base group for comparison is the control villages. Household
characteristicsij is the list of baseline household characteristics defined above.
Children education characteristicsij is a dummy variable for child education
characteristics as defined above. Crop failureij is a dummy variable used to account
the occurrence of rainfall shock. Villagej is a set of village dummy variables used to
capture village heterogeneities. The estimate for the parameter a1 is the average
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village level effects of the provision of weather index insurance. Our objective is to
test whether this coefficient is positive and statistically different from zero.

3.2.5.2 Instrumental variable estimation for the treatment-on-the-treated effects of
the weather index insurance program
Since the HARITA project did not provide subsidies to rural households for
insurance participation, in the treatment villages insurance participation was
voluntary. As such, there can be a selection bias in insurance participation and the
effect of participating in the insurance may not be correctly estimated in the above
models (see Appendix Table 1 for the determinants of insurance participation at the
baseline). In order to address this endogeneity concern, we conduct a set of
instrumental variable (IV) estimation to obtain a more reliable estimate of the
program effects. Specifically, we make use of the random assignment of the
insurance

program

across

the

eight

sample

villages

to

obtain

a

Treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effect of the program. Using the Household in
treatment village variable to instrument for the endogenous Household Purchased
Insurance variable, the first stage of the IV model can be written as follow:

Household Purchased Insuranceij = b0+ b1*Household in treatment villageij +
b2*Baselinehouseholdcharacteristicsij
a4*Crop failureij + Villagej + eij.

+

a3*Children_characteristicsij

+

(2)

We obtain from the first stage of the IV model the predicted values of the
Household purchased insurance variable, namely, Predicted household purchased
insurance. We then use this set of predictions as the independent variable of the
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second stage of the IV estimation:

Householdeducationexpensesijendline

= c0 + c1* Predicted household purchased

insuranceij+c2*Baselinehouseholdcharacteristicsij+
c3*Children_characteristicsij + c4*Crop failureij + Villagej + eij.

(3)

We hope that the estimate for the parameter c1 in the IV model above can
give us a more reliable estimate for the Treatment-on-the-treated effect of the
participation in the weather index insurance program.

3.3. Average Impact of the Weather index insurance Interventions

3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Rainfall shocks are key sources of uncertainty for farmers in our study area.
As Table 3 shows, almost all of the farmers reported experiencing rainfall shocks in
the study years (2010-2013). Specifically, 61 percent of the households living in our
study villages reported that the first rainfall shock they encountered in the last 4
years was severe. The other 39 percent of the farmers reported that they were
exposed to rainfall shock, but the rainfall shock was not severe (Table 3, Column 1
row 1). Moreover, nearly 70% of the households in our study villages reported crop
failure due to drought, which is the most commonly occurring adverse climate shock
(Table 2, Column 2 row 1).
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study.
Most of the household heads are illiterate (on average household heads attend 1.5
years of education). The households in our study area are poor small farm holders.
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The average farmer in our sample owns 3.5 tsimad of land (nearly 1 hectare) and also
an average household owns livestock value of six thousand Birr. The households in
our study spend a small amount of money on child school expenditure. In Panel B we
present summary statistics of the three types of child school expenses per semestergeneral education expenses, tuition fees and total education expenses. The
households in our sample on average spend Birr 140.36, Birr 22.61 and Birr 162.97
respectively, for general education, tuition fees and total education expenses per
semester. Table 5 compares child school expenses by treatment, on average the child
school expenses for those who purchased weather index insurance is more than the
one for households that did not purchase weather index insurance as indicated by the
two sample robust t test. General education expenses, tuition fees and total education
expenses are higher for buyers of weather index insurance than the households who
do not buy insurance (Column 1-3, row 1).

3.3.2 Multivariate Results
Our multivariate results provide a similar story as the descriptive results
described above. Specifically, when we estimated the basic model (equation 1), we
found that weather index insurance intervention improves general education
expenses. Table 6 shows that, on average there is a significant difference in general
education expenses between households in treatment and comparison villages.
Weather index insurance intervention improves general education expenses by ETB
56.10 (Column 3, row 1) and is statistically significant at the one percent level. Our
multivariate results also show that rainfall shocks adversely affect household
expenses on general education. The incident of rainfall shock reduces general
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education expenses by ETB 7.94 (Column 3, row 2), but it is not statistically
significant.

3.3.3 Instrumental variable estimations
The application of instrumental variable (IV) estimation depends on finding a
strong instrument. We use the random assignment of the weather index insurance
program at the village level as an instrument for household weather index insurance
participation in estimating the model (3) above. Our instrumental variable (IV)
estimate shows a similar story as the descriptive and the fixed effect results discussed
in table 5 and table 6 above. Among households with school-aged children, insured
households in the treatment villages invest more in child schooling expenses in
general. Particularly, table 9 shows the estimates from IV regression result. Column
2-4 and row 2 of the table shows that weather index insurance has a positive and
significant effect on the three outcome variables. As can be seen in table 9, for
example, general education expenses is Birr 52.20 higher for the households with
weather index insurance than without insurance and is statistically significant at the
five percent level. Column 3 and row 2 of the same table also shows that tuition fees
is Birr 28.47 (se=3.85) higher for households with weather index insurance than
without insurance and the values are significant at the one percent level. Tuition fee
is a mandatory fee households need to pay as long as the child stays in the school.
Tuition fees in rural Ethiopia are also mostly fixed in all government schools. In such
cases, weather index insurance should have insignificantly affect tuition fees. We
assume households in our study area may have considered for the voluntary school
contribution and other fees which are common in rural Ethiopia as part of tuition fees.
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In such cases, households are more likely to cut the non-tuition fees component at the
time of rainfall shock.
Further, to see the impact on the total education expenses, we aggregated the
total sum of general school expenses and tuition fees together in table 9. It shows that
WII intervention increases aggregate school expenses. Particularly, aggregate school
expenses is ETB 80.67(se=23.75) higher for insured households than for those
without insurance (Column 4, row 2) and is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. Moreover, as table 9 shows, rainfall shocks adversely affect household
expenditure on education. Rainfall shock reduces total education expenses by ETB
10.06(se=11.25-column 4, row 3) but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
Finally, appendix 3 tells us a story regarding educational investment respond
when both buyers and non-buyers experienced rainfall shock. In this table, we
introduce an interaction variable between household purchased insurance and
rainfall shock. As can be seen in appendix table 3, weather index insurance
compensation (ex post shock) helps buyers to maintain their educational investment
(Column 1, column 2 & column 3, row 2). However, our study lacks enough
statistical power to identify this channel.

3.4. Conclusion and Discussion

As noted in the introduction, micro and macro level uninsured shocks and
adverse events negatively affect child education outcomes. The impacts of these
shocks are severe for children of farming households that practice smallholder
rain-fed agriculture, because households practicing smallholder rain-fed agriculture
are usually poor and have few means to mitigate adverse impacts of rainfall shocks
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(Udry, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Dercon et al., 2005). They have low income and
savings, they barely have access to formal credit and insurance mechanisms and their
informal social networks are not effective because of the systemic nature of weather
shocks.
In principle, it is possible that weather index insurance participation helps
rural households to invest in their children’s education. Specifically, if weather index
insurance can help rural households better manage rainfall risks a priori and can help
rural households increase the level of agricultural investment and hence also their
agricultural yield and income (Giné and Yang, 2009; Hill & Angelino, 2010; Cole et
al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), rural households may have more financial resources to
meet with the investment needs of their children’s education. Furthermore, when
facing large rainfall shocks, insured households may also receive monetary
compensation from the insurance policy and this compensation may help them
overcome cash constraints that usually take place after rainfall shocks. Rural
households with such compensation are therefore less likely to cut investment in
their children’s education after rainfall shocks.
In this study, we evaluate the impact of weather index insurance on child
education expenses based on evidence from rural households in Northern Ethiopia.
To examine the impacts, we conduct a randomized control trial (RCT) that has been
conducted by HARITA research group on a sample of 8 villages and 400 households
in Northern Ethiopia in 2010. The results indicate that WII is relevant in determining
household school expenses because insured households are effectively protected
from the rainfall shock, which often induces them to reduce educational expenses. In
addition, education expenditure is higher for rural households with WII than those
without the insurance. These results are statistically significant.
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Further, we also find that rainfall shocks have negative effects on household
education expenses. Rainfall shock (proxied in our analysis by the severity of crop
failure due to rainfall shock) shows negative effects on household education
expenses.
These results are consistent with theoretical notion on the role of WII in
reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses. It was shown that
weather index insurance affects education expenses in two ways: WII helps
households earn higher income due its effect on farm investment, yield and
agricultural income (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), in turn, increasing
expenses including investment on education. Second, as noted in the literature, WII
is one of the risk coping strategies that help households to smooth consumption
during adverse shocks. Therefore, insurance policy holders are less likely to cut
school expenses compared to non-buyers.
Even though our study may not have enough statistical power to identify
some of the theoretical channels regarding rainfall shocks, weather index insurance
and compensation from insurance policy, but overall our results are consistent with
the story that rainfall shock experience reduces education expenses, weather index
insurance helps better management of educational investment and insurance
compensation also help to maintain education investment.
Finally, having shown that the introduction of weather index insurance can
play a role in reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses and
given the importance of such investment for human capital formation, this implies
that policies aimed at insuring rural households against rainfall shocks may lead to an
improvement in households’ educational investment.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1
Summary statistics of sample rural households in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia (N=373)
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
A. Household characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.35
0.48
0.00
1.00
Age of household head (in years)
43.92
14.02
18.00
80.00
Years of education of household head
1.54
2.58
0.00
10.00
Size of household
5.33
2.24
1.00
12.00
B. Children count in primary, middle & high school
age
Number of children in primary school age
0.96
0.87
0.00
3.00
Number of children in middle school age
0.27
0.45
0.00
2.00
Number of children in high school age
0.61
0.75
0.00
3.00
C. Household asset
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
3.49
2.93
0.00
22.50
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
6.19
9.15
0.00
67.55
D. Agricultural yield
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)
5.06
25.44
0.00
441.02
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
3.67
25.55
-10.45
440.15
E. Children education expenses
General education expenses (in Birr)
140.4
218.1
0.0
1,950.0
Tuition fees (in Birr)
22.6
53.2
0.0
700.0
Total children education expenses (in Birr)
163.0
241.7
0.0
1,970.0
Data source: Data for Panel A, Panel C and Panel D are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010
baseline survey. Data for Panel B & E is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author.
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Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare.
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Table 2
Self-reports of major shocks among sample households in Rural Tigray in 2010 (N=373)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Percent of
Percent of Percent of Percent of
Percent of
households households households households
households
who reported
who
who
who
who reported
the specified reported the reported the reported the
the problem
shock is main problem is problem is problem is
is severe
problem
minor
moderate
serious
Crop failure due to drought
70.1
2.5
5.1
14.7
48.8
Crop failure due to pests
41.5
9.8
12.2
11.1
8.4
Unusual temperatures
28.6
7.1
14.4
5.8
1.2
Flood disaster
46.1
5.3
10.4
16.7
13.7
Hailstorms
28.6
12.4
7.8
5.3
3.0
Illness in the family
33.9
11.9
5.1
9.4
7.6
Death in the family
23.3
12.2
2.0
4.1
5.1
Loss of a job
19.2
8.7
4.1
4.3
2.0
Changes in market prices
24.3
5.8
10.9
5.3
2.3
Data source: Data for the 2010 baseline survey is obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program.
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Table 3
Reported severity level of the worst rainfall shocks households faced in the last 4 years
(2010-2013), (N=373)
(1)
(2)
Percentage of
Percentage of
households who
households who
reported the shock reported the shock
was severe
was not severe
Severity of the first rainfall shock
61.13
38.87
(1=Severe; 0=Not severe)
Severity of the second rainfall shock
25.74
74.26
(1=Severe; 0=Not severe)
Data source: 2013 endline survey by the author.
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Table 4
Mean Comparison of sample rural households in offering & control villages in the Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia
Offering
Control
Difference
village
village
(1) – (2)
(N=280)
(N=93)
(1)
(2)
(3)
A. Household characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.37
0.27
0.09*(0.057)
Age of household head (in years)
42.6
47.7
-5.1**(1.65)
Years of education of household head
1.6
1.3
0.3(0.308)
Size of household
5.2
5.4
-0.2(0.267)
Number of children in primary school age
1
0.83
0.17* (0.104)
Number of children in middle school age
0.26
0.29
-0.02 (0.054)
Number of children in high school age
0.62
0.54
0.07 (0.090)
B. Household asset
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
3.8
2.4
1.4***(0.342)
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
6.56
5.05
1.51 (1.09)
C. Agricultural yield
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000
5.48
3.77
1.71 (3.04)
Birr)
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
3.93
2.86
1.07 (3.06)
Data source: Except for the data for the number of children in primary, middle and high school age school; the other data is obtained from 2010
survey provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program. Data for the number of children primary, middle and
high school age is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author.
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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Table 5
Mean comparison by WII treatment status for the sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2013
Outcome variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
General education
Tuition fees
Total education
expenses
expenses
Household purchased insurance
47.78**
10.89**
58.67**
(1=Yes; 0=No)
(22.40)
(5.45)
(24.79)
Data source: Author’s survey.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
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Table 6
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education expenses
(1)
(2)
(3)
General
General
General
education
education
education
expenses
expenses
expenses
**
***
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No)
54.95
87.53
56.10***
(18.81)
(9.83)
(11.78)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks household
-18.99
-7.52
-7.94
faced in the last four years
(16.67)
(13.52)
(15.24)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
72.05*
69.71**
(34.47)
(22.79)
Age of household head (in years)
0.82*
0.56
(0.36)
(0.32)
Years of education of household head
9.16**
9.71***
(2.85)
(2.74)
Size of household
31.44***
13.00**
(5.83)
(4.43)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-1.76
-1.98
(3.91)
(3.95)
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-1.26
-1.85
(2.32)
(1.66)
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)
17.45*
16.32
(8.42)
(8.82)
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
-17.75*
-16.51*
(8.28)
(8.67)
Number of children in primary school age
29.02***
(7.06)
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Number of children in middle school age

18.62
(32.18)
Number of children in high school age
80.05**
(29.54)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
373
372
372
Adjusted R-square
0.03
0.17
0.23
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school
age, and general education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
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Table 7
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on tuition expenses
(1)
(2)
(3)
Tuition
Tuition
Tuition
expenses
expenses
expenses
*
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No)
-9.74
8.40
2.89
(6.14)
(3.73)
(5.29)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks
2.61
4.41
4.27
household faced in the last four years
(5.44)
(5.51)
(5.82)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
5.11
4.55
(7.17)
(5.02)
Age of household head (in years)
0.09
0.00
(0.15)
(0.14)
Years of education of household head
1.63
1.74
(1.17)
(1.09)
Size of household
3.98**
0.11
(1.33)
(1.27)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-0.52
-0.59
(0.54)
(0.46)
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-0.21
-0.32**
(0.14)
(0.11)
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)
2.23*
1.99*
(1.13)
(0.97)
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
-2.28*
-2.02*
(1.14)
(0.98)
Number of children in primary school age
4.10
(4.19)
Number of children in middle school age
9.65
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(7.13)
16.44*
(7.99)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
373
372
372
Adjusted R-square
0.03
0.08
0.12
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school
age, and tuition expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village
level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
Number of children in high school age
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Table 8
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on total education expenses
(1)
(2)
(3)
Total
Total
Total
education
education
education
expenses
expenses
expenses
*
***
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No)
45.20
95.93
58.99***
(21.70)
(10.69)
(13.40)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks
-16.38
-3.11
-3.67
household faced in the last four years
(19.24)
(15.83)
(17.40)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
77.16*
74.26***
(35.42)
(21.20)
Age of household head (in years)
0.91*
0.57
(0.40)
(0.32)
Years of education of household head
10.80**
11.45**
(3.60)
(3.29)
Size of household
35.42***
13.11**
(6.94)
(5.10)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-2.29
-2.57
(4.02)
(4.04)
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-1.47
-2.17
(2.34)
(1.60)
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)
19.69**
18.31*
(8.23)
(8.61)
**
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
-20.03
-18.53*
(8.09)
(8.45)
Number of children in primary school age
33.12***
(8.93)
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Number of children in middle school age

28.27
(28.93)
Number of children in high school age
96.50**
(35.93)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
373
372
372
Adjusted R-square
0.03
0.18
0.25
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school
age, and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
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Table 9
IV estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education, tuition & total education expenses
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Household
General
Tuition
Total
Purchased education expenses education
insurance
expenses
expenses
(1=Yes;0=
No)
Household in treatment village (1=Yes;
0.83***
0=No)
(0.03)
Household purchase insurance (1=Yes;
52.20**
28.47***
80.67***
0=No)
(26.48)
(3.85)
(23.75)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks
0.09**
-10.85
0.79
-10.06
household faced in the last four years
(0.04)
(10.42)
(3.67)
(11.25)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.08
67.00***
2.37
69.37***
(0.05)
(19.26)
(3.93)
(16.83)
Age of household head (in years)
-0.00
0.71**
0.08
0.80**
(0.00)
(0.33)
(0.14)
(0.33)
***
Years of education of household head
0.01
9.54
1.55
11.09***
(0.01)
(2.35)
(1.10)
(2.97)
***
Size of household
0.02
11.24
-0.41
10.84**
(0.01)
(4.00)
(1.06)
(4.34)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
0.00
-2.17
-0.62
-2.79
(0.00)
(3.41)
(0.49)
(3.45)
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-0.01**
-1.39
-0.04
-1.43
(0.00)
(1.55)
(0.13)
(1.56)
Total value of agricultural produce (in
-0.01
16.81**
2.17**
18.98**
1,000 Birr)
(0.01)
(7.99)
(1.03)
(7.83)
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0.01
-17.05**
-2.21**
-19.26**
(0.01)
(7.84)
(1.04)
(7.67)
0.03**
27.89***
3.34
31.23***
(0.01)
(6.58)
(3.59)
(7.94)
Number of children in middle school age
0.04
15.99
8.81
24.80
(0.05)
(27.89)
(6.65)
(24.21)
Number of children in high school age
-0.02
83.23***
16.70**
99.92***
(0.03)
(24.84)
(6.64)
(29.93)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
372
372
372
372
Adjusted R-square
0.51
0.23
0.10
0.25
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school
age, general education, tuition and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000
Birr)
Number of children in primary school age
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Appendix
Appendix Table 1
OLS regression: The participation of weather index insurance among rural households in 2010
Dependent variable: Household purchased
insurance (1=Yes; 0=No)
(1)
(2)
Household in insurance offering village
0.644***(0.091)
0.695***(0.066)
(1=Yes; 0=No)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.148*(0.067)
0.079 (0.062)
Age of household head (in years)
-0.002**(0.001)
-0.002 (0.001)
Years of education of household head
0.008 (0.007)
0.013 (0.008)
Size of household
0.012* (0.006)
0.030**(0.009)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-0.011 (0.008)
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-0.012***(0.003)
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000
-0.009* (0.004)
Birr)
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
0.010* (0.004)
Data source: Data for the 2010 survey is provided by the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program.
Note: Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad is 0.25 hectare. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are
reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance atsum the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Appendix Table 2
OLS estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education, tuition & total education expenses
(1)
(2)
(3)
General
Tuition
Total
education
expenses
education
expenses
expenses
***
Household in treatment village (1=Yes; 0=No)
56.10
2.89
58.99***
(11.78)
(5.29)
(13.40)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks
-7.94
4.27
-3.67
household faced in the last four years
(15.24)
(5.82)
(17.40)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
69.71**
4.55
74.26***
(22.79)
(5.02)
(21.20)
Age of household head (in years)
0.56
0.00
0.57
(0.32)
(0.14)
(0.32)
Years of education of household head
9.71***
1.74
11.45**
(2.74)
(1.09)
(3.29)
Size of household
13.00**
0.11
13.11**
(4.43)
(1.27)
(5.10)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-1.98
-0.59
-2.57
(3.95)
(0.46)
(4.04)
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-1.85
-0.32**
-2.17
(1.66)
(0.11)
(1.60)
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)
16.32
1.99*
18.31*
(8.82)
(0.97)
(8.61)
*
*
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
-16.51
-2.02
-18.53*
(8.67)
(0.98)
(8.45)
***
Number of children in primary school age
29.02
4.10
33.12***
(7.06)
(4.19)
(8.93)
103

Number of children in middle school age

18.62
9.65
28.27
(32.18)
(7.13)
(28.93)
Number of children in high school age
80.05**
16.44*
96.50**
(29.54)
(7.99)
(35.93)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
372
372
372
Adjusted R-square
0.23
0.12
0.25
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school
age, general education, tuition and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
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Appendix Table 3
IV estimates of the effects of weather index insurance on general education, tuition & total education expenses
(1)
(2)
(3)
General
Tuition
Total
education
expenses
education
expenses
expenses
***
Household purchase insurance (1=Yes; 0=No)
30.74
21.07
51.81
(47.21)
(3.46)
(45.02)
Household purchased insurance * Rainfall shock
35.23
12.15*
47.38
(44.95)
(7.18)
(46.05)
Reported number of severe rainfall shocks
-26.36
-4.56***
-30.92*
household faced in the last four years
(19.26)
(1.76)
(18.53)
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
65.50***
1.86
67.36***
(20.05)
(3.99)
(17.88)
Age of household head (in years)
0.66*
0.06
0.72**
(0.37)
(0.13)
(0.36)
Years of education of household head
9.55***
1.55
11.11***
(2.44)
(1.07)
(3.02)
**
Size of household
10.97
-0.50
10.47**
(4.28)
(1.16)
(4.78)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-2.25
-0.65
-2.91
(3.40)
(0.46)
(3.42)
Total value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-1.03
0.09
-0.94
(1.72)
(0.17)
(1.80)
Total value of agricultural produce (in 1,000 Birr)
16.37*
2.02**
18.39**
(8.39)
(1.00)
(8.28)
**
**
Imputed agricultural income (in 1,000 Birr)
-16.62
-2.06
-18.67**
(8.23)
(1.00)
(8.11)
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26.88***
2.99
29.87***
(5.77)
(3.35)
(6.99)
Number of children in middle school age
15.23
8.55
23.79
(28.18)
(6.42)
(24.55)
Number of children in high school age
82.97***
16.61**
99.57***
(24.58)
(6.70)
(29.69)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations (N)
372
372
372
Adjusted R-square
0.23
0.09
0.24
Data source: Data for household characteristics, household asset and agricultural yield are obtained from Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for
Adaptation (HARITA) program 2010 baseline survey the 2010 baseline survey. Data for the number of children primary, middle and high school
age, general education, tuition and total education expenses is obtained from the 2013 endline survey by the author. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level.
Number of children in primary school age
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CHAPTER 4
Aggregating and disaggregating risk preference: Evidence from a framing
experiment among Ethiopian farmers

4.1 Introduction
Economists have long been investigating the risk preference of individuals
and also the aggregation of risk preference of individuals in small groups.27 The
literature generally finds that groups are more averse to risks and uncertainties than
individuals. In some of the literature, groups are also shown to be more risk averse
than individuals are in more risky situations and are less risk averse than individuals
in less risky situations (Shupp & Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al.,
2009; Sutter et al., 2012).
Despite the large body of theoretical and empirical literature, the existing
literature on the aggregation of individual risk preference, however, contains a few
gaps. First, the literature fails to distinguish and compare two different types of
research designs that examine the aggregation of individual risk preference.
Specifically, in the literature there are two-arm one-stage research studies that
compare the risk preference of a sample of individuals side-by-side with the
aggregate risk preference of groups that are formed by a different sample of
individuals (Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Masclet et al., 2009); there also are one-arm
two-stage research studies that compare the risk preference of individuals with the

27

The main issues considered in the first groups of literature are assessing and measuring the risk
preference of individuals using different risk preference eliciting methods (Becker et al., 1964;
Binswanger, 1980; Harrison, 1986; Holt & Laury, 2002; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007;
Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Charness et al., 2012; Noelck & Musshoff, 2013) and the second group of
the literature (Bateman & Munro 2005; Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Shupp & Williams 2008; Masclet et
al., 2009; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Carlsson et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al.,
2012; Ambrus et al., 2015) examine individual and a small member groups decision making behavior
under risk and uncertainty.
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aggregate risk preference of groups that are sequentially formed by the same sample
of individuals (Bateman & Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter
et al., 2012; Amnrus et al., 2015).28 While both types of research design show that
small groups are more risk averse than individuals, to our knowledge, no literature
has examined whether or not the results obtained from these two sets of research
designs are qualitatively the same. In particular, except for a few ones (e.g., Shupp &
Williams 2008) most of the literature has not pointed out whether prior structural
manifestation of individual risk preference has any effects on the aggregation of
individual risk preferences in small groups.
Second, the existing literature almost totally neglects the disaggregation of
group risk preference back to individual risk preference (Baker et al., 2008). The
disaggregation of group risk preference has also important economic implications,
however. Many decisions made collectively by small groups under risks and
uncertainties have to be further managed by or executed by only individuals of the
groups. As the literature has shown that individuals are typically less risk averse than
groups, so it is important to study whether individuals who participated in group
decisions on risk and uncertainty tend to be more risk averse as compared to those
who do not. In particular, whether individuals who experienced risk preference
decisions in small groups will bring forward the aggregate risk preference of the
group or will actually revert back to their individual level of risk preference. The
literature, however, is basically silent on this aspect. Specifically, it is unclear if prior
communication, knowledge, and decision-making on aggregate risk preference in
small groups will affect individual risk preference.

28

Baker et al., 2008 exceptionally examine a one-arm three-stage research
(individual-group-individual) and further investigate how participations in a group discussion (second
stage) affect individual risk preference in the third stage (phase).
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Third, most empirical research on the aggregation of individual risk
preference are conducted in experimental settings and computer labs using only
convenience samples of university students (Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Shupp &
Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; He et al., 2011) or self-selected groups of
individuals such as married couples (Bateman & Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009;
Sutter et al., 2012). In the first case, however, there raises questions about whether
the findings obtained from university students can offer practical values for real
world situations and decisions faced by individuals and groups of different
background (Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton, 2015). In the second case, there
also are concerns about how decisions made by such endogenously formed groups
can be generalized.
Fourth, because of research budgetary limitations the experimental scale in
the existing studies is mostly either small scale as in the case of (Bateman & Munro
2005; Shupp & Williams 2008; Parkinson & Baddeley, 2011) or moderate scale
(Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Man & Norton,
2015).29 By contrast, this research is conducted in Ethiopia with poor rural farmers
and the lower per capita income in Ethiopia allow us to conduct a large scale field
experiment by providing small cash amount ($3 per participant) as an incentive for
participation in the experiment.
This study is designed to address these several limitations of the existing
literature and has three main goals. First, we aim to compare the two different
aggregation methods of individual risk preference in small groups and evaluate
whether the mechanisms on individual risk preference aggregation can have
29

The RCT scale classification is relative. In our search for related studies 52 and 204 respectively,
are the smallest and the largest sample sizes and we set a sample size of 100 and below as small scale
and a sample size between 100 and 204 as medium scale. To our knowledge, no related study has
examined using a sample size of greater than 204.
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differential effects on the elicited group risk preference. Specifically, we want to
examine whether results obtained from two-arm one-stage research design are
qualitatively the same as those that are obtained from one-arm two-stage research
design.
Second, we want to investigate the disaggregation of group risk preference
back to individual risk preference. Specifically, we want to examine whether the
experience of risk preference exercise in small groups and knowledge of prior group
risk preference exercise has any effects on individual risk preference.
Third, we want to conduct a risk preference study using a more
methodological sampling procedure to obtain a study sample that has both a higher
degree of external validity and also a better representation of real communities that
regularly faces risks and uncertainties.
In order to achieve these goals, we conduct a randomized field experiment
that comprises two experimental arms and two experimental phases. Specifically, our
experiment contains a Risk Preference Individual to Group Arm in which
participants have to take part in a series of risk preference elicitation exercise
individually in the first phase before taking part in a similar series of risk preference
elicitation exercise collectively as a group in the second phase. Our experiment also
contains a Risk Preference Group to Individual Arm in which participants have to
first take part in a series of risk preference elicitation exercise collectively as a group
in the first phase before taking part in a similar series of risk preference elicitation
exercise individually in the second phase.
The above experimental setting can help us achieve our goals. First, by
comparing the group risk preference of the Individual to Group Arm with the group
risk preference of Group to Individual Arm, we can evaluate whether the
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mechanisms on individual risk preference aggregation can have differential effects
on the elicited group risk preference. Second, by comparing the individual risk
preference of the Individual to Group arm with the individual risk preference of the
Group to Individual arm, we can show how the experience of risk preference
exercise in small groups and prior knowledge of group risk preference can affect
individual risk preference.
We also conduct our randomized field experiment with a large number of
rural farmers randomly selected from Northern Ethiopia. We conduct our study in the
rural part of a poor developing country because the societal structures of most
developing countries in Africa revolve around small groups and clusters. Many
important decisions on farming practices, technological adoption, agricultural
production and environmental protection are commonly done in groups. In particular,
rural farmers undertake economic, political and environmental decisions in groups,
suggesting that group decision-making plays an important role in developing
countries.
Our study has a few limitations, however. First, unlike the other studies
(Shupp & Williams 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2012)
that have used cash rewards in their risk preference experiment, due to resource
limitations, in our lottery exercises we conducted a hypothetical lottery game instead
of lotteries with real payoffs. However, to minimize potential hypothetical bias,
participants were given a consent form to sign. The consent form states the purpose
of the study, its implications for real life, willingness to participate (free to withdraw
at any time) and once anyone decided to participate he/she has to tell the truth.
Second, we only conduct a randomized field experiment and do not have the
capacity and facilities to conduct lab-in-the-field experiment. However, to get
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reliable information from the field experiment, we hired well trained enumerators
who can explain and elaborate the hypothetical lottery games to our subjects clearly.
We also provided the enumerators detailed experimental instructions that can help
them to smoothly conduct the field experiment (More details in Appendix 1, 2 & 3).
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our research
methodology, which includes our sampling methods, experimental arms and phases,
data collection and statistical approaches. Section 3 presents the empirical results.
Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.

4.2. Research Methodology

4.2.1 Sampling method
We conduct our risk preference randomized field experiment in the Tigray
Region of Northern Ethiopia. The Tigray Region is predominately rural, poor and the
per capita income of the region is only US$230 (Tigray Bureau of Plan & Finance,
2010). Farmers in the region typically practices low-yield smallholder rain-fed
agriculture with limited technology inputs and no irrigation water (Ersado et al.,
2004). Negative rainfall shocks are a major threat to agriculture in the region and
severe droughts had occurred multiple times in the past decades (Kumasi and
Asenso-Okyere, 2011).
We conduct our field experiment with a total of 571 farmers that are
randomly selected from the Tigray Region. The sampling method comprises four
main steps. First, we selected four drought-prone districts (or Weredas) from
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different parts of the region to be our study districts.30 Then, we randomly selected
eight different administrative villages (or Tabyas) in each of the four sample districts
to obtain a sample of 32 villages. Third, in each of the 32 administrative villages we
randomly chose two sub-village clusters (or Kushets which are essentially natural
villages) to obtain a total of 64 sub-village clusters. In the last step, we randomly
selected nine poor farmers in each of the 64 sub-village clusters to be the farmer
sample of our study. In doing these steps, we targeted to obtain a total of 576 sample
farmers.31 However, our final sample contains only 571 farmers because five of the
farmers could not show up due to health problems.

4.2.2 Experimental design and research hypothesis
We randomly allocate farmers in our sample into the two experimental arms
of our study. In order to obtain a balanced sample of farmers between our two
experimental arms, we allocate farmers to the two experimental arms using a within
cluster randomization procedure. Specifically, within each of the 64 sub-village
clusters, we first randomly put the nine farmers into three groups of three farmers.
We then randomly assign one of the three farmer groups to the Individual to Group
Arm and also one other group to the Group to Individual Arm. There still remain two
groups of three farmers in each of the 32 sample villages (one group of three farmers

30

The current study shares the same sampling frame with an ongoing randomized control experiment
on weather index insurance and agricultural input coupons. Therefore, our four sample districts are all
drought-prone districts and in order to assess the drought vulnerability risk of the districts,
district-level information such as the availability of weather stations, the historical patterns of drought
occurrences and also the drought vulnerability of agricultural production were considered. In this step,
we selected the districts of Ganta-Afeshum and Gulo-Maheda in the Eastern Tigray, and the districts
of Enderta and Hintalo-Wajirat in the Southern Tigray. However, the experimental interventions of the
other studies were designed to be orthogonal to those in this study. Specifically, the fieldwork of this
current study was completed before the introduction of interventions on weather index insurance and
agricultural input coupons.
31
Farmers in our sample are poor and are all members of Productive Safety Net program (PSNP)
which targeted to help chronically food insecure rural households (WFP, 2012).

113

per each of the two sub-village clusters in a village). We then randomly allocate
these two remaining groups of the villages to the two experimental arms.
The two experimental arms of this study are named the Risk Preference
Individual to Group Arm and the Risk Preference Group to Individual Arm
(henceforth, Individual to Group Arm and Group to Individual Arm). Farmers in
both of the experimental arms have to go through two phases of risk preference
elicitation exercise. Specifically, farmers assigned to the Individual to Group Arms
have to take part in the Individual Risk Preference Exercises first and then the Group
Risk Preference Exercise. Farmers assigned to the Group to Individual Arms instead
have to first take part in the Group Risk Preference Exercise and then the Individual
Risk Preference Exercise.
4.2.2.1 Individual Risk Preference Exercise
The Individual Risk Preference Exercise (henceforth, Individual Exercise)
contains nine hypothetical lotteries that farmers are asked to take part in individually.
We asked each individual farmer to tell us the maximum amount of cash that the
farmer is willing to pay for participating in a lottery that would hypothetically give
the farmers a chance to win 100 birr in cash (about US$4.5 or about 5 days of causal
labor wages). In the nine hypothetical lotteries, there are some chances to win 100
birr in cash and the nine games carry different chances of winning. The nine
hypothetical lotteries carries different chances of winning and the win percentages of
the lotteries range from 10% to 90%. In order to ensure that farmers are able to take
part in the individual exercise without interference from each other, we conduct the
individual exercise with individual farmers at a distance of others to prohibit
communication among farmers.
4.2.2.2 Group Risk Preference Exercise
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The Group Risk Preference Exercise (henceforth, Group Exercise) has a
similar design to the Individual Exercise. Farmers were put into three-member
groups to participate in the group risk preference exercise. In the exercise, we asked
the group to make one decision for each of the nine lotteries on the maximum
amount of cash that the group is willing to pay in order to play the lottery. Farmers
were allowed to make group decision after free discussion and the discussion may
involve different forms of communications such as sharing, debate, and persuasion.
No specific guidelines were provided to the farmers. The hypothetical lotteries in the
group exercise were almost identical to those in the individual exercise. We asked
the farmer group to tell us the maximum amount of cash that the farmer is willing to
pay for participating in a lottery that would hypothetically give the farmers a chance
to win 300 birr in cash (about US$13.5 or about 15 days of causal labor wages). The
cash outcome of the hypothetical lotteries is to be divided and shared equally within
the group. Among the nine hypothetical lotteries, there are some chances to win 300
birr in cash and the nine games carry different chances of winning. The nine
hypothetical lotteries carries different chances of winning and the win percentages of
the lotteries range from 10% to 90%. Farmers in the group were allowed to
communicate with each other, but not with anyone outside of the groups.
Appendix 1 presents the instructions of our risk preference experiment we
provided for our enumerators. Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 present the experimental
instruments used in the individual risk preference exercise and the group risk
preference exercise respectively.
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4.2.2.3 Experimental propositions
Figure 4 summarizes the overall experimental design. Our experimental
design allows us to undertake five different comparisons on the aggregation and
disaggregation of risk preference.
First, by comparing the individual risk preference of the Individual to Group
Arm with the group risk preference of the Group to Individual Arm (i.e., Phase One
of the two arms), we can obtain an estimate of the pure risk preference differential
(or across-subject differential).
Second, by comparing the individual risk preference of the Individual to
Group Arm with the group risk preference of the same arm (i.e., Phase One and
Phase Two of the Individual to Group Arm), we can obtain an estimate of the
aggregation effects of risk preference within subjects.
Third, by comparing the group risk preference of the Group to Individual
Arm with the individual risk preference of the same arm (i.e., Phase One and Phase
Two of the Group to Individual Arm), we can obtain an estimate of the
disaggregation effects of risk preference within subjects.
Fourth, by comparing the group risk preference of the Individual to Group
Arm with the group risk preference of the Group to Individual arm (i.e., Phase Two
of the Individual to Group Arm and Phase One of the Group to Individual Arm), we
can obtain an estimate of the individual risk preference exercise on group risk
preference.
Fifth and finally, by comparing the individual risk preference of the
Individual to Group Arm with the individual risk preference of the Group to
Individual arm (i.e., Phase One of the Individual to Group Arm and Phase Two of the
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Group to Individual Arm), we can obtain an estimate of the group risk preference
exercise on individual risk preference.

4.2.3 Data Collection
In November 2015, our research team visited each study villages and
households and conducted a baseline survey. The survey collected information on
socioeconomic data, including farmer demographic characteristics, wealth and assets
(including size of farmland, livestock and productive assets), numeracy score, risk
aversion and community trust score. Six months later in April 2016, we invited the
farmers to participate in our risk preference experiment. Since the farmers in the
April intervention are exactly the same as the farmers interviewed in November, we
matched the experimental information with that of the information collected in the
main survey and create a full set of information. Consequently, we make use of a set
of household characteristics and other control variables from the baseline survey.
4.2.3.1 Dependent variables: Certainty Equivalent Ratio (CER)
Following Shupp & Williams (2008), we use the Certainty Equivalent Ratio
(CER) as our measure of risk preference to be our dependent variable. CER is
defined as the ratio of a farmer’s willingness to pay (WTP) to play a lottery to the
lottery’s expected value. CER = 1 indicates risk neutrality, CER less than one (1)
implies risk-averse and CER greater than one (1) corresponds to risk loving
preference over a specific lottery (Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Shupp & Williams,
2008).32 We choose CER because our study farmers have low literacy levels (on

32

We also run second sets of regressions using the coefficient of risk aversion (r). The coefficient of
risk aversion is defined as:𝑟 = 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐸𝑅⁄(𝑙𝑛𝑃 + 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐸𝑅) , where P is the lottery probability of winning.
r=0 implies risk neutrality, r>0 implies risk aversion and r<0 implies risk loving. Results for the
second sets of regression are not shown but are available upon request.
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average a farmer in our study attended 2.8 years of education) and the willingness to
pay experiment to measure risk preference is easier to understand than the Holt and
Laury (2002) risk task that requires knowledge of expected payoffs and variance.
4.2.3.2 Treatment variables
In order to examine the different experimental propositions stated above, we
construct three different treatment variables to measure different aspects of our
experimental design for analysis.
First, in order to indicate the experimental arm that the farmers belong to, we
defined a dummy variable Group to Individual Arm. Specifically, this variable equals
one (1) if the farmer was assigned to the Group to Individual Arm (i.e., participating
first in the group exercise before the individual exercise) and zero (0) if the farmer
was assigned to the Individual to Group Arm (i.e., participating in the individual
exercise before the group exercise).
In order to examine the effect of group exercise on individual risk preference,
we created a dummy variable Farmer had group exercise to represent the farmer’s
experience when they participate in the individual exercise. Specifically, the variable
equals one (1) if the farmer had already participated in a group exercise and zero (0)
if otherwise.
Finally and similarly, in order to examine the effect of individual exercise on
group risk preference, we created another dummy variable Farmer had individual
exercise to represent the farmer’s experience when they participate in the group
exercise. Specifically, the variable equals one (1) if the farmer had already
participated in an individual exercise and zero (0) if otherwise.
4.2.3.3 Control variables

118

We also make use of other information in our survey to construct a number of
individual characteristics to be used as control variables in our estimations.
Specifically, the list of individual characteristics includes the gender of the farmer
(1=female; 0=male), the age of the farmer (in years), the number of years of
education of the farmer, the size of household, the size of farmland the household
owned, the value of productive assets the household owned and also the value of
livestock the household owned. We call this set of variables individual
characteristics.

4.2.4 Statistical Approach
We use both descriptive statistics and regression analyses to examine our
empirical propositions. In our regression analysis, we use robust estimates of the
standard errors with the clustering of observations at the village level.
4.2.4.1 Fixed effects model
We specify our fixed effects (FE) regression model as follows.

CERij = bo + b1*Treatment variableij + b2*Individual characteristicsij + μj +
υk + eij.

(1)

CERij is certainty equivalent ratio. Individual characteristicsij is the set of individual
characteristics as defined before. We also include village dummy variables, μj, and
enumerator dummy variables, υk, to control for unobserved heterogeneities of the
villages and of enumerators.
In this model, Treatment Variable can be one of the three variables that we
discussed above, namely Group to Individual Arm, Farmer had group exercise and
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Farmer had individual exercise. When the treatment variable is Group to Individual
Arm, we are estimating the pure risk preference differential between groups and
individuals. When the treatment variable is Farmer had group exercise, we are
estimating the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual risk preference.
Lastly, when the treatment variable is Farmer had individual exercise, we are
estimating the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group risk preference.
We hope that the estimate for the parameter b1 can tell us whether the above effects
mentioned in section 4.2.2.3 exist.
4.2.4.2 Fixed effects model with interaction terms with Lottery Win Percentage
In order to examine whether the effects found vary by the winning percentage of
the hypothetical lotteries, we conduct a further set of regression analysis as follow:

CERij = co + c1*Treatment variableij + c2*Lottery Win Percentageij
c3*Treatment

variableij *Lottery

Win

characteristicsij + μj + υk + eij.

Percentageij

+

+

c4*Individual
(2)

In this model, Treatment Variable can be one of the three variables that we
discussed above. Lottery Win Percentage is a set of eight dummy variables that
represents the chance of winning in the hypothetical lotteries. We also include a set
of eight interaction variable constructed by multiplying the Treatment Variable with
the Lottery Win Percentage variable. We hope that the estimate for the parameter c1
can tell us whether the expected effects mentioned in section 4.2.2.3 exist.
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4.3. Empirical Results

4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample farmers. There are
more female farmers than male farmers in our sample. On average, 57 percent of our
study respondents are female farmers, and the remaining 43 percent are male farmers.
The average age of farmers is 47 years and most of the farmers have low literacy
level. On average farmers attended 2.8 years of education. The average household
size is 5.4 members. The farmers are poor. The average per capita livestock value is
about 980 birr and also households on average own nearly 1.8 tsimad (less than 0.5
hectare) of land for farming.
Table 2 presents mean of individual characteristics of the farmers by the two
experimental arms. The table shows that our sample in the two experiment arms is
extremely well balanced. None of the individual characteristics are statistically
different between the two experiment arms. Consequently, we created two perfectly
balanced samples of farmers that are highly statistical balanced (288 farmers in
Individual to Group Arm and 283 farmers in Group to Individual Arm).
Table 3 describes famers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the hypothetical
lottery by experimental arms (Individual to Group versus Group to Individual arm).
The first two columns (A1 & A2) respectively show individual and group WTP for
the Individual to Group arm and the second two columns (D1 & D2) respectively
display individual and group WTP for the Group to Individual arm. Overall,
willingness to pay is low in the low winning percentages and it is higher in the
highest winning percentages for both experimental arms.
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Table 3 can help us to examine three main comparisons. First, comparing the
individual WTP of the Individual to Group arm (A1) with the group WTP of the
Group to Individual arm (D1) shows that groups in the Group to Individual arm on
average show lower WTP in each lottery win percentage than the individuals in the
Individual to Group arm. From table 3 we also observe a clear WTP difference
between individual WTP in the Group to Individual arm (D2) and individual WTP in
the Individual to Group arm (A1). WTP for the individuals in the Group to Individual
arm is less than the WTP for the individuals in the Individual to Group arm in each
lottery win percentages. It suggests that for those individuals who previously
submitted group bid, their WTP decreased in each lottery win percentages. Third, the
table also depicts that the group WTP of the Individual to Group arm (A2) and the
group WTP of the Group to Individual arm (D1) are not significantly different. This
supports that having prior knowledge and decision on individual WTP does not
significantly affect the subsequent group’s willingness to pay or it means that for
those groups who previously submitted individual bid, their WTP has not
significantly changed.
The graphical presentations tell a similar story to the WTP results. Figure 1
shows mean CER for individuals in the Individual to Group Arm and the three
member groups in the Group to Individual Arm. It can be observed that both
individuals and the three member groups exhibit CER that varies approximately
between 0.28 and 0.49, implying high risk aversion. However, the average group
CER for the Group to Individual Arm is less than the average individual CER for the
Individual to Group Arm in each lottery win percentage. It shows that the three
member groups are more risk averse than the individuals (pure risk aggregation).
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Figure 2 displays mean CER for individuals in Individual to Group Arm and
Group to Individual Arm. As can be seen from the graph, individual risk preference
line for subjects in Individual to Group Arm is above the individual risk preference
line for subjects in Group to Individual Arm, suggesting that after submitting groups
risk preference exercise as a group, the individuals in Group to Individual Arm
become more risk averse.
In Figure 3, we present mean CER for the small group in the Individual to
Group Arm and Group to Individual Arm. As can be seen from the graph the two
lines are nearly asymptotic, suggesting that after submitting individual risk
preference exercise individually, the groups’ risk preference in the Individual to
Group Arm has not significantly changed.

4.3.2 Multivariate Results
4.3.2.1 Main Proposition
Our multivariate results are similar to the descriptive results as described
above. Table 9 presents risk preference difference between individuals and the three
member group (pure risk aggregation). When we regress CER on Group to
Individual Arm, we find a statistically significant risk preference difference between
groups and individuals. Groups are more risk averse than individuals in all of the
nine lotteries, the risk aversion (CER) for the three member groups is higher by at
least 0.09 (se=0.036) than the individuals, and values are significant at least at the
five percent level.
In table 11 we show how participation in prior group exercise affects
individual risk preference. As can be seen from the table the risk aversion (CER) for
the farmers who submitted a lottery bid through discussion in a group before
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submitting an individual bid has increased. For example, at the 10% lottery win
percentage the risk aversion (CER) in this group has increased by 0.14 (se=0.035)
and values are significant at the one percent level (Column 1, row 1).
In contrast, however, we find no evidence that participation in prior
individual exercise affects group risk preference. In Table 10, we find no statistically
significant result.
4.3.2.2 Results by Lottery Win Percentage
In table 12, our regression results are consistent with the results from (Shupp
& Williams, 2008) and other similar studies on the risk preference differential
between individuals and groups. Groups are more risk averse than individuals, risk
aversion (CER) for the three member groups is higher by 0.115 (se=0.024) than the
individuals and values are significant at the one percent level (Column 1, row 10).
However, two basic differences between our findings and the existing literature are
worth mentioning. First, our subjects (who are mainly poor farmers) in general are
more risk averse than the subjects employed in the other studies (mainly students).
Second, the results of other studies suggests that groups are more risk averse than
individuals in low winning percentages, but groups tend to be less risk averse in the
highest winning percentages. Our result, however, shows that groups are more risk
averse on both low and high winning percentages.
We also compared regression results on the impacts of group risk decision on
the individual risk preference obtained using the above method with our descriptive
statistics and regression results for robustness check. For such purpose, in Table 13,
we regress CER on farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) controlling for eight
dummies for the lottery win percentages and eight interaction variables created by
the interaction of group decision dummy and the eight dummies for lottery win
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percentages. Results from such regression also show that for those individuals who
previously submitted group bid, their risk aversion (CER) increased on average by
0.110 (se=0.023) and the result is significant at the one percent level (Column 1, row
10). In contrast, however, we find no evidence that participation in prior individual
exercise affects group risk preference. In Table 14, we find no statistically significant
result (Column 1, row 10).
4.3.2.3 Heterogeneity Analysis
In order to assess if the impacts of group risk decision varies with respect to
socioeconomic covariates, we do impact heterogeneity analysis with respect to four
key household characteristics (the gender of household head, age of household head,
years of education of the household head and the size of land). Tables 15-18 show
the heterogeneous effect of group risk decision on individual risk preference in
relation to gender, age, education and land size owned by the household respectively.
Table 15 presents impact heterogeneity by gender of the household head. As
can be seen from the table, after doing the group exercise the individual risk aversion
(CER) for the female participants is higher by 0.04(se=0.02) than the individual risk
aversion (CER) for male participants and the result is significant at 1 percent level
(Column 1, row 11). It suggests that the group exercise affects the individual risk
preference of female participants more than it affects the male participants. We also
find that older household heads are more responsive to the group risk preference
exercise than the younger heads. The evidence shows that participation in prior group
exercise affects the individual risk preference of the older household heads more than
it affects the younger household heads. After the group exercise, the individual risk
aversion (CER) for the older household heads is higher by 0.05 (se=0.02) than the
younger household heads and the result is significant at the one percent level (Table
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16-column 1, row 12). There is no evidence heterogeneity effect of group risk
preference exercise by the level of household head’s education and land size
ownership.

4.4. Discussion and Conclusion

This research contributes to the growing literature on the aggregation and
disaggregation of risk preference by investigating the effects of decisions made
collectively by small groups under risk and uncertainties on individual decision
behavior. It also examines if a prior structural manifestation of individual risk
preference has an effect on the aggregation of individual risk preferences in small
groups. We conduct a randomized field experiment that comprises two experimental
arms and two experimental phases and we find evidence that support the following
four main conclusions.
(1) Our result shows that both individuals and groups in our study are on average
risk averse. Our findings on the pure risk preference differential also show that
on average the three person group are more risk averse than individuals. This
finding is in line with the existing empirical literature on risk preference
differential between individuals and a small member group (Shupp & Williams
2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2012).
Two basic differences between our findings and the existing literature are
worth mentioning, however. First, our subjects (who are mainly poor farmers) in
general are more risk averse than the subjects employed in the other studies (mainly
students). Second, the results of other studies suggests that groups are more risk
averse than individuals in low winning percentages, but groups tend to be less risk
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averse in the highest winning percentages. Our result, however, shows that groups
are more risk averse on both low and high winning percentages.
(2) Turning to the impact of group risk preference, our results indicate that risk
preference decisions made in a group influence the subsequent individual risk
preference. Specifically, experiencing risk preference exercise in small groups
and prior knowledge of group risk preference exercise has a significant effect on
the subsequent individual risk preference. It means that individuals who
participated in group decisions on risk and uncertainty will bring forward the risk
preference of the group back to their individual risk preference. However, there
are two reasons that explain this effect. First, it could be that the social influence
from the group discussion which affects the individual risk preference. Second, it
is also possible that individuals may simply put a figure from the group exercise
(recalling effect). Individuals may recall what they did in the group exercise and
simply put similar figure when they were asked to play the game individually.
The economic implication of this result is quite large. Many economic
decisions made collectively by small groups under risks and uncertainties have to be
further managed by or executed by only individuals of the groups and our findings
portrays that prior communications, knowledge, and decision making by small
groups under risk and uncertainties can subsequently affect individual decisions.
(3) Using our experimental setting, we also find that risk preference decisions made
individually does not significantly influence the subsequent group risk preference.
Specifically, on average groups decisions are not significantly affected by the
fact that participants had prior knowledge and decision making on individual risk
preference. This result is very similar to the findings in Shupp & Williams
(2008).
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(4) Finally, we also observe results obtained from two-arm one-stage research design
are qualitatively similar as results obtained from one-arm two-stage research
design. This tells us, the structural manifestation of individual risk preference has
no significant effects on the risk preference of small groups. Thus,
methodologically the use of one arm two phases or two arms one phase
approaches for risk aggregation does not matter.
Further research on aggregating and disaggregating risk preference with real
money payoffs would be interesting to further investigate the worries of hypothetical
bias. Moreover, more work needs to be done in order to find out whether the results
found in this study are not affected by the recalling effect. Also, to understand how
recalling effect influences our result, experimental design that controls for recalling
effect can address such problem. It is possible also to do the same experimental
exercise in the future with the same households and see if the impact still matters,
because the recalling effect should not last for months.
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Tables and Figures

Table 1
Summary statistics of sample farmers in Tigray Region in Northern Ethiopia (N=571)
N
Mean
S.D.
A. Demographic characteristics
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male)
571
0.57
0.50
Age (in years)
571
46.89
13.25
Years of education
571
2.79
4.57
Size of household
571
5.36
2.01
B. Wealth and assets
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
571
1.83
1.71
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
570
5.29
6.39
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr)
569
0.50
1.36
Data source: Author’s survey.
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Min.

Max.

0.00
20.00
0.00
1.00

1.00
99.00
18.00
11.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

12.00
64.30
20.30

Table 2
Mean comparison of farmer characteristics between experimental arms
Individual to Group Group to Individual
arm
arm
(N=283)
(N=288)
(1)
(2)
A. Demographic characteristics
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male)
Age (in years)
Years of education
Size of household
B. Wealth and assets
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
Data source: Author’s survey.
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Difference
(2) – (1)

0.55
47.25
2.44
5.31

0.58
46.54
3.14
5.41

0.02 (0.04)
-0.70 (1.11)
0.70 (0.38)
0.09 (0.17)

5.19
0.53
1.84

5.38
0.46
1.80

0.19 (0.53)
-0.07 (0.11)
-0.04 (0.14)

Table 3
Willingness to pay (WTP) for farmers
Lottery win
Individual to Group arm:
Individual to Group arm:
Group to individual arm:
Group to Individual arm:
percentage
Individual
Group
Group
Individual
(A1)
(A2)
(D1)
(D2)
Mean
S.D.
Mean
S.D.
Mean
S.D.
Mean
S.D.
10%
4.86
4.34
3.76
3.44
3.62
3.12
3.71
3.47
20%
8.21
5.78
6.32
5.30
6.30
5.14
6.12
5.45
30%
11.85
7.87
9.21
7.60
9.00
7.70
8.54
7.53
40%
15.66
10.37
11.97
9.73
12.16
10.66
11.10
9.79
50%
19.55
13.05
14.74
12.04
15.17
13.26
14.30
12.91
60%
23.76
15.54
17.85
14.36
18.32
15.79
18.05
16.26
70%
28.22
18.32
21.07
16.39
21.45
18.37
21.52
19.47
80%
32.98
21.02
24.41
18.87
24.65
21.09
25.01
22.58
90%
37.94
23.84
28.01
21.52
26.84
22.10
28.63
25.60
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: For an easy comparison among experimental, the group WTP is divided by three (number of person in a group)
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Table 4
Simple differencing for pure risk preference differential between experimental arms in Phase 1
Lottery win
Individual to Group arm: Individual (A1) Group to Individual arm: Group (D1)
Difference
percentage
(N=283)
(N=283)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
CER
r
CER
r
CER
r
10%
0.486
0.263
0.374
0.330
0.111*** (0.034) -0.066*** (0.019)
20%
0.410
0.367
0.309
0.441
0.101*** (0.023) -0.074*** (0.016)
30%
0.394
0.438
0.287
0.520
0.107*** (0.021) -0.081*** (0.016)
40%
0.391
0.499
0.280
0.583
0.110*** (0.021) -0.083*** (0.016)
50%
0.391
0.577
0.289
0.630
0.101*** (0.022) -0.073*** (0.017)
60%
0.395
0.614
0.304
0.674
0.091*** (0.022) -0.060*** (0.018)
70%
0.403
0.672
0.311
0.724
0.092*** (0.023) -0.051*** (0.019)
80%
0.412
0.738
0.316
0.781
0.096*** (0.023) -0.042*** (0.020)
90%
0.421
0.817
0.321
0.845
0.100*** (0.024)
-0.028 (0.021)
Average
0.104***(0.008) -0.061***(0.006)
0.412
0.551
0.308
0.612
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 5
Simple differencing for the effects of within-arm aggregation on risk preference
Lottery win
Individual to Group arm: Individual (A1)
Individual to Group arm: Group (A2)
Difference
percentage
(N=288)
(N=288)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
CER
r
CER
r
CER
r
10%
0.486
0.263
0.362
0.332
0.123*** (0.028) -0.069*** (0.015)
20%
0.410
0.367
0.315
0.434
0.095*** (0.019) -0.066*** (0.013)
30%
0.394
0.438
0.300
0.508
0.094*** (0.018) -0.070*** (0.013)
40%
0.391
0.499
0.303
0.563
0.087*** (0.018) -0.063*** (0.014)
50%
0.391
0.557
0.303
0.618
0.087*** (0.018) -0.060*** (0.015)
60%
0.395
0.614
0.303
0.672
0.090*** (0.018) -0.058*** (0.016)
70%
0.403
0.672
0.306
0.728
0.096*** (0.018) -0.055*** (0.017)
80%
0.412
0.739
0.308
0.784
0.104*** (0.018) -0.045* (0.018)
90%
0.419
0.817
0.298
0.880
0.121*** (0.018) -0.063*** (0.016)
Average
0.100***(0.007) -0.062***(0.005)
0.412
0.552
0.312
0.613
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 6
Simple differencing for the effects of within-arm disaggregation on risk preference (D1 versus D2)
Lottery win
Group to Individual arm: Group (D1) Group to Individual arm: Individual (D2)
Difference
percentage
(N=288)
(N=288)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
CER
r
CER
r
CER
r
10%
0.371
0.332
0.376
0.326
-0.005 (0.018)
0.006 (0.009)
20%
0.305
0.444
0.315
0.432
-0.010 (0.015)
0.012 (0.009)
30%
0.284
0.522
0.306
0.501
-0.022 (0.014)
0.021 (0.011)
40%
0.277
0.585
0.299
0.565
-0.021 (0.013)
0.020 (0.010)
50%
0.286
0.633
0.294
0.625
-0.008 (0.013)
0.008 (0.012)
60%
0.300
0.677
0.297
0.678
0.003 (0.014)
-0.001 (0.014)
70%
0.307
0.727
0.301
0.742
0.006 (0.015)
-0.015 (0.013)
80%
0.312
0.784
0.304
0.802
0.007 (0.015)
-0.018 (0.015)
90%
0.318
0.847
0.313
0.873
0.005 (0.015)
-0.026 (0.015)
Average
-0.005 (0.005)
0.001 (0.004)
0.307
0.617
0.312
0.616
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.

136

Table 7
Simple differencing for the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group risk preference
Lottery win
Individual to Group arm: Group (A2) Group to Individual arm: Group (D1)
Difference
percentage
(N=283)
(N=288)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
CER
r
CER
r
CER
r
10%
0.362
0.333
0.375
0.330
-0.012 (0.028)
0.002 (0.015)
20%
0.315
0.435
0.309
0.442
0.006 (0.022)
-0.007 (0.014)
30%
0.300
0.509
0.287
0.520
0.012 (0.021)
-0.011 (0.015)
40%
0.304
0.563
0.280
0.583
0.023 (0.021)
-0.020 (0.166)
50%
0.303
0.618
0.289
0.631
0.014 (0.022)
-0.012 (0.017)
60%
0.305
0.673
0.304
0.675
0.001 (0.022)
-0.002 (0.018)
70%
0.306
0.729
0.311
0.725
-0.004 (0.023)
0.004 (0.019)
80%
0.308
0.784
0.316
0.781
-0.008 (0.023)
0.003(0.022)
90%
0.299
0.879
0.323
0.843
-0.025 (0.023)
0.035** (0.017)
Average
0.004 (0.007)
0.001 (0.006)
0.312
0.613
0.308
0.612
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 8
Simple differencing for the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual risk preference
Lottery win
Individual to Group arm: Individual
Group to Individual arm: Individual
Difference
percentage
(A1)
(D2)
(N=283)
(N=288)
(1) – (2)
(1)
(2)
CER
r
CER
r
CER
r
10%
0.486
0.263
0.378
0.325
0.108*** (0.034) -0.062*** (0.019)
20%
0.410
0.368
0.317
0.431
0.092*** (0.024) -0.063*** (0.016)
30%
0.395
0.439
0.309
0.499
0.086*** (0.022) -0.060*** (0.017)
40%
0.391
0.500
0.302
0.564
0.090*** (0.022) -0.064*** (0.017)
50%
0.391
0.558
0.299
0.623
0.092*** (0.022) -0.065*** (0.018)
60%
0.396
0.614
0.300
0.677
0.096*** (0.021) -0.063*** (0.020)
70%
0.403
0.673
0.304
0.740
0.100*** (0.021) -0.067*** (0.018)
80%
0.412
0.739
0.309
0.801
0.104*** (0.022) -0.061*** (0.019)
90%
0.422
0.815
0.314
0.873
0.108*** (0.022) -0.058*** (0.019)
Average
0.099***(0.008) -0.060***(0.006)
0.412
0.552
0.313
0.612
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 9
OLS estimates for pure risk preference differential in CER between experimental arms in Phase 1 (A1 versus D1)
Dependent variable: CER
Lottery win percentage
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Farmer in Group to Indvidual Arm (1=Yes; -0.149*** -0.112*** -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.103*** -0.093** -0.091** -0.096** -0.096**
0=No)
(0.035) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041)
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male)
0.054
0.027
0.020
0.010
0.011
0.016
0.015
0.013
0.015
(0.041) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Age (in years)
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of education
-0.004
-0.001
-0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size of household
0.010
0.010*
0.010*
0.010*
0.010
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-0.016
-0.010
-0.008
-0.010
-0.013* -0.013* -0.013*
-0.012
-0.012
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-0.006** -0.004* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr)
0.004
-0.004
-0.004
-0.008*
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.000
0.001
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Enumerator dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
568
568
568
568
568
568
568
567
568
Adjusted R-square
0.256
0.321
0.349
0.364
0.365
0.356
0.352
0.356
0.349
Data source: Author’s survey.
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Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10
% level respectively.
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Table 10
OLS estimates of the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group CER (A2 versus D1)
Dependent variable: CER
Lottery win percentage
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Farmer had individual exercise (1=Yes;
-0.024
-0.000
0.015
0.033
0.023
0.010
-0.006
0=No)
(0.050) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male)
0.035
0.007
-0.009
-0.011
-0.017
-0.012
-0.016
(0.039) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Age (in years)
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of education
-0.001
0.001
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Size of household
-0.006
-0.006
-0.004
-0.005
-0.003
-0.005
-0.004
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-0.011
-0.004
-0.002
-0.003
-0.005
-0.006
-0.007
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-0.001
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr)
0.004
0.001
-0.001
-0.001
0.000
-0.002
-0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Enumerator dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
568
568
568
568
568
568
568
Adjusted R-square
0.375
0.454
0.499
0.527
0.526
0.519
0.512
Data source: Author’s survey.
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80%
(8)
0.004
(0.036)
-0.018
(0.027)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.006)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.006)
Yes
Yes
567
0.526

90%
(9)
-0.009
(0.038)
-0.013
(0.027)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
559
0.508

Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10
% level respectively.
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Table 11
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2)
Dependent variable: CER
Lottery win percentage
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.139*** -0.099*** -0.092*** -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.098*** -0.105*** -0.106***
(0.034) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
Gender (1=Female; 0=Male)
0.010
-0.013
-0.013
-0.024
-0.018
-0.022
-0.025
-0.026
-0.026
(0.037) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Age (in years)
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of education
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
-0.0001
-0.000
-0.0001
-0.001
-0.0001
-0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size of household
0.012* 0.013** 0.010*
0.009
0.007
0.006
0.004
0.003
0.002
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
-0.013
-0.004
-0.002
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Value of livestock (in 1,000 Birr)
-0.003
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
0-0.002
-0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Birr)
-0.001
-0.007
-0.006 -0.010** 0.001
0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Village dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Enumerator dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
568
568
568
568
568
568
568
568
567
Adjusted R-square
0.149
0.228
0.253
0.282
0.299
0.315
0.320
0.325
0.329
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10
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% level respectively.
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Table 12
OLS estimates for pure risk preference differential in CER between experimental arms in Phase 1 (A1 versus D1)
Coefficient estimates
Constant
0.486*** (0.017)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.076** (0.024)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.091*** (0.024)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.095*** (0.024)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.095*** (0.024)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.090*** (0.024)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.083*** (0.024)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.074** (0.024)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.065** (0.024)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.115*** (0.024)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT20
0.011 (0.034)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT30
0.005 (0.034)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT40
0.001 (0.034)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT50
0.010 (0.034)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT60
0.020 (0.034)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT70
0.019 (0.034)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT80
0.015 (0.034)
Farmer in Group to Individual Arm * LOT90
0.012 (0.034)
Total number of observations
5134
R-Squared
0.042
Data source: Author’s survey.
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Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 13
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2)
Coefficient estimates
Constant
0.486*** (0.016)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.076*** (0.023)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.091*** (0.023)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.095*** (0.023)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.095*** (0.023)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.090*** (0.023)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.083*** (0.023)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.074** (0.023)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.064** (0.023)
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.110*** (0.023)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20
0.016 (0.032)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30
0.022 (0.032)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40
0.018 (0.032)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50
0.014 (0.032)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60
0.011 (0.032)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70
0.008 (0.032)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80
0.003 (0.032)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90
-0.001 (0.032)
Total number of observations
5138
R-Squared
0.041
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 14
OLS estimates of the effects of individual risk preference exercise on group CER (A2 versus D1)
Coefficient estimates
Constant
0.371*** (0.016)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.065** (0.023)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.087*** (0.023)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.094*** (0.023)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.085*** (0.023)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.070** (0.023)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.064** (0.023)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.059* (0.023)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.053 (0.023)
Farmer had individual exercise (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.009 (0.023)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT20
0.018 (0.032)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT30
0.024 (0.032)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT40
0.035 (0.032)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT50
0.026 (0.032)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT60
0.013 (0.032)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT70
0.008 (0.032)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT80
0.004 (0.032)
Farmer had individual exercise * LOT90
-0.011 (0.032)
Total number of observations
5129
R-Squared
0.01
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 15
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to gender of the
household head
(1)
***
Constant
0.49 (0.02)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.10***(0.02)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.07***(0.02)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.06***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.08***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise * Female household head
-0.04***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80
0.00(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90
-0.00(0.03)
Household characteristics
Yes
Observations
5138
R2
0.043
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head and
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size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 16
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to household
head age
(1)
Constant
0.49***(0.02)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.10***(0.02)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.07***(0.02)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.06***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.10***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise * Middle age (1=if age between 40 & 59)
-0.01(0.01)
Farmer had group exercise * Old age (1=if age over 60)
-0.05***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80
0.00(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90
-0.00(0.03)
Household characteristics
Yes
Observations
5138
R2
0.04
Data source: Author’s survey.
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Note: Age group 20-39 is omitted for reference. Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head,
years of education of household head and size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 17
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to years of
education of the head
(1)
Constant
0.50***(0.02)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.10***(0.02)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.07***(0.02)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.06***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.10***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise * Years of education
-0.00*(0.00)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80
0.00(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90
-0.00(0.03)
Household characteristics
Yes
Observations
5138
R2
0.05
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head and
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size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.

154

Table 18
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), heterogeneity with respect to size of land
(1)
Constant
0.50***(0.02)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.10***(0.02)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.07***(0.02)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.06***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.10***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise * Size of land
-0.00 (0.00)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50
0.02(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70
0.01(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80
0.00(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90
-0.00(0.03)
Household characteristics
Yes
Observations
5138
R2
0.05
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head years of education of household head and
size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Figure 1 Mean CER between individuals in Individual to Group arm and the three
member groups in Group to Individual arm
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Figure 2 Individual CER average with & without group
risk preference exercise

Figure 3 Group CER average with & without individual risk
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Individual to Group arm

Phase 1

Individual risk
preference
exercise (A1)

Phase 2

Group risk
preference
exercise (A2)

Group to Individual arm

(N=283)

Preference aggregation
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Preference differential

(N=288)
Group risk
preference
exercise (D1)
Preference disaggregation

Farmers randomly allocated
to two experimental arms

Individual risk
preference
exercise (D2)

Figure 4 Profile of the randomized experimental study (on the previous page)
Appendix
Appendix 1
OLS estimates of the effects of group risk preference exercise on individual CER (A1 versus D2), triple heterogeneity with respect to gender of
the household head
(1)
Constant
0.50***(0.02)
LOT20 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 20%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT30 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 30%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT40 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 40%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT50 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 50%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.10***(0.02)
LOT60 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 60%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.09***(0.02)
LOT70 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 70%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.08***(0.02)
LOT80 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 80%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.07***(0.02)
LOT90 (1=if Lottery win percentage is 90%; 0=if otherwise)
-0.06***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise (1=Yes; 0=No)
-0.11***(0.02)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20* Female household head
-0.04(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30* Female household head
-0.04(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT40* Female household head
-0.04(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50* Female household head
-0.04(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60* Female household head
-0.05(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70* Female household head
-0.05(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80* Female household head
-0.05(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90* Female household head
-0.05(0.03)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT20
0.04(0.04)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT30
0.04(0.04)
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Farmer had group exercise * LOT40
0.04(0.04)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT50
0.04(0.04)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT60
0.04(0.04)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT70
0.04(0.04)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT80
0.03(0.04)
Farmer had group exercise * LOT90
0.03(0.04)
Household characteristics
Yes
Observations
5138
R2
0.04
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=yes; 0=no), age of household head, years of education of household head and
size of land (in tsimad) .Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectivel
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Appendix 2

Experiment Instructions for Enumerators

Individual to Group Arm should have three respondents. Individual to Group Arm
respondents should first answer Individual Risk Preference Exercise individually and
separately. No other people should be around. Make sure that the respondents do not
communicate with each other before or after their individual exercise. After all
respondents in Individual to Group Arm have completed Individual Risk Preference
Exercise, respondents in Individual to Group Arm should form a group to answer
Group Risk Preference Exercise together.

Group to Individual Arm should have three respondents. Group to Individual Arm
respondents should first answer Group Risk Preference Exercise together as a
group. No other people should be around the group. After all respondents in Group
to Individual Arm have completed Group Risk Preference Exercise together as a
group, respondents should answer Individual Risk Preference Exercise individually
and separately. No other people should be around. Make sure that the respondents
do not communicate with each other before or after their individual exercise.
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Appendix 3: Individual Risk Preference Exercise

Enumerator please read the following instructions to respondents:
In this part, we are going to play nine hypothetical lottery games individually. In
each of the nine hypothetical games, there are some chances to win 100 birr of cash
and the nine games carry different chances of winning. The chances range from one
out of ten (1/10), two out of ten (2/10), and step-by-step up to nine out of ten (9/10).
You can understand the chances with the example of drawing one ball from a bag
containing ten balls. If there are one red ball and nine white balls in the bag, the
chance of winning 100 birr in this lottery is one out of ten (1/10). You will win 100
birr if you pick a red ball. You will win nothing if you pick a white ball.

Do you understand the instructions?
1=Yes_____ (Continue) 2=No____ (Repeat instructions and answer questions)

Now, as you understand the instructions, we will ask you to make one decision for
each of the nine lottery games. Suppose you have to pay cash in order to play the
lotteries. Suppose for each lottery you have 100 birr of cash and you can use some of
the cash to pay for the lottery. If you win the lottery, the final cash amount will be the
100 birr in hand minus your payment plus 100 birr from winning. If you do not win
the lottery, the final cash amount will only be the 100 birr in hand minus your
payment. Please tell us the MAXIMUM amount of cash that you are willing to pay
for each lottery. (Enumerator: All the nine lotteries must be asked and answered.)
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No

Lottery Options

01

1 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(1 red ball, 9 white balls)
2 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(2 red balls, 8 white balls)
3 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(3 red balls, 7 white balls)
4 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(4 red balls, 6 white balls)
5 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(5 red balls, 5 white balls)
6 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(6 red balls, 4 white balls)
7 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(7 red balls, 3 white balls)
8 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(8 red balls, 2 white balls)
9 out of 10 chance of winning 100 birr
(9 red balls, 1 white ball)

02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09

What is the MAXIMUM amount of cash (up
to 100 birr) that you are willing to pay in
order to play this lottery?
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Appendix 4: Group Risk Preference Exercise

Enumerator please read the following instructions to respondents:
In this part, we are going to play nine hypothetical lottery games. In each of the nine
hypothetical games, there are some chances to win 300 birr of cash and the nine
games carry different chances of winning. The chances range from one out of ten
(1/10), two out of ten (2/10), and step-by-step up to nine out of ten (9/10). You can
understand the chances with the example of drawing one ball from a bag containing
ten balls. If there are one red ball and nine white balls in the bag, the chance of
winning 300 birr in this lottery is one out of ten (1/10). Your group will win 300 birr
if your group picks a red ball. Your group will win nothing if your group picks a
white ball.

Do you all understand the instructions?
1=Yes_____ (Continue) 2=No____ (Repeat instructions and answer questions)

Now, as you all understand the instructions, we will ask your group to make one
decision for each of the nine lottery games. Suppose your group have to pay cash in
order to play the lotteries. Suppose for each lottery your group have 300 birr of cash
and your group can use some of the cash to pay for the lottery. If your group wins the
lottery, the final cash amount will be the 300 birr in hand minus your payment plus
300 birr from winning. If your group does not win the lottery, the final cash amount
will only be the 300 birr in hand minus your payment. The cash will be shared
equally. Please tell us the MAXIMUM amount of cash that your group is willing to
pay for each lottery. For each lottery, your group has one minute to discuss and
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make one group decision. Your group must make one decision. (Enumerator: All the
nine lotteries must be asked and answered. Extra 30 seconds only if the group fails to
agree within one minute. No more extension.)
No

Lottery Options

01

1 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(1 red ball, 9 white balls)
2 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(2 red balls, 8 white balls)
3 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(3 red balls, 7 white balls)
4 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(4 red balls, 6 white balls)
5 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(5 red balls, 5 white balls)
6 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(6 red balls, 4 white balls)
7 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(7 red balls, 3 white balls)
8 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(8 red balls, 2 white balls)
9 out of 10 chance of winning 300 birr
(9 red balls, 1 white ball)

02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09

What is the MAXIMUM amount
of cash (up to 300 birr) that your
group is willing to pay in order to
play this lottery?
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Extra
time?
(1=Yes;
2=No)

CHAPTER 5
Eliciting Responses to Sensitive Questions in the Field: A Randomized Experiment

5.1 Introduction

Researchers in the social sciences often conduct research with survey data on
topics that are considerably sensitive in nature. A large body of empirical work has been
done on topics related to abortion (Schuman et al., 1981; Peytchev, et al., 2010), drugs
(Timothy et al., 1989; Aquilino & Sciuto, 1990; Turner, et al., 1998), sexual behaviors
(Turner, et al., 1998), child labors (Dumas, 2007), and domestic violence (Koenig, et al.,
2006; Rabel et al., 2014).
One major difficulty that researchers face in examining the empirical patterns of
these sensitive topics is about the availability and the reliability of data. In order to
conduct an empirical study on these topics, data need to be collected from the field.
However, as already shown in the existing literature, many people are not willing to take
part in field surveys and to response to such questions. And even if people agree to
participate in field survey, they may not necessarily tell the truth. First, some survey
questions may be intrusive, socially undesirable or sometimes respondent perceives
some level of threat of disclosure (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). Second, respondents may
not critically read the questions and rush their answer due to lack of motivation,
cooperation or sense of obligation (Jobber & Saundrens, 1988).
In order better study topics that may be sensitive in nature, some researchers
have proposed different ways to improve the method of field data collection.
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Specifically, some have suggested that respondents shall be provided with high
participation incentives so that they are more motivated to cooperate and provide
truthful responses to sensitive questions (Jobber & Saundrens, 1988). Some others have
also suggested that field survey should be designed in a way that encourage a more
friendly and less frightening environment so that respondents will feel more comfortable
with providing truthful responses (Lee 1993; Barnett, 1998; Schaeffer, 2000;
Tourangeau & Yan, 2007; Beatty & Herrmann 2009).
There are also studies that examine the effects of incentives on the quality of
survey responses. In fact, many studies find out incentives also improve response quality
which is equally important as the improvements in response rates (McDaniel & Rao,
1980; Goetz et al., 1984; Brennan, 1992; Willimack et al, 1995; Shettle and Mooney,
1999). These studies demonstrate that incentives improve response quality in terms of
reducing item nonresponse rates and refusal rates to open ended questions.
The existing literature has largely been focusing on examining ways to reduce
survey nonresponse per se. A large body of literature has shown that both monetary and
non-monetary incentives can increase survey response rates (Goetz et al., 1984; Joseph
& Peter, 1986; Jobber & Saunders, 1988; Willimack et al, 1995; Kalantar & Talley,
1999; Singer et al, 1999; Leung et al., 2002; Leung et al., 2004; Ryu et al., 2005; Baron
et al., 2008; Haris et al., 2008; Wetzels et al., 2008; Petrolia & Bhattacharjee, 2009).33

33

The majority of these studies focus on mail and telephone surveys and, few studied on face-to-face
surveys. Most of these studies found that, incentives improve response rates, particularly in mail surveys
and also in other survey studies (Armstrong, 1975; Goetz et al., 1984; Joseph & Peter, 1986; Singer et al,
1999; Leung et al., 2002; Leung et al., 2002; Ryu et al., 2005; Baron et al., 2008; Petrolia & Bhattacharjee,
2009). Specifically, it has been documented that monetary incentives are more powerful and effective than
non-monetary incentives such as gifts or lotteries in improving response rates in mail and other surveys
(Leung et al., 2002; Leung et al., 2004; Ryu et al., 2005; Petrolia & Bhattacharjee, 2009). In fact, the
suggestion is that the uses of monetary incentives appear to affect response rates because monetary
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Yet, despite the growing literature on the use of incentives to improve response rates and
response quality in broad ranges of survey modes, there are still some fundamental
unanswered questions.
The first important question is whether respondents report to sensitive questions
honestly or not. In this case, there are evidences that show respondents underreport
responses to sensitive questions (Bradburn, 1983; Wish, Hoffman, & Nemes, 1997;
Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). The second question builds on the first one. The second
important question is how to improve responses to sensitive questions.
Although field surveys are one of the major methods of how researchers collect
data from the field, only a few empirical studies have been designed to examine whether
and how researchers can better obtain information about sensitive questions from
respondents (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Jobe et al.,
1996). While there are some empirical studies on mechanisms that improve responses to
sensitive questions, these studies mainly compare the disclosure level of sensitive
questions (response to sensitive questions) among survey modes (Locke et al., 1992;
Aquilino, 1994; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Jobe et al., 1996; Brakel et al., 2008),34
and only a few studies evaluate the impact of promised incentive on responses to
sensitive questions (Brakel et al., 2008).35

incentive induce respondents’ motivation, cooperation and sense of obligations to the task for which they
are being paid (Goetz et al., 1984).
34
It has been shown that disclosure level of sensitive questions (response to sensitive questions) is higher
for self-administered survey studies than interviewer assisted surveys (Locke et al., 1992; Aquilino, 1994;
Jobe et al., 1996; Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Brakel et al., 2008)
35
This study investigates the effect of a promised incentive of 10 euro on responses to sensitive questions
and the findings shows that the 10 euro promised incentive has no significant impact on the responses to
sensitive questions (Brakel et al., 2008)
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In this study, we have two overall goals. First, financial incentives can affect the
decision of households to take part in the survey studies, and our assumption is if
incentives induce willingness to participate, households may also behave differently
with incentives or without incentives in their response to sensitive questions after taking
part to participate. So, we expect high financial incentive to have a positive impact on
the response to sensitive questions.
Second, the presentation of sensitive questions in the form of framed or
unframed questions may affect responses to sensitive questions. That is, through the use
of framed questions it may be possible to present case specific people’s behavior that
may reduce threats, create relaxation or motivate respondents in providing honest reports
to sensitive questions (Iarossi, 2006). So, we expect framed questions will have positive
effects on responses to sensitive questions.
In order to achieve these two goals, we conduct a randomized field experiment
among a large number of rural households in the Northern part of Ethiopia. Specifically,
we develop two sets of experimental interventions on collecting data from the field and
randomly allocate our targeted respondents to these two sets of interventions. In the first
intervention, we vary the amount of financial incentives that survey participants can get
from completing our survey. In the second intervention, we randomized these two
groups to get either survey with framed or unframed questions.
Then, we compare responses to the sensitive questions by financial incentive and
survey form type. We also compare responses by grouping in to two sub domains using
the sensitivity levels of the questions (less sensitive and high sensitive survey questions).
And then, we further grouped the questions in to four socioeconomic domains (health,
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social protection, loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household) to see
if responses differ by domain.
Our study has a few limitations, however. First, due to a low literacy level of
the households in our study area, we could not apply self-administrated surveys (our
field survey was assisted by interviewers).To get reliable information, we hired well
trained enumerators who have years of experience in a similar job. We also provided
them training and a toolkit of instructions. Further, in order to deal with possible
heterogeneities among enumerators, we include enumerator dummy variables in our
regression analyses. Second, due to resource constraint, our financial incentive
experiment has two experimental arms (high pay and low pay) to investigate the impact
of incentives on responses to sensitive questions; the no-pay experimental arm is not
included in our study. We planned to include the third experimental arm in the coming
follow-up survey that will be held in October 2016. Third, because of the flip coin
procedure that is used to assign households either in the high pay or low pay group, the
number of households in the two groups (high pay and low pay) is not exactly equal.
However, high pay and low pay groups are perfectly balanced. We also control for
household, village and enumerator characteristics in our regression estimates in order to
get reliable causal impacts.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our research venue and
our research methodology, which includes the sampling procedure, the survey design,
the two experimental interventions on data collection, data collection and the statistical
approach. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the effects of the two interventions
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(financial incentives and framed survey questions) on responses to the sensitive
questions. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
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5.2 Research Methodology

5.2.1 Sampling Method
Our sample includes approximately 1152 rural households drawn from 32
villages in four districts, Ganta-Afeshum, Gulo-Maheda, Enderta and Hintalo-Wajirat, in
the Tigray regional state, northern Ethiopia. 36 There were four main steps in the
formation of the sample.
First, we selected four districts (or Weredas) from different parts of the Tigray
region to be our study districts. Then, we randomly selected eight villages (or Tabyas) in
each of the four sample districts to obtain a sample of 32 villages. Third, in each of the
32 villages we randomly selected three sub-villages (or Kushets) to obtain 96
sub-villages. In the fourth step, 12 households in each of the 96 sub villages were
randomly drawn and we obtained a sample of 1,152 rural households from such
sampling frame for this study.

5.2.2 Experimental interventions
We conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of two interventions to
understand the effects of financial incentive, and framed survey questions on the
responses to sensitive questions.
5.2.2.1 Financial incentive intervention
The first set of intervention is providing different levels of financial incentives to
the sample households. The high pay (ETB 15) and the low pay (ETB 5). For the
36

The study is part of an on-going RCT research on the cost effectiveness of integrating weather index
agricultural insurance into the productive safety net program in Northern Ethiopia.
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purpose of this intervention, we randomly assign households using flipping a coin.
Particularly, after asking their willingness to take in the survey, we flip a coin and let the
responds know how much he/she will get before commencing the survey. Consequently,
our sample is divided in to two intervention groups: 625 households received a high pay
incentive (ETB 15) and 513 households were given a low pay incentive (ETB 5).37
5.2.2.2 Framed survey questions intervention
In this second set of intervention, we prepare two sets of survey questionssurvey with framed questions and survey with unframed questions. The two forms of the
questions have similar content but the framed questions have elaborations about human
behavior that are intended to reduce the nature of intrusiveness, undesirable and threat of
disclosure in the questions. Both the framed and unframed questionnaires comprised 22
questions with varying degree of sensitivity levels. Random assignment of intervention
to the individual households was achieved by alternating the questionnaire type when we
interviewed the households. Accordingly, 572 households were interviewed using the
framed questionnaire and 571 households were interviewed with unframed questionnaire
type.
5.2.2.3 Individual randomized allocation to experimental interventions
The sample households were randomized to the four experimental groups. We
randomized by alternating the questionnaire type used for the interview as we move
from one household to another household.38 As a result of the randomization, half of the

37

The numbers of households in these two strata is not exactly equal; however, as can be seen from table
3 the two groups are nearly perfectly balanced.
38
Twenty four enumerators (interviewers) were randomly assigned to do the survey in four districts and
32 villages. We also assigned one supervisor in each district to supervise 6 enumerators throughout the
study. The supervisors assigned interviewers to a respondent, and they were told to alternate the
questionnaire type as they move from one respondent to another respondent. In this manner, the
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respondents were interviewed using a questionnaire with framed questions and half
using a questionnaire with unframed question (See Fig.1 for the study organization).

5.2.3 Data Collection
After excluding two households who refused to participate and seven
non-contacted households, this study uses the responses from the remaining 1,143
households. All the 1,143 sample households were face to face interviewed in November
2015.
After collecting the supplementary survey information in the manner mentioned
in the above paragraphs, we then matched the supplementary survey information with
that of the information collected in the main survey to create a full set of cross-sectional
survey data. By doing so, it is possible to use household characteristics and other control
variables from the main survey for balancing and other statistical analysis. For example,
as part of assessing the validity of our randomization process, respondents’
characteristics in the two experimental arms were examined using two-sample t-test.
Due to the large scale of our RCT study, the household characteristic of the sample rural
households is perfectly balanced between the experimental arms (Table 2 & table 3).
5.2.1 Dependent variables
Our RCT intervention allows us to create two dependent variables. The first one
is a dummy variable for Response to the sensitive question which takes one (1) if the
household’s response to the sensitive question is ‘yes’ and zero (0) otherwise. The
second dependent variable is a continuous variable (Response to less sensitive questions)
enumerators have taken proper registration the sequence of alternation of questionnaire type throughout
the study.
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created by the count for the number of positive responses to the less sensitive questions
provided by each household. To measure the sensitivity level of the survey questions, we
adopt a 5-point scale design (1=extremely low sensitive and 5=extremely high sensitive)
and ask academicians and local experts in Ethiopia to rate the sensitivity level to each of
questions based on the 5-point scale. Then, we classify questions with an average score
of less than 3 as less sensitive questions and the questions with score values of 3 and
above as high sensitive questions.
There are two testable hypotheses associated with these dependent variables. The first
hypothesis is that the high incentive (ETB 15) groups will provide high responses to the
sensitive questions. The second hypothesis is those households who are interviewed
using framed questions will provide more positive responses to the sensitive questions.
5.2.2 Treatment variables
Financial incentive and the framed questions are the two major treatment
variables of our intervention expected to influence the dependent variable (response to
sensitive questions). Certain designing features such as the presentation of survey
questions in framed questions as compared to unframed questions may influence
response to sensitive questions. The following example clarifies the difference between
our framed and unframed presentation of survey questions.
Framed question: “Here is something that has been said about some people in this area.
They don’t always wash their hands after going to the toilet. Sometimes, they even shake
hands with friends without washing their hands. Have you ever shaken hands with your
friends without washing your hands after going to the toilet?”
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Unframed question: “Have you ever shaken hands with your friends without washing
your hands after going to the toilet?”

We defined a dummy variable Framed questionnaire to capture the effect of
survey with framed questions on responses to sensitive questions. We first define the
dummy variable Framed questionnaire to represent whether the household was
interviewed using the framed questions or unframed questions. Specifically, the variable
equals one (1) if the household was interviewed using framed questions and equals zero
(0) if it was otherwise.
Receiving either in the form of high pay or low pay incentive is another
treatment variable that could affect responses to sensitive questions. Thus, we created
another dummy variable High pay to represent whether the household received a
participation incentive of ETB 15 or ETB 5. Specifically, this variable equals one (1) if
the respondent received a participation incentive of ETB 15 and equal zero (0) if it was
otherwise.
5.2.3 Control variables
We make use of other household information in the survey to construct a number
of household characteristics to be used as control variables in our estimations.
Specifically, the list of household variables includes the gender of the household head
(1=female; 0=male), the age of the household head, the number of years of education of
the household head received, the size of household, and also the size of farmland the
household owned. We also collect information about the numeracy level, the level of

176

risk aversion and the community trust score of the households.39 We call this set of
household variables household characteristics.

5.2.4 Statistical Approach
We use descriptive statistics and regression analyses to estimate the effects of the
two interventions on household’s responses to sensitive questions. In our regression
analyses, we use both ordinary least square (OLS) model as well as logistic probability
models.
5.2.4.1 Responses to individual questions
Response to individual questions is observed over the zero and one. To estimate
the effects of our two interventions on the responses to sensitive questions, we employ a
logit probability model as follows:

P(Positiveresponse)=Ʌ(b0+b1*Framed_questionnaireij+b2*High_payij+
b3*Framed_questionnaire*High_pay ij + b4*Household Characteristicsij
+μj+υk).

(1)

P(Positive response) is the probability of positive responses to the sensitive
question. For each sensitive question, we developed a similar set of logistic regression
equation. High_payij is a dummy variable that equals one (1) if the household received
ETB 15 for participating in the survey and equals zero (0) if the household received only
39

Numeracy level is the average for the number of numeracy questions correctly answered. Risk attitude
is constructed from the willingness to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling
and 10 completely willing). The community trust score is constructed based on the respondents view if the
most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5 do not trust them)
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ETB 5. Framed_questionnaireij is a dummy variable that equals one (1) if framed
questions were used for conducting the field survey with the household and equals zero
(0) if unframed questions were used instead. Framed_questionnaire*High_pay is an
interaction variable of framed questionnaire and high pay. Household Characteristicsij is
the set of household characteristics as defined before. We also include village dummy
variables, μj, and enumerator dummy variables, υk, to control for possible heterogeneities
among villages and among enumerators. We hope that the estimates for the parameters
b1, b2 and b3 can tell us the effect of the two interventions (and their interaction) on the
household’s response.
5.2.4.2 Responses to questions by level of question sensitivity
We also want to understand the impact of our intervention by the level of
sensitivity of the questions, we estimate ordinary least square (OLS) model as follows.

Response_less_sensitiveij = b0+ b1*Framed_questionnaireij +b2 *High_payij +
b3 *Framed_questionnaire*High_pay ij + b4 *Household Characteristicsij +μj +
υk + eij.

(2)

Response_less_sensitiveij is a count of the number of positive responses to the
less sensitive survey questions for each household. Framed_questionnaireij is a dummy
variable that equals (1) if the household is interviewed using the framed questions and
equal to zero (0) if it was otherwise.
5.2.4.3 Responses to questions by type of questions
To understand the impact of our intervention by socioeconomic domains, we
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further estimate ordinary least square (OLS) model as follows.

ResponseSocioeconomic_ij = b0+ b1*Framed_questionnaireij +b2 *High_payij
+ b3 *Framed_questionnaire*High_pay ij + b4 *Household Characteristicsij
+μj + υk + eij.

(3)

ResponseSocioeconomic_ij is a count of the number of positive responses to the
sensitive questions grouped in to four socioeconomic domains (health, social protection,
loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household). It represents for these
four different socioeconomic variables

5.3. Empirical Results

5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 provides the summary characteristics of our study households. There are
more female household heads than men household heads in the study sample (54%
versus 46% respectively). The average size of the household is about 5.3 persons to a
household with nearly 47 years of household heads age. Most of the household heads
have low level of education (on average household heads attend 2.8 years of education).
The numeracy level of the study households is also very lower (on average the number
of numeracy questions correctly answered by household is nearly 1 out of 3 numeracy
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measurement questions). In panel B we also present summary statistics of several wealth
and assets. The households in our study area are small farm holders. On average a
household owns about 2.4 tsimad (less than one hectare) of land. Panel C reports
numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust scores of the heads of the household.
To assess the validity of our randomization process, respondents’ characteristics
in the two experimental arms were examined using two-sample t-test. Table 2 and 3
present the mean comparison of respondents’ characteristics by intervention groups.
Randomization resulted in a very similar household characteristic between the two
experimental interventions, as shown by the insignificant mean difference (Table
2-Column 3, row 1-10) and (Table 3-Column 3, row 1-10). The key control variables are
nearly perfectly balanced in the two experimental arms.
In table 7 we present mean comparison of response frequencies by survey
questionnaire type to see the effects of framed questionnaire in improving responses to
sensitive questions. From descriptive statistics point of view, it seems that the
presentation of survey question either in a framed or unframed question does not matter.
Reviewing the mean difference for each sensitive question demonstrates that almost in
all the 14 sensitive questions there is no significant difference among the two groups
(Column 6, row 1-14).
Table 7 also provides a descriptive overview of mean comparisons between high
pay and low pay incentive groups. Overall, the response frequencies were positive and
significantly higher for the high pay incentive groups. Out of the 14 sensitive questions
frequency of positive responses were higher for the high pay groups in ten of the
questions but values are statistically significant for three questions. In some of the
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questions the high pay incentive improves response rate to sensitive question up to 8.7
percent improvement and such improvement were significant at the one percent level
(Column 3, 9). However, comparing high pay incentive and low pay incentive without
considering the survey questionnaire type may not give us a clear understanding whether
the effect comes from the financial incentive or the framing.
Table 9 provides mean response comparison between the households who
received framed questions with an incentive of ETB 15 (Framed -high pay) versus those
households who were interviewed using framed questions with an incentive of ETB 5
(Framed -low pay). Out of the 14 sensitive questions percent response were higher for
the framed questionnaire- high pay groups in five of the questions. As compared to table
7 the number has increased from three to five after we control for the framed
questionnaire. In table 9, we also compared unframed-high pay and unframed-low pay.
Similarly, out of the 14 sensitive questions percent response were higher for the
unframed-high pay groups in five of the questions. It seems that, by the descriptive
statistics, high pay incentive significantly improves responses to sensitive questions. On
the other hand, the presentation of similar questions in a framed or unframed survey
question does not significantly affect responses to sensitive questions. Yet, the findings
from descriptive statistics may be biased because of different confounding factors.

5.3.2 Multivariate Results
5.3.2.1 Individual questions
When we run the logistic regression model controlling for household and
individual characteristics, enumerators and village specific effects, our intervention
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variables insignificantly affect responses to sensitive questions. For example, Table 11
indicates that the impact of financial incentive, and framed question on responses to the
sensitive questions and we observe no significant effect of either treatments (Column 4,
row 1-14).
5.3.2.2 By question sensitivity
Table 12 reports the effect of financial incentive, and framed questions on the
responses to the less sensitive questions. The statistical estimate is conducted using OLS
regression controlling for household and individual characteristics, enumerator and
village specific effects. We find financial incentive has positive and significant impact
on responses to less sensitive questions, statistically significant at the five percent level
(Column 2, row 2).
3.2.3 By question type
We also examine the impact by grouping the sensitive question in four
socioeconomic domains. However, our result shows that none of the coefficients either
for financial incentive or framed question were significant, suggesting that financial
incentive and framed questions do not affect response

sensitive questions by

socioeconomic grouping (Table 13 & table 14).

5.4. Discussion and Conclusion

This study examines the effects of financial incentive, and the framing of survey
questions on the responses to sensitive survey questions. We conducted a randomized
field experiment among a large number of rural households selected from 32 village
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communities in Northern Ethiopia. We evaluate the effects of two different
interventions.
The first intervention consists of two types of financial incentive groups- the
high pay (ETB 15) intervention group and the low pay (ETB 5) intervention group. For
the second type of intervention, we prepare two types of survey questions –survey with
framed questions and survey with unframed questions.
We compare the response rate among those receiving high financial incentive
and low financial incentive; and among those who were interviewed using framed
survey questions and unframed survey questions. We also compare response by
grouping them into two sensitivity levels (less sensitive ones and more sensitive ones).
We further grouped the questions in to five socioeconomic domains (health, social
protection, loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household) to see if
responses differ by domain.
The result shows that high financial incentive improves response to the little
sensitive survey questions, but the survey with framed questions does not. Respondents
in the high pay category were more likely to provide more positive responses to the little
sensitive questions. However, providing survey incentives in the case of high sensitive
questions does not significantly affect responses. In respect to the socioeconomic
domains, both the financial incentive and the framing of questions do not matter.
Besides, the use of framed survey question does not significantly improve response for
sensitive questions in all the cases.
This study has a few limitations that should be addressed in the future research.
First, our financial incentive experiment has two experimental arms (high pay and low
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pay) and we suggest future research with no-pay third experimental arm. Second, our
results suggest that financial incentive may positively affect responses to less sensitive
questions. This positive effect can be emanated from two behavioral effects. First, it
could be that those who got high financial incentive are motivated or create a sense of
belongings to provide more positive responses to the sensitive questions. Second, it is
also possible that those in the low incentive group are disappointed and as a result, they
were not willing to cooperate and provide more positive responses to the sensitive
questions.
Overall, our findings suggest that the use of financial incentive may trigger the
respondents to provide more positive responses to little sensitive questions among a
representative sample of rural farmers in Northern Ethiopia. However, no relationship
between financial incentive and responses to high sensitive questions was found.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1
Summary statistics of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2015 (N=1,143)
Mean
S.D.
Min
E. Demographic characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
Age of household head (in years)
Years of education of household head
Size of household
F. Wealth and assets
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
Value of livestock (in Birr)
Value of productive assets (in Birr)
G. Numeracy level, risk attitude and trust level
Numeracy level
Risk aversion
General trust level

Max

0.54
47.25
2.80
5.32

0.50
13.46
4.60
2.12

0.00
18.00
0.00
1.00

1.00
99.00
19.00
12.00

2.41
5,689.7
562.3

1.98
6,752.8
1,126.0

0.25
0.0
0.0

18.00
50,540.0
20,445.0

1.39
6.21
2.45

1.12
3.13
1.01

0.00
1.00
1.00

3.00
10.00
5.00

Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Numeracy level is the average for the number of questions correctly answered. Risk attitude is constructed from the willingness
to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling and 10 completely willing). Community trust score is constructed
based on the respondent view if the most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5 do not trust
them). Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare.
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Table 2
Mean comparison by questionnaire type for the sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2015
Framed
Unframed
Difference
question
question
(1) – (2)
(N=572)
(N=571)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Demographic characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.53
0.54
-0.02 (0.03)
Age of household head (in years)
47.44
47.06
0.38 (0.80)
Years of education of household head
2.85
2.73
0.12 (0.27)
Size of household
5.25
5.38
-0.12 (0.12)
Wealth and assets
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
2.27
2.54
-0.26** (0.11)
Value of livestock (in Birr)
5,590.0
5,789.5
-199.5 (399.6)
Value of productive assets (in Birr)
517.5
607.1
-89.5 (66.6)
Numeracy level, risk attitude and trust level
Numeracy level
1.37
1.42
-0.04 (0.06)
Risk aversion
6.24
6.17
0.06 (0.19)
Community trust score
2.42
2.48
-0.05 (0.05)
Data source: Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Numeracy level is the average for the number of numeracy questions correctly answered. Risk attitude is constructed from the
willingness to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling and 10 completely willing). Community trust score is
constructed based on the respondent view if the most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5
do not trust them). Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are
robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively..
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Table 3
Mean comparison by financial incentive for the sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia in 2015
High pay
Low pay
Difference
(N=625)
(N=513)
(1) – (2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Demographic characteristics
Female household head (1=Yes; 0=No)
0.53
0.55
-0.02 (0.02)
Age of household head (in years)
47.13
47.34
-0.21 (0.80)
Years of education of household head
3.01
2.54
0.45*(0.27)
Size of household
5.35
5.28
0.06 (0.12)
Wealth and assets
Size of farmland (in tsimad)
2.41
2.37
0.02 (0.11)
Value of livestock (in Birr)
5,917.7
5,438.7
478.9(402.7)
Value of productive assets (in Birr)
561.0
566.7
-5.6(67.3)
Numeracy level, risk attitude and trust level
Numeracy level
1.41
1.38
0.03 (0.06)
Risk aversion
6.28
6.11
0.17 (0.19)
Community trust score
2.49
2.41
0.08 (0.05)
Data source: Author’s survey.
Note: Numeracy level is the average for the number of numeracy questions correctly answered. Risk attitude is constructed from the
willingness to take agricultural risks on 10 points scale (1=completely unwilling and 10 completely willing). Community trust score is
constructed based on the respondent view if the most people in this Kushet can be trusted using 5-point scale (1=fully trust them and 5
do not trust them). Size of farmland is measured in tsimad and 1 tsimad equals 0.25 hectare. Standard errors reported in parentheses are
robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively..
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Table 4
Breakdown of responses elicited from rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143)
Number of positive
Number of negative
List of questions
N
responses
responses
(1=Yes; 0=No)
Question 1*
1142
336
806
Question 2
1141
43
1098
Question 3*
1142
239
903
Question 4*
1140
166
974
Question 5
1141
27
1114
Question 6
1142
75
1067
Question 7*
1142
208
934
Question 8
1087
79
1008
Question 9
1141
93
1048
Question 10*
1134
156
978
Question 11*
894
123
771
Question 12*
1141
145
996
Question 13*
1141
113
1028
Question 14*
891
245
646
Question 15*
1099
124
975
Question 16
886
44
842
Question 17*
890
100
790
Question 18*
1081
475
606
Question 19
1137
93
1044
Question 20
1136
113
1023
Question 21*
1139
237
902
Question 22*
1140
214
926
Data Source: Author’s survey.
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Number of no
responses (Missing
or not answering)
1
2
1
3
2
2
1
56
2
9
249
2
2
252
44
257
253
62
6
7
4
3

Table 5
Percentage of positive responses eliciting from rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143)
Percentage of positive responses
List of questions
Full sample
Framed question Unframed
High
Low
(1=Yes; 0=No)
question
Question 1
0.294
0.293
0.294
0.308
Question 3
0.209
0.209
0.207
0.217
Question 4
0.146
0.157
0.133
0.130
Question 7
0.182
0.192
0.170
0.185
Question 10
0.138
0.136
0.137
0.119
Question 11
0.138
0.132
0.141
0.144
Question 12
0.127
0.123
0.131
0.134
Question 13
0.099
0.096
0.101
0.086
Question 14
0.275
0.255
0.293
0.299
Question 15
0.113
0.114
0.111
0.117
Question 17
0.112
0.105
0.118
0.107
Question 18
0.439
0.454
0.422
0.464
Question 21
0.208
0.213
0.201
0.218
Question 22
0.188
0.192
0.181
0.193
Data Source: Author’s survey.
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0.282
0.196
0.163
0.175
0.158
0.125
0.115
0.111
0.245
0.107
0.116
0.410
0.197
0.182

Table 6
Percentage of positive responses elicited from rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143)
Percentage of positive responses
List of questions
Whole sample
Framed and High Framed and Low Unframed and High
Unframed and Low
(1=Yes; 0=No)
Question 1
0.294
0.282
0.305
0.318
0.258
Question 3
0.209
0.230
0.183
0.205
0.211
Question 4
0.146
0.133
0.183
0.126
0.143
Question 7
0.182
0.185
0.198
0.186
0.151
Question 10
0.138
0.103
0.167
0.132
0.147
Question 11
0.138
0.097
0.110
0.129
0.083
Question 12
0.127
0.136
0.106
0.132
0.123
Question 13
0.099
0.084
0.106
0.088
0.115
Question 14
0.275
0.185
0.206
0.271
0.187
Question 15
0.113
0.113
0.106
0.113
0.099
Question 17
0.112
0.068
0.095
0.094
0.091
Question 18
0.439
0.470
0.381
0.410
0.394
Question 21
0.208
0.227
0.198
0.208
0.195
Question 22
0.188
0.201
0.183
0.186
0.179
Data Source: Author’s survey.
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Table 7
Mean comparison of response frequencies by financial incentive and framed question for a sample of rural households in Northern
Ethiopia (N=1,143)
Percentage of positive responses
List of questions
High pay
Low pay
Difference
Framed
Unframed
Difference
(1=Yes; 0=No)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
Question 1
0.315
0.282
0.033 (0.027)
0.292
0.294
-0.001 (0.026)
Question 3
0.243
0.196
0.046* (0.025)
0.210
0.207
0.003 (0.023)
Question 4
0.117
0.162
-0.045* (0.021)
0.156
0.138
0.022 (0.020)
Question 7
0.183
0.175
0.007 (0.022)
0.192
0.170
0.022 (0.021)
Question 10
0.133
0.157
-0.023 (0.021)
0.137
0.137
0.000(0.018)
Question 11
0.126
0.099
0.027 (0.027)
0.119
0.127
-0.008 (0.023)
Question 12
0.117
0.115
0.001 (0.018)
0.121
0.131
-0.010 (0.018)
Question 13
0.093
0.111
-0.017 (0.018)
0.094
0.101
-0.007 (0.016)
Question 14
0.329
0.241
0.087** (0.035) 0.268
0.305
-0.036 (0.034)
Question 15
0.108
0.108
0.000 (0.019)
0.117
0.113
0.003 (0.018)
Question 17
0.090
0.106
-0.015 (0.022)
0.089
0.108
-0.019 (0.022)
Question 18
0.483
0.410
0.073** (0.032) 0.454
0.415
0.039 (0.029)
Question 21
0.234
0.197
0.037 (0.024)
0.209
0.201
0.008 (0.0220
Question 22
0.209
0.181
0.027 (0.024)
0.191
0.181
0.010 (0.022)
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors for paired t-test are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 8
Mean comparison of response frequencies by framed question for a sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143)
Percentage of positive responses
List of questions
High and
High and
Difference
Low and Framed Low and
Difference
(1=Yes; 0=No)
Framed
Unframed
Unframed
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
Question 1
0.139
0.161
-0.022 (0.021)
0.155
0.126
0.029 (0.023)
Question 3
0.113
0.104
0.009 (0.018)
0.093
0103
-0.009 (0.019)
Question 4
0.065
0.064
0.001 (0.014)
0.093
0.070
0.023 (0.017)
Question 7
0.091
0.094
-0.003 (0.017)
0.101
0.074
0.027 (0.018)
Question 10
0.051
0.067
-0.016 (0.013)
0.085
0.072
0.013 (0.017)
Question 11
0.048
0.065
-0.017 (0.013)
0.056
0.040
0.015 (0.013)
Question 12
0.067
0.067
0.000 (0.014)
0.054
0.060
-0.005 (0.014)
Question 13
0.041
0.044
-0.003 (0.011)
0.054
0.056
-0.001 (0.014)
Question 14
0.091
0.137
-0.046** (0.019)
0.105
0.091
0.013 (0.019)
Question 15
0.056
0.057
-0.001 (0.013)
0.054
0.048
0.005 (0.014)
Question 17
0.033
0.048
-0.014 (0.011)
0.048
0.044
0.003 (0.013)
Question 18
0.232
0.208
0.024 (0.026)
0.194
0.192
0.001 (0.027)
Question 21
0.112
0.105
0.006 (0.018)
0.101
0.095
0.005 (0.019)
Question 22
0.099
0.094
0.004 (0.017)
0.093
0.087
0.005 (0.018)
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors for paired t-test are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 9
Mean comparison of response frequencies by financial incentive for a sample of rural households in Northern Ethiopia (N=1,143)
Percentage of positive responses
List of questions
Framed and
Framed and
Difference
Unframed and
Unframed and
Difference
(1=Yes; 0=No)
High
Low
High
Low
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
(1)
(2)
(1) – (2)
Question 1
0.152
0.128
0.024 (0.021)
0.177
0.114
0.063***(0.022)
Question 3
0.120
0.077
0.043***(0.017) 0.114
0.093
0.021 (0.019)
Question 4
0.072
0.077
-0.004 (0.015)
0.070
0.063
0.007 (0.015)
Question 7
0.102
0.083
0.019 (0.017)
0.103
0.066
0.036** (0.017)
Question 10
0.056
0.070
-0.014 (0.014)
0.073
0.065
0.008 (0.015)
Question 11
0.052
0.046
0.006 (0.012)
0.072
0.036
0.035***(0.013)
Question 12
0.080
0.044
0.035***(0.014) 0.073
0.054
0.019 (0.015)
Question 13
0.044
0.044
0.000 (0.012)
0.049
0.051
-0.001 (0.013)
Question 14
0.093
0.086
0.006 (0.016)
0.151
0.082
0.068***(0.020)
Question 15
0.060
0.044
0.016 (0.013)
0.063
0.044
0.019 (0.013)
Question 17
0.036
0.040
-0.003 (0.011)
0.052
0.040
0.012 (0.012)
Question 18
0.250
0.160
0.089***(0.025) 0.228
0.174
0.054** (0.026)
Question 21
0.117
0.083
0.033** (0.017) 0.116
0.086
0.029 (0.018)
Question 22
0.104
0.077
0.027* (0.017)
0.103
0.079
0.024 (0.017)
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Standard errors for paired t-test are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 10
Effects of framed question and financial incentive on survey response: Logit probability estimate controlling for enumerator and
village dummy
List of questions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Framed
High pay (1=ETB15;
(1=Yes; 0=No)
N
Framed * High pay
(1=long; 0=short
0=ETB5)
Question 1
1093
0.150 (0.271)
0.188 (0.203)
-0.302 (0.263)
Question 3
974
-0.348 (0.329)
-0.297 (0.287)
0.640 (0.394)
Question 4
920
0.262 (0.277)
-0.297 (0.290)
-0.114 (0.448)
Question 7
735
0.309 (0.279)
0.263 (0.324)
-0.259 (0.358)
Question 10
1130
-0.260 (0.424)
-0.508 (0.5470
-0.010 (0.669)
Question 11
670
0.397 (0.373)
0.540 (0.356)
-0.943*(0.439)
Question 12
1101
-0.232 (0.386)
0.148 (0.394)
0.059 (0.498)
Question 13
626
-0.519 (0.387)
-0.532 (0.435)
0.651 (0.514)
Question 14
832
0.179 (0.299)
0.488 (0.306)
-0.680 (0.417)
Question 15
593
-0.161 (0.344)
0.137 (0.464)
0.361 (0.583)
Question 17
880
-0.026 (0.358)
-0.028 (0.376)
-0.144 (0.539)
Question 18
1033
-0.162 (0.252)
-0.039 (0.223)
0.535 (0.305)
Question 21
1042
0.068 (0.324)
0.214 (0.255)
0.002 (0.430)
Question 22
987
0.079 (0.334)
0.097 (0.274)
-0.037 (0.421)
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at
the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 11
Effects of framed question and financial incentive on survey response: Logit probability estimate controlling for household &
individual characteristics, enumerator and village dummy
List of questions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Framed
High pay (1=ETB15;
(1=Yes; 0=No)
N
Framed * High pay
(1=long; 0=short
0=ETB5)
Question 1
971
0.269 (0.311)
0.199 (0.237)
-0.388 (0.343)
Question 3
856
-0.384 (0.382)
-0.340 (0.346)
0.769 (0.475)
Question 4
803
0.386 (0.370)
-0.238 (0.344)
-0.300 (0.560)
Question 7
615
0.283 (0.354)
0.273 (0.373)
-0.173 (0.409)
Question 10
1002
-0.082 (0.563)
-0.334 (0.638)
-0.236 (0.793)
Question 11
595
0.383 (0.527)
0.346 (0.448)
-0.778 (0.569)
Question 12
973
-0.529 (0.432)
-0.024 (0.420)
0.411 (0.517)
Question 13
490
-0.030 (0.509)
-0202 (0.488)
0.301 (0.568)
Question 14
733
0.065 (0.327)
0.402 (0.335)
-0.677 (0.469)
Question 15
485
-0.576 (0.463)
-0.109 (0.554)
0.919 (0.699)
Question 17
797
-0.332 (0.432)
-0.014 (0.451)
0.206 (0.566)
Question 18
869
-0.336 (0.314)
-0.018 (0.272)
0.644 (0.411)
Question 21
922
-0.053 (0.393)
0.017 (0.278)
0.182 (0.487)
Question 22
922
-0.053 (0.393)
0.017 (0.278)
0.182 (0.487)
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust score. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level
respectively.
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Table 12
Effects of framed question and financial incentive by level of question sensitivity: OLS estimate
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Response to less
Response to less
Response to high
Response to high
sensitive questions
sensitive questions
sensitive questions
sensitive questions
Framed questionnaire (1=framed
questions; 0=unframed)

0.099 (0.118)

0.022 (0.113)

-0.024 (0.112)

-0.048 (0.126)

High pay (1=ETB15; 0=ETB5)

0.281** (0.100)

0.220** (0.105)

-0.024 (0.119)

-0.059 (0.127)

Framed questionnaire*high pay

-0.220 (0.135)

-0.123 (0.1350

0.005 (0.146)

0.097 (0.160)

Household and individual
No
Yes
No
Yes
characteristics
Enumerator dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observation (N)
764
689
865
785
Adjusted R-square
0.362
0.381
0.475
0.482
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust score. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level
respectively.
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Table 13
Effects of framed question and financial incentive by question type (Socio-economic domains): OLS estimate
(5)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Response to
Response to Response to loan
Response to health
Response to public gender & intra
social protection
& finance
related questions
good questions household related
related questions related questions
questions
Framed questionnaire (1=framed
questions; 0=unframed)

0.053 (0.049)

-0.009 (0.061)

-0.020 (0.062)

0.020 (0.041)

0.033 (0.062)

High pay (1=ETB15; 0=ETB5)

0.048 (0.0430

0.000 (0.055)

-0.080 (0.059)

0.058 (0.040)

0.094 (0.065)

Framed questionnaire*high pay

-0.068 (0.053)

0.015 (0.079)

0.067 (0.086)

-0.075 (0.057)

-0.141 (0.091)

Household and individual
No
No
No
No
No
characteristics
Enumerator dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observation (N)
1138
1133
1128
890
852
Adjusted R-square
0.281
0.381
0.396
0.417
0.232
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust scorel. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 14
Effects of framed question and financial incentive by question type (Socio-economic domains): OLS estimate
(5)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Response to social Response to loan Response to Response to gender
Response to health
protection related
& finance
public good
& intra household
related questions
questions
related questions
questions
related questions
Framed
questionnaire
questions; 0=unframed)

(1=framed

0.061 (0.054)

-0.006 (0.070)

-0.017 (0.072)

-0.004 (0.041)

-0.039 (0.064)

High pay (1=ETB15; 0=ETB5)

0.045 (0.042)

-0.010 (0.059)

-0.083 (0.070)

0.018 (0.039)

0.061 (0.072)

Framed questionnaire*high pay

-0.058 (0.059)

0.030 (0.089)

0.064 (0.099)

-0.021 (0.0570

-0.058 (0.100)

Household and individual
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
characteristics
Enumerator dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Village dummy
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observation (N)
1138
1002
1000
799
773
Adjusted R-square
0.281
0.393
0.412
0.410
0.253
Data Source: Author’s survey.
Note: Household characteristics includes female household head (1=Yes; 0=No), age of household head, years of education of
household head, size of household, size of farmland, numeracy level, risk aversion and community trust score. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the village level are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Random sample of Households
N=1,143

Households receive
framed questions
N=572

High pay incentive
households
N=308

Households receive
unframed questions
N=571

High pay incentive
households
N=317

Low pay incentive
households
N=262

Figure 1 Profile of the randomized experiment study
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Low pay incentive
households
N=251

Appendix

Appendix 1
Survey with unframed questions

Questions (Enumerators must read these questions exactly as written. Do not
change or shorten the questions)
Please use the following codes: 1=Yes; 2=No; -88=Not applicable

1. Have you ever shaken hands with your friends without washing your hands after
going to the toilet?(Less sensitive; Health)*

2. Have you ever eaten anything without washing your hands after going to the
toilet? (Dropped)

3. Have you ever refused a loan request from a close friend or relative even though
you have the money in hand? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)*

4. Have you ever intentionally delayed paying back a loan to a close friend or
relative even though you have the money for the repayment? (More sensitive;
Loan and finance)*

5. If there is a woman giving birth, do you prefer to take her to traditional birth
attendants? (Dropped)
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6. Do you agree that it is not worthy to send female child to school? (Dropped)

7. Have you ever knowingly stayed close to others when you are being infected
with communicable diseases? (More sensitive; Health)*

8. Have you ever under reported the age of your children in order to get such
benefits? (Dropped)

9. Have you ever knowingly used public or private transportation without paying
for the service? (Dropped)

10. As a buyer, have you ever received too much change from some sellers and
knowingly kept it? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)*

11. Have you ever intentionally graze your cattle, sheep or goats in these publicly
restricted areas? (Less sensitive; Common pool)*

12. Have you ever collected wood illegally from publicly restricted forest? (More
sensitive; Common pool)*

13. Have you ever pretended to be sick in order to get exemptions from PSNP or
from other public works? (More sensitive; Social protection)*

14. For female respondents: Have your husband ever shouted loudly at you or even
physically beaten you up? (Less sensitive; Gender and intra household)*
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For male respondents: Have you ever shouted loudly at your wife or even
physically beaten your wife up?

15. Have you ever under-declared the sales value to your partners (or other
household members) so that you can use the money for your own personal
consumption? (More sensitive; Gender and intra household)*

16. For female respondents: Have you ever taken money out of your husband’s
pocket without informing him? (Dropped)

For male respondents: Have you ever taken money out of your wife’s pocket
(Muday) without informing her?

17. For female respondents: Have you ever taken grain out of the household grain
storage for sale without informing your husband and then use the money for
personal or household consumption? (More sensitive; Gender and intra
household)*

For male respondents: Have you ever taken grain out of the household grain
storage for sale without informing your wife and then use the money for personal
consumption?

205

18. For Orthodox Christians or Muslims: Have you ever eaten any food during the
specified fasting period (hour) or skipped fasting for one day? (Less sensitive;
Religion)*

For others (no or other religion): Just tick here _________

19. For Orthodox Christians: Have you ever eaten any meat, egg, milk and milk
products during the fasting period? (Dropped)

For Muslims: Have you ever prayed less than five times a day?

For others (no or other religion): Just tick here _________

20. Do you agree that some people in this village pay bribes to village leader in order
to get access to irrigation water, agricultural package incentives, government
transfers, or other NGO program benefits? (Dropped)

21. Do you agree that some people in this village concealed some part of their wealth
in order to join the PSNP program? (Less sensitive; Social protection)*

22. Do you agree that some people in this village underreported their wealth in order
to stay longer in the PSNP program? (Less sensitive; Social protection)*
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Appendix 2
Survey with framed questions

Questions (Enumerators must read these questions exactly as written. Do not
change or shorten the questions)
Please use the following codes: 1=Yes; 2=No; -88=Not applicable

1. Here is something that has been said about some people in this area. They don’t
always wash their hands after going to the toilet. Sometimes, they even shake
hands with friends without washing their hands. Have you ever shaken hands
with your friends without washing your hands after going to the toilet? (Less
sensitive; Health)*
2. Here is something that has been said about some people in this area. They don’t
always wash their hands after going to the toilet. Sometimes, they even eat food
without washing their hands. Have you ever eaten anything without washing your
hands after going to the toilet? (Dropped)

3. Some people fear that others may not repay loans on time or repay loans at all.
When they get a loan request from a close friend or relative, they refuse the
request and pretend as if they have no money for lending. Have you ever refused
a loan request from a close friend or relative even though you have the money in
hand? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)*

4. Sometimes people delayed paying back the loan they took from a close friend or
relative but keep the money for personal use for additional days. Have you ever
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intentionally delayed paying back a loan to a close friend or relative even though
you have the money for the repayment? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)*

5. Some people prefer to take a pregnant woman to traditional birth attendant for
giving birth due to convenience, cost and tradition. If there is a woman giving
birth, do you prefer to take her to traditional birth attendants? (Dropped)
6. Some families prefer not to send their girls to school. Some of them traditionally
perceive that it is not worthy sending girls to school. It is also believed that
sending girls to school may spoil their behavior. Do you agree that it is not
worthy to send female child to school? (Dropped)

7. Some people do not like to keep good physical distances from others when being
infected with communicable diseases such as the flu or cold. Have you ever
knowingly stayed close to others when you are being infected with
communicable diseases? (More sensitive; Health)*

8. Some households underreport the age of their children in order to get child
benefits from NGOs and the government or to get free transportation for their
children. Have you ever under reported the age of your children in order to get
such benefits? (Dropped)

9. Sometimes people knowingly use public or private transportations without
paying for the service. They may come up with cash in big denominations so that
they are exempted from paying due to the lack of change. Or they may take
advantages of the driver’s assistant (Woyala) who forgets to collect the fare.
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Have you ever knowingly used public or private transportation without paying
for the service? (Dropped)

10. Sellers sometimes do not carefully count change for buyers and may give extra
change to buyers. When this happens, some buyers intentionally keep the extra
change. As a buyer, have you ever received too much change from some sellers
and knowingly kept it? (More sensitive; Loan and finance)*

11. Population in the area is increasing and there is not enough land for grazing. As
such, some people send their cattle, sheep or goats intentionally to public areas
that restrict grazing activities. Have you ever intentionally graze your cattle,
sheep or goats in these publicly restricted areas? (Less sensitive; Common pool)*

12. Some years ago, people in this area were able to collect wood from any forest for
cooking, building houses, and for other household activities. This time, the
government has restricted some areas in order to preserve the forest. However,
some people still illegally collect wood from publicly restricted forest because of
the high prices of wood and charcoal. Have you ever collected wood illegally
from publicly restricted forest? (More sensitive; Common pool)*

13. During the busy period of the agricultural season, some farmers in this area
pretend to be sick in order to get exemptions from the PSNP or from other public
works. Have you ever pretended to be sick in order to get exemptions from PSNP
or from other public works? (More sensitive; Social protection)*
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14. For female respondents: Some husbands have bad temper and can feel very angry
or irritated with their wives. They may shout loudly at their wives or even
physically beat up their wives. Have your husband ever shouted loudly at you or
even physically beaten you up? (Less sensitive; Gender and intra household)*

For male respondents: Some husbands have bad temper and can feel very angry
or irritated with their wives. They may shout loudly at their wives or even
physically beat up their wives. Have you ever shouted loudly at your wife or even
physically beaten your wife up?

15. Some husbands or wives in this area do not report the exact sales value of their
produce to their partners. They may pretend that part of the produce for sale was
stolen or lost and then use the extra money for their personal consumption. Have
you ever under-declared the sales value to your partners (or other household
members) so that you can use the money for your own personal consumption?
(More sensitive; Gender and intra household)*

16. For female respondents: As you may know, sometimes husbands in this area do
not provide enough money to their wives for personal or household consumption.
In some cases, the wives need to take money out of their husbands’ pocket
without informing them. Have you ever taken money out of your husband’s
pocket without informing him? (Dropped)

For male respondents: As you may know, sometimes men need extra money for
going out with friends and for drinking alcohol (Sewa, Tej, Areki or Beer).
210

However, they may not have enough money and choose to take money out of
their spouse’s pocket (Muday). Have you ever taken money out of your wife’s
pocket (Muday) without informing her?

17. For female respondents: Related to the above question, sometimes wives take
grain out of the household’s grain storage for sale without informing their
husbands and use the money for personal or household consumption. Have you
ever taken grain out of the household grain storage for sale without informing
your husband and then use the money for personal or household consumption?
(More sensitive; Gender and intra household)*

For male respondents: Related to the above question, sometimes men take grain
out of the household’s grain storage for sale without informing their wife and use
the money for going out with friends or for drinking alcohol (Sewa, Tej, Areki or
Beer). Have you ever taken grain out of the household grain storage for sale
without informing your wife and then use the money for personal consumption?

18. Some Orthodox Christians or Muslims do not strictly follow the fasting rules of
their religion. For example, some may break fasting during the specified period
(hour) and some may even totally skip fasting. Have you ever eaten any food
during the specified fasting period (hour) or skipped fasting for one day? (Less
sensitive; Religion)*

For others (no or other religions): Just tick here _________
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19. For Orthodox Christians: In the fasting period, followers should not consume
meat, egg, milk and milk products. However, some followers still sometimes eat
some of these foods and pretend as if they are strictly doing fasting. Have you
ever eaten meat, egg, milk and milk products during the fasting period?
(Dropped)

For Muslims: There are praying rules for Muslims. Specifically, Muslims should
practice Salat but some followers do not actually pray five times a day. Have you
ever prayed less than five times a day?

For others (no or other religions): Just tick here _________

20. Some people pay bribes to their village leaders in order to get irrigation water
access or extra water rations. Some need to pay bribes to get agricultural package
incentives, government transfers, or other NGO program benefits. Some people
pay bribes because they see others are doing it and they feel that it is ok if others
are doing it. Do you agree that some people in this village pay bribes to village
leader in order to get access to irrigation water, agricultural package incentives,
government transfers, or other NGO program benefits? (Dropped)

21. The PSNP program may not be able to identify households who correctly report
their wealth from those who underreport their wealth. Many households report
their wealth correctly but some households do not. Some underreport their wealth
in order to join PSNP program. Do you agree that some people in this village
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concealed some part of their wealth in order to join the PSNP program? (Less
sensitive; Social protection)*

22. Some people in this area may find it difficult for them to accumulate enough
wealth for graduation from the PSNP in some specific periods. They will then
underreport their wealth in order to stay longer in the PSNP program. Do you
agree that some people in this village underreported their wealth in order to stay
longer in the PSNP program? (Less sensitive; Social protection)*
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CHAPTER 6

6.1 General Conclusions
This dissertation contains four empirical studies on related topics in
development economics. The four studies are all randomized field experiments and
all of them use original data obtained from rural households in Northern Ethiopia for
empirical analysis.
In the first study, we analyze an impact evaluation of a weather index
insurance program that is offered commercially among rural households in northern
Ethiopia. The study makes two main contributions to the existing empirical research
on the impacts of weather index insurance. The first contribution of this study is, it
investigates the impact of weather index insurance when the insurance is
commercialized and is offered to rural households without subsidy. Second, our
study provides an empirical evidence on the impact of weather index insurance when
the insurance is offered commercially to rural households for a number of
consecutive years.
Our results is consistent with the story that rainfall shock experience reduces
agricultural investment (past rainfall shock experience deteriorates savings and also
it is a barrier to the adoption of agricultural technologies like chemical fertilizer),
weather index insurance (along with ex-ante technology adoption behavioral change)
helps better management of agricultural investment and insurance compensation
(ex-post) also help to maintain farmers’ investment on risky agricultural inputs such
as chemical fertilizer.
In general, our results provide the following sets of conclusions. The first one
is that carefully designed and implemented weather index insurance can indeed
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improve agricultural investment, yield and finance. Second, from a development
point of view, our result suggests that variability of weather coupled with incomplete
insurance markets may hinder agricultural development in developing countries. As
such, an introduction of innovative weather index insurance in developing countries
may play a significant role in boosting investments, savings and economic growth.
The second essay deals with the effects of weather index insurance on rural
households' spending on children's education. Specifically, this essay examines
whether insured households can better pay for their children's education expenses
due to better risk management. It also reports whether insured households can
maintain their children's education expenses when they experienced rainfall shocks.
To examine the impacts, we conduct a randomized control trial (RCT) that has been
conducted by HARITA research group on a sample of 8 villages and 400 households
in Northern Ethiopia in 2010.
The findings report that WII is relevant in determining household school
expenses because insured households are effectively protected from the rainfall
shock, which often induces them to reduce educational expenses. In addition,
education expenditure is higher for rural households with WII than those without the
insurance. Further, we also find that rainfall shocks have negative effects on
household education expenses. Rainfall shock (proxied in our analysis by the
severity of crop failure due to rainfall shock) shows negative effects on household
education expenses.
These results are consistent with theoretical notion on the role of WII in
reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses. It was shown that
weather index insurance affects education expenses in two ways: WII helps
households earn higher income due its effect on farm investment, yield and
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agricultural income (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014), in turn, increasing
expenses including investment on education. Second, as noted in the literature, WII
is one of the risk coping strategies that help households to smooth consumption
during adverse shocks. Therefore, insurance policy holders are less likely to reduce
school expenses compared to non-buyers. Overall, our results are consistent with the
story that rainfall shock experience reduces education expenses, weather index
insurance helps better management of educational investment and insurance
compensation also help to maintain education investment.
Finally, having shown that the introduction of weather index insurance can
play a role in reducing the impacts of rainfall shocks on education expenses and
given the importance of such investment in human capital formation, this implies that
policies aimed at insuring rural households against rainfall shocks may lead to an
improvement in households’ educational investment.
The third essay presents the results of a randomized field experiment
conducted with a large number of rural farmers randomly selected from Northern
Ethiopia. This research contributes to the growing literature on the aggregation and
disaggregation of risk preference by analyzing whether risk preference among poor
people with low level of education can be framed by interactions among peers. It also
examines if a prior structural manifestation of individual risk preference has an effect
on the aggregation of individual risk preferences in small groups.
We find evidence that supports the following four main conclusions. First,
our findings on the pure risk preference differential among individuals and groups
shows that on average the three person groups are more risk averse than individuals.
This finding is in line with the existing empirical literature on risk preference
differential between individuals and a small member groups (Shupp & Williams
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2008; Baker et al., 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; He et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2012).
Two basic differences between our findings and the existing literature are worth
mentioning, however. First, our subjects (who are mainly poor farmers) in general
are more risk averse than the subjects employed in the other studies (mainly students).
Second, the results of other studies suggest that groups are more risk averse than
individuals in low winning percentages, but groups tend to be less risk averse in the
highest winning percentages. Our result, however, shows that groups are more risk
averse on both low and high winning percentages.
Second, the results indicate that risk preference decisions made in a group
influence the subsequent individual risk preference. Specifically, experiencing risk
preference exercise in small groups and prior knowledge of risk preference in small
groups has a significant effect on the subsequent individual risk preference. It means
that individuals who participated in group decisions on risk and uncertainty will
bring forward the risk preference of the group back to their individual risk preference.
The economic implication of this result is quite large. Many economic decisions
made collectively by small groups under risks and uncertainties have to be further
managed by or executed by only individuals of the groups and our findings portrays
that prior communications, knowledge, and decision making by small groups under
risk and uncertainties can subsequently affect individual decisions.
Third, we also find that risk preference decisions made individually does not
significantly influence the subsequent group risk preference. Specifically, on average
groups decisions are not significantly affected by the fact that participants had prior
knowledge and decision making on individual risk preference. This result is very
similar to the findings in Shupp & Williams (2008). Finally, we observe results
obtained from two-arm one-stage research design are qualitatively similar as results
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obtained from one-arm two-stage research design. This tells us, the structural
manifestation of individual risk preference has no significant effects on the
aggregation of individual risk preference in small groups. Thus, methodologically the
use of one arm two phases or two arms one phase approaches for risk aggregation
does not matter.
In the final essay, we present the results of a randomized field experiment
conducted with a large number of rural households randomly selected from Northern
Ethiopia. The essay explores the effects of financial incentive and the framing of
survey questions on the responses to survey questions of sensitive nature. There are
two interventions in this study. The first intervention consists of two types of
financial incentive groups- the high pay (ETB 15) intervention group and the low pay
(ETB 5) intervention group. For the second type of intervention, we prepare two
types of survey questions –survey with framed questions and survey with unframed
questions.
Then, we compare the response rate among those receiving high financial
incentive and low financial incentive; and among those who were interviewed using
framed survey questions and unframed survey questions. We also compare response
by grouping them into two sensitivity levels (less sensitive ones and more sensitive
ones). We further grouped the questions in to five socioeconomic domains (health,
social protection, loan and finance, common pool and gender and intra household) to
see if responses differ by domain.
The result shows that high financial incentive improves response to the little
sensitive survey questions, but the survey with framed questions does not.
Respondents in the high pay category were more likely to provide more positive
responses to the little sensitive questions. However, providing survey incentives in
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the case of high sensitive questions does not significantly affect responses. In respect
to the socioeconomic domains, both the financial incentive and the framing of
questions do not matter. Besides, the use of framed survey question does not
significantly improve response for sensitive questions in all the cases. Overall, our
findings suggest that the use of financial incentive triggers respondents to provide
more positive responses to little sensitive questions among a representative sample of
rural farmers in Northern Ethiopia. However, no relationship between financial
incentive and responses to high sensitive questions was found.
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